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Preface
"Finance is at the core of the development process. [...] E¢ cient, well-functioning -
nancial systems are crucial in channeling funds to the most productive uses and in
allocating risks to those who can best bear them, thus boosting economic growth, im-
proving opportunities and income distribution, and reducing poverty. [...] Lack of access
to nance is often the critical mechanism behind both persistent income inequality and
slow economic growth. Hence nancial sector reforms that promote broader access to
nancial services should be at the core of the development agenda."1
This is how the World Bank Report "Finance for All" (2008) highlights well-
functioning nancial systems and access to nance as crucial factors for development.
Apart from sound nancial institutions and prudential regulation, the report focuses,
rst, on openness along with increased competition and, second, on micronance as
two means to enhance access to nance and to promote nancial development. With
respect to the rst point, a major role is attributed to the entry of foreign banks which
bring capital, technology, and know-how. Even if foreign banks were to concentrate on
lending to rather large and transparent rms, overall empirical evidence suggests that
foreign bank entry improves access to nance, since domestic banks - as a result of
stronger competition - are driven to serve small and medium enterprises. Second, the
report discusses the role of micronance programs. Access to microloans contributes to
growth and development by unleashing the productive potential of the unbanked poor
who otherwise would have no means to realize their projects and become entrepreneurs.
In this thesis, we focus on precisely these two drivers of nancial development. More
specically, we analyze the role and the incentives of banks in the process of nancial
market liberalization and the market for micronance. In the rst chapter, we examine
the incentives of multinational banks to expand abroad. We investigate in detail how
specic characteristics of local banking markets a¤ect a multinational banks choice of
1World Bank (2008, p. 17,21)
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entry mode. The second chapter addresses the impact of nancial market liberalization
on host countries. We study, in particular, how local banks are a¤ected by enhanced
competition and spillovers from foreign banks. Finally, in the last chapter, we discuss
di¤erent lending strategies of micronance institutions. More precisely, we analyze a
micronance institutions incentives to o¤er group or individual loans.
Over the last decade, banking markets in many developing and emerging markets
have been liberalized on a large scale. In 2006, in roughly 40 percent of all developing
countries, more than 50 percent of banks were foreign owned, up from just around 15
percent in 1995. From 1995 to 2006, the number of foreign banks rose by 173 percent
in Europe and Central Asia, by 100 percent in South Asia, and by 66 percent in the
Middle East and Northern Africa. Most striking has been the increase in Eastern
Europe. In countries such as Albania, Estonia, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia, more
than 80 percent of banks are now foreign owned (Claessens et al. (2008)).
This enormous upheaval of banking markets gives rise to numerous interesting ques-
tions concerning both the role of multinational banks expanding abroad and the incen-
tives of local banks as how to react to foreign entry. What determines a multinational
banks decision to grant cross border loans or to access a new market via a nancial
foreign direct investment? How do the development and the size of the local banking
market a¤ect this decision? How do a banks incentives to expand abroad depend on its
own e¢ ciency? Do increased competition and spillovers from foreign to domestic banks
prompt local banks to improve on their e¢ ciency? What are the e¤ects of banking
market liberalization on social welfare?
We analyze the incentives of multinational banks to enter new markets in chapter
1. We set up a model of bank competition with banks di¤ering in screening e¢ ciencies.
Banks may choose to grant cross border loans or to seek access to a new market via
greeneld or acquisition entry. Foreign banks enjoy better renancing conditions and
are more e¢ cient in screening borrowers than their local competitors. However, apart
from entry costs, foreign banks may encounter a disadvantage relative to domestic
banks, in so far that the latter hold soft information on borrowers due to prior lending
relationships.
Our model combines two related strands of literature, namely trade theory and
industrial organization literature. In trade theory, the decision between exports and
foreign direct investments is studied, analogous to the trade-o¤ between cross border
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lending and nancial foreign direct investments. Papers in trade theory typically build
on monopolistic competition between rms. We depart from this approach in that
banks in our model compete in prices which we consider a more appropriate form of
competition in the banking sector. Furthermore, instead of labor productivity we rely
on a banks screening e¢ ciency as the central indicator of its productivity since it
determines the quality of its credit portfolio.
In industrial organization literature, the trade-o¤ between greeneld and acquisi-
tion entry is addressed. A greeneld entrant is generally presumed to produce at lower
marginal costs than domestic rms. This is motivated by the foreign rms superior
production technology of which it can take full advantage when building its own pro-
duction facilities from scratch. At the same time, however, this implies huge xed
market entry costs. In contrast, the acquisition of a local rm involves restructuring
costs and constrains the foreign rm to the use of the targets inferior production facil-
ities which may raise the foreign rms marginal costs above those of domestic rms.
We contribute to this literature in that we account for a key feature of banking, namely
the importance of access to soft information about borrowers. We argue that the for-
eign bankslack of access to soft information may imply the reversal of the pattern of
marginal costs described above. E¤ectively, due to problems of collecting soft infor-
mation in case of de novo investment, a foreign bank may nd itself at a disadvantage
relative to local banks. Instead, the acquisition of a local bank grants access to exactly
this information and, in combination with better screening skills, allows the foreign
bank to operate at lower marginal costs than domestic banks.
Our analysis shows that the entry mode pattern of banks depends on their e¢ ciency
in screening potential borrowers. If rather ine¢ cient in screening borrowers, a bank
chooses not to expand abroad. With increasing e¢ ciency, cross border lending becomes
feasible. In contrast to the typical ndings in the industrial organization literature, we
demonstrate that still more e¢ cient banks opt for de novo investment whereas the
most e¢ cient banks favor the acquisition of a local bank. Moreover, in less developed
host banking markets, a wider range of foreign banks opt for cross border lending and
acquisition entry. In contrast, the scope for de novo investment augments in more
developed banking markets. Interestingly, in larger host banking markets, a wider
range of foreign banks prefer the acquisition of a local bank while de novo investment
loses in attractiveness.
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In chapter 2, we turn to the impact of banking market liberalization on host coun-
tries.2 We consider two channels through which foreign banks may a¤ect the local
banking market. First, competition intensies owing to the higher e¢ ciency of entrant
banks and - if entry occurs via de novo investment - a rise in the number of banks.
Second, due to spillover e¤ects, domestic banks may learn from their new competitors
and improve on their screening skills. In that we account for spillovers and, even more
so, their interaction with competition e¤ects, we add to the scarce theoretical literature
on foreign bank entry.
In our model of bank competition, foreign banks more e¢ ciently screen borrowers
than their local competitors. Foreign banks expand via de novo investment or via the
acquisition of a local bank. To a certain extent, spillover e¤ects enhance the local banks
screening e¢ ciency. However, domestic banks must further invest in their screening
technology in order to attain the e¢ ciency level of foreign banks.
Our analysis shows that domestic banks invest less in better screening skills the
larger spillovers and competition are. Domestic banksincentives to improve on their
screening e¢ ciency are higher if foreign bank entry occurs via acquisition rather than
through de novo investment. We nd that the impact of foreign bank entry on so-
cial welfare in the host country is determined by the competitive environment of the
host banking market, a second indicator of competition in our model. Interestingly,
greeneld entry and, thus, more competitors are more likely to correlate with positive
welfare e¤ects the more competitive the market environment, whereas spillovers are
less likely to have positive welfare e¤ects the stronger competitive pressure is. Hence,
competitive e¤ects seem to reinforce each other, while spillovers and competition tend
to weaken each other.
Having analyzed both the incentives of foreign banks to expand abroad and the
impact of foreign bank entry on host countries, we subsequently turn to the market for
micronance that as well has the potential to enhance access to nance and to promote
nancial development. Micronance has become highly popular since Muhammad
Yunus was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007. According to him, "all human
beings have an innate skill, [...], the survival skill. The fact that the poor are alive is
clear proof of their ability. They do not need us to teach them how to survive; they
already know how to do this."3 Hence, by giving the unbanked poor access to nance,
2Chapter 2 is joint work with Monika Schnitzer, University of Munich and CEPR.
3Yunus (2007, p. 140)
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their entrepreneurial potential can be unleashed. Indeed, a large body of research has
found that access to microloans reduces poverty and positively a¤ects nutrition, health
and education as well as gender empowerment.
Typically, micronance is associated with joint liability of group members. Strik-
ingly, however, many micronance institutions rather o¤er individual instead of group
loans. This triggers several interesting questions. What are the underlying incentive
mechanisms that play a role in individual and group lending schemes and how do they
di¤er? What determines a micronance institutions decision to o¤er group or individ-
ual loan contracts? How do individual loan programs of micronance institutions and
the individual lending technology applied by commercial banks di¤er?
So far, the literature has almost exclusively focused on group lending schemes. It is
surprising that to date the analysis of individual lending schemes has been largely ne-
glected despite individual loans dominating the micronance business in many regions
of the world.
With the aim to contribute to a better understanding of the di¤erent incentive mech-
anisms in group and individual lending programs, we set up a model of competition
between micronance institutions in chapter 3. Borrowers lack pledgeable collateral
and are unable to provide hard information, because they have no documented credit
history. Hence, in contrast to commercial banks, micronance institutions cannot
screen borrowers and secure loans with collateral. Instead, micronance institutions
o¤er either group contracts which implies a transfer of the monitoring role to borrowers
or they o¤er individual loans. In the latter case, micronance institutions specialize in
closely monitoring borrowers. Clients are exempt from the typical costs associated with
group loans such as bearing additional risk, loss of privacy or time spent on nding a
group partner.
Surprisingly, our analysis shows that micronance institutions are more likely to
o¤er group instead of individual loans the smaller a loan is. This result contrasts
several arguments brought forward in the so far rather descriptive literature on this
topic. Moreover, we nd that individual loans are o¤ered when renancing costs are
low and competition between micronance institutions is intense. Interestingly, our
analysis predicts that individual loans in micronance will gain in importance over the
next years if micronance institutions themselves continue to get better access to funds
from capital markets.
Chapter 1
The Entry Mode Choice of
Multinational Banks
1.1 Introduction
The last few years have seen an impressive liberalization of banking markets. While
banks active in rather saturated developed nancial markets looked for new investment
and growth opportunities, banks in many emerging economies were in need for fresh
capital in the aftermath of banking crises. The privatization process in Eastern Europe
provided further opportunities for multinational banks to expand abroad. Nowadays,
in around 40 percent of all developing countries, more than 50 percent of banks are
foreign owned. Strikingly, this gure rises to more than 80 percent in several Eastern
European countries (Claessens et al. (2008)).
This immense transformation of banking markets triggers several questions concern-
ing both the incentives of multinational banks to enter new markets and the incentives
of host countries as how to shape foreign entry. Should a multinational bank grant
cross border loans or rather access a new market via de novo investment or the acqui-
sition of a local bank? How does the development and the size of the local banking
market a¤ect a multinational banks entry mode choice? What are the host country
policy makers preferences regarding di¤erent entry modes of foreign banks?
With the aim to address these questions, we set up a model of spatial bank compe-
tition à la Salop. Foreign banks may enter the host country via cross border lending, de
novo investment or the acquisition of a domestic bank. Banks compete in interest rates
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for potential borrowers that engage in investment projects of uncertain return. Foreign
banks have access to a better screening technology and enjoy lower renancing costs
than local banks. However, besides market entry costs, foreign banks are at a disad-
vantage relative to domestic banks in that the latter hold soft information on borrowers
due to prior lending relationships. Furthermore, granting cross border loans implies a
rather limited knowledge of the host market. Hence, when multinational banks decide
about their mode of entry, they face a trade-o¤ between the size of market entry costs
and their relative disadvantage in what concerns access to soft information and their
knowledge of the local market.
We demonstrate that multinational banks choose their entry mode according to
their e¢ ciency in screening potential borrowers. If a bank is rather ine¢ cient in screen-
ing, it chooses not to expand abroad. With increasing e¢ ciency, cross border lending
becomes feasible. As soon as the better market knowledge in case of greeneld entry
compared to cross border lending compensates for the larger xed entry cost, the for-
eign bank shifts from cross border lending to de novo investment. Only if the screening
technology of the foreign bank is powerful enough, it can drive down the acquisition
price to the point that acquisition entry becomes the dominant entry mode.
A major focus of our study is to explain how a foreign banks entry mode choice is
a¤ected by the nancial development and the size of the host banking market. Indica-
tors for the host countrys level of nancial development in our model are the screening
e¢ ciency and renancing conditions of local relative to foreign banks. As a further in-
dicator serves the importance of access to soft information as a measure of a markets
transparency. A high level of competitive pressure is yet another sign for increased
development. We show that in less developed host banking markets a wider range of
foreign banks opt for cross border lending and acquisition entry whereas the range of
foreign banks that prefer greeneld investment contracts. Interestingly, a wider range
of foreign banks favors acquisition entry in smaller host banking markets whereas the
attractiveness of de novo investment is enhanced in larger markets.
Our welfare analysis allows us to determine the preferences of the host country
policy maker concerning foreign bank entry. The policy maker prefers a foreign bank
not to enter the market when it is rather ine¢ cient in screening borrowers. From the
policy makers point of view, cross border lending is strictly dominated by greeneld
entry. Greeneld entry, in turn, is favored for intermediate screening e¢ ciencies of
foreign banks. If a foreign bank is highly e¢ cient in screening borrowers, the policy
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maker prefers the foreign bank to acquire a local bank. Although the policy makers
preferences regarding foreign entry are similar to those of foreign banks, scope for
regulation exists as the threshold values determining the preferred entry mode pattern
of the policy maker and the foreign banks di¤er.
We nd that the regulation of foreign bank entry is shaped as follows. Entry is
permitted but to foreign banks that rather e¢ ciently screen borrowers. Furthermore,
the less competitive the market environment is, the more likely it is that foreign banks
are denied entry. Cross border lending is not allowed for. Foreign banks that intend to
expand via cross border lending or the acquisition of a local bank are forced to enter
via de novo investment if their screening e¢ ciency is insu¢ ciently low.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the
literature. Section 1.3 describes the set-up of the model. In section 1.4, we study the
entry mode choice of multinational banks. Comparative statics in section 1.5 allow
us to analyze the impact of the nancial development as well as the size of the host
banking market on the entry mode decision of foreign banks. We present the welfare
analysis in section 1.6. Empirical hypotheses are stated in section 1.7. Section 1.8
concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
The expansion of multinational banks into new markets and, even more so, the banks
entry mode choice has received astonishingly little attention in the nance literature
so far. Buch and Lipponer (2007) and García Herrero and Martínez Pería (2007)
empirically analyze the decision of multinational banks to expand abroad via cross
border lending or via a nancial foreign direct investment. They nd that the larger
the host banking market, the more a foreign direct investment is preferred over cross
border activities. Van Tassel and Vishwasrao (2007) as well as Beermann (2007) set
up models to study the trade-o¤ between greeneld and acquisition entry. Van Tassel
and Vishwasrao conclude that a multinational bank generally favors acquisition over
de novo entry. Beermann shows that the most e¢ cient banks choose to expand via the
acquisition of a host country bank whereas less e¢ cient banks opt for greeneld entry.
This chapter is further related to two strands of literature, namely trade theory
and industrial organization literature. Trade theory explains a rms decision to ex-
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pand abroad via exports (the equivalent to cross border lending) or a foreign direct
investment (the equivalent to a nancial foreign direct investment). One of the rst
models in trade theory to study the export versus foreign direct investment decision of
rms is Brainard (1993). She points to the trade-o¤ between xed and variable costs.
Firms choose to export in case of high xed and low variable costs and to serve the
foreign market via a foreign direct investment otherwise. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple
(2004) incorporate rm heterogeneity into this trade-o¤ between variable and xed
costs. They show that when countries open up to trade, the least productive rms are
forced to exit the market and the remaining rms engage with increasing labor pro-
ductivity in exports before they start to operate in a new market via a foreign direct
investment. Nocke and Yeaple (2004) theoretically analyze the decision of a rm to
expand via de novo investment or the acquisition of a local rm and conclude that the
most e¢ cient rms opt for de novo investment. In a related paper, Nocke and Yeaple
(2007) distinguish between exports, greeneld and acquisition entry and suggest that
the entry mode choice of rms depends on whether foreign and host country rms di¤er
in mobile or immobile capabilities.
Related articles in the industrial organization literature focus on the trade-o¤ be-
tween greeneld and acquisition entry. Gilroy and Lukas (2006), Görg (2000), Iranzo
(2003), as well as Ra¤ et al. (2006) set up models in which a rms decision between
greeneld and acquisition entry depends on di¤erences in the marginal costs of foreign
and domestic rms. As in Eicher and Kang (2005) or Müller (2007), it is generally as-
sumed that a greeneld entrant produces at lower marginal costs than domestic rms.
This is motivated by the foreign rms superior production technology of which it can
take full advantage when building its own production facilities from scratch. At the
same time, however, this implies huge xed market entry costs. In contrast, if en-
try occurs via acquisition, the foreign rm is presumed to be constrained to the use
of the inferior production facilities of the acquired rm and, in addition, the need to
restructure the target rm. In turn, this implies higher marginal costs of the foreign
compared to the domestic rm. Most of these papers conclude that rather productive
rms opt for de novo investment whereas less productive rms favor the acquisition of
a domestic rm.
The situation in the banking industry is di¤erent. A multinational bank that enters
a new market via de novo investment faces a disadvantage relative to domestic banks
in that the latter hold soft information on borrowers due to prior lending relationships.
Consequently, when a foreign bank opts for greeneld entry, it may incur higher variable
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costs than the domestic banks. However, if a multinational bank decides to enter a
new market via the acquisition of a host country bank, it gains access to the soft
information held by the target. Moreover, the entrant can relatively easily implement
its own superior screening technology. As a result, the entrant may operate at lower
marginal costs than domestic banks.
Hence, we add to the trade and industrial organization literature with its focus on
manufacturing industries in that we account for special characteristics of the banking
sector. We depart from trade theory in that our model is not based on monopolistic
competition. Rather, banks in our model compete in prices which we consider a more
appropriate form of competition in the banking industry. Furthermore, instead of
labor productivity we rely on a banks screening e¢ ciency as the key indicator of its
productivity since it determines the quality of its credit portfolio. Moreover, we add
to the industrial organization literature in that we stress that the foreign bankslack
of access to soft information may imply the reversal of the pattern of marginal costs as
described above. As in the industrial organization literature, we allow for restructuring
costs but emphasize that they should be of a rather xed nature.
1.3 The Model
We consider two separated banking markets, A and B. Multinational banks are based
in market A. Market B represents the host banking market. In market B, a continuum
of borrowers with mass m is uniformly distributed along a circular road with circum-
ference 1. Each borrower can engage in one investment project that requires an initial
outlay of 1. Borrowers can either invest in good or in bad projects. It is common
knowledge that the fraction of borrowers with good projects is  and the fraction of
borrowers with bad projects is 1   , 0 <  < 1. Individual borrowers know about
the quality of their own investment projects. In case the project is good it generates
a return v > 0 with certainty while a bad project always fails yielding a return of
zero. The returns of the projects are observable and contractible. Borrowers are not
endowed with any initial wealth and therefore need to apply for credit at the banks,
the only source of nance in our model.
Before market B is opened up to the entry of a foreign bank, two identical repre-
sentative banks Bj, j = 1; 2, are located equidistantly along the circular road. The
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location of a bank reects its specialization in a certain credit product or industry.
Banks compete in the interest rates rBj they simultaneously charge borrowers. Bor-
rowers whose investment project yields a return of v repay their loan with interest to
the bank whereas borrowers whose project fails do not repay their loan. Host country
banks incur renancing costs iB > 0 per loan of size 1. They have access to an im-
perfect screening technology based on the evaluation of hard information provided by
borrowers. It allows the local banks to identify the fraction B, 0 < B < 1, of bor-
rowers investing in bad projects. The banks cannot distinguish between the remaining
borrowers with bad projects and borrowers investing in good projects. Hence, the
fraction (1  B) of bad borrowers and all good borrowers applying for credit obtain
nancing. Without loss of generality, we assume that screening is costless for all banks.
When the host banking market opens up to foreign bank entry, a foreign bank based
in market A is granted the permission to enter market B. Without loss of generality we
abstract from relocation costs and assume that after foreign entry, banks are located
equidistantly along the circular road. We assume that the foreign bank has access to
a superior screening technology relative to domestic banks. Its screening technique
allows the foreign bank to identify a fraction A, 0 < B < A < 1, of borrowers
investing in bad projects. Furthermore, we assume lower renancing costs of foreign
banks compared to host country banks, i.e. 0 < iA < iB.4 The foreign bank may enter
market B via cross border lending, de novo investment, or the acquisition of a domestic
bank.
When a foreign bank enters the host country via cross border lending or de novo
investment, it encounters a disadvantage relative to domestic banks in what concerns
the access to soft information about borrowers. In contrast to hard information, soft
information needs to be collected over time through relationships with clients (Petersen
and Rajan (1994), Stein (2002)). As in Sengupta (2007), we assume that domestic
banks were able to collect unobservable, i.e. soft information on their borrowers during
past lending relationships. In the literature, there are di¤erent approaches to capture
the soft information advantage of domestic relative to foreign banks. DellAriccia et
al. (1999) and DellAriccia (2001) base their model on the existence of new and old
borrowers so that domestic banks have an advantage over foreign banks concerning
the share of old borrowers. Gormley (2008) interprets the information advantage of
domestic versus foreign banks as higher per borrower screening costs of the latter. For
our analysis, it is convenient to model the lack of soft information about borrowers
4These assumptions are conrmed by e.g. Berger (2007), Gormley (2008), and Sengupta (2007).
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as a decline in the power of the foreign banks screening technology. We assume that
in case of cross border lending and greeneld entry, the quality of the foreign banks
screening technology is diminished by a factor , 0 <  < 1. Hence, only the share A
of borrowers with bad projects is identied. However, the acquisition of a local bank
ensures access to the soft information held by the target which implies that the fraction
A of borrowers with bad projects is denied credit. We assume that all borrowers apply
for a loan with new investment projects. Hence, although domestic banks have access
to soft information about potential clients, both foreign and domestic banks need to
screen borrowers.
In our model, we also consider the foreign banks fairly limited knowledge of the
host banking market if it grants cross border loans and, accordingly, has no large
presence in the local banking market. We capture this limited market knowledge by an
even lower quality of the foreign banks screening technology. That is, only the share
A, 0 <  < 1, of borrowers investing in bad projects is identied in case of cross
border lending.
When the foreign bank starts to operate in market B, it incurs market entry costs.
Entry costs are modeled as a xed component in case of cross border lending, FCBL,
and greeneld entry, FGR, FCBL < FGR. Note that in case of greeneld entry the for-
eign bank needs to establish a new branch network, whereas with cross border lending,
it may only set up a representative o¢ ce which is much less costly. When a multina-
tional bank enters a new market via the acquisition of a domestic bank, the foreign
banks entry cost consists of the endogenous takeover price and a xed component FAC ,
FAC < FGR. The xed component may reect, for instance, restructuring costs or the
amortization of bad credits due to asymmetric information concerning the quality of
the targets credit portfolio before the acquisition.
Banks compete in the interest rates rA and rBj they simultaneously ask from bor-
rowers. Borrowers base their decision at which bank to apply for credit on the interest
rates o¤ered by the banks and the transport costs they have to incur to travel to the
bank. The transport costs express the preferences borrowers have for a particular type
of bank. We assume that transport costs tx are proportional to the distance x between
the borrower and the bank. Furthermore, we assume that the return of a good project
v is high enough so that the market is covered at equilibrium prices.
Borrowers and banks are risk neutral and maximize prots. We take it as given
that each bank disposes of enough funds to nance all borrowers applying for a credit.
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We assume that banks can observe the location of borrowers.5 Borrowers with bad
projects that are denied credit do not apply for credit at another bank because banks
can deduce from the borrowers location that they have unsuccessfully applied for a
loan at another bank.
The time structure of the game is as follows. At stage 1, market B opens up to the
entry of one representative foreign bank. At stage 2, borrowers apply for credit at the
banks. Banks engage in screening the borrowers. At stage 3, returns realize and all
borrowers having invested in good projects pay back their loan.
1.4 Choice of Entry Mode
In this section, we study the incentives of the foreign bank to grant cross border loans
or to expand via greeneld investment or the acquisition of a domestic bank.
1.4.1 Cross Border Lending
The foreign bank enters market B via cross border lending if it thereby makes positive
prots in the host banking market. The prot of the foreign bank in the host banking
market is given by
CBLA =


 
rCBLA   iA
  (1  ) (1  A) (1 + iA)mCBLA   FCBL: (1.1)
When the foreign bank o¤ers cross border loans, it has no access to soft information
about borrowers and, in addition, a fairly limited knowledge of the local banking mar-
ket. Hence, the foreign bank identies a rather low fraction A of borrowers with
bad projects but cannot distinguish between the remaining fraction (1  A) of bad
borrowers and the borrowers with good projects. Accordingly, the foreign bank nances
the fraction (1  A) of borrowers investing in bad projects as well as all borrowers
with good projects applying for credit. Since bad borrowers do not make any repay-
ments, the foreign bank incurs a cost of 1 + iA on this group. The fraction  of good
5As e.g. in DellAriccia (2001), this assumption considerably simplies our analysis. Note that we
abstract from the possibility of price discrimination of borrowers.
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borrowers, however, repays the loan with interest so that the bank obtains the margin
rCBLA   iA on those clients. The market share of the foreign bank is derived in the Ap-
pendix (see proof of Lemma 1.1) and is given by mCBLA = m

1
3
+
rCBLB1
+rCBLB2
 2rCBLA
2t

.
Fixed entry costs amount to FCBL.
Host country banks do not incur any soft information problems or xed costs.
Accordingly, their prot is given by
CBLBj =
h


rCBLBj   iB

  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)
i
mCBLBj :
6 (1.2)
Banks maximize their prot with respect to the interest rates they ask from bor-
rowers. We state the resulting equilibrium prots in Lemma 1.1:
Lemma 1.1 If foreign bank entry takes place via cross border lending, equilibrium
prots of banks are given by
CBLA = mt
eCBLA 2   FCBL (1.3)
CBLBj = mt
eCBLB 2  CBLB 8 j: (1.4)
Proof: see Appendix.
The foreign bank enters the host banking market via cross border lending as soon
as the quality of its screening technology allows it to make positive prots in market
B, that is, CBLA  0. Our result is stated in Proposition 1.1.
Proposition 1.1 The foreign bank enters the host banking market via cross border
lending if its screening e¢ ciency is higher than the threshold value CBLA . That is, if
A  CBLA =
5
2
q
tFCBL
m
   5
6
t
 (1  ) (1 + iA) : (1.5)
Proof: see Appendix.
6In our analysis, we focus on the interaction of foreign and domestic banks and, therefore, abstract
from the possible exit of domestic banks.
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1.4.2 Greeneld Investment
When the foreign bank enters the host market via de novo investment, it gains a fairly
good knowledge of the local market due to its large presence and branch network.
Yet, it has no access to soft information about borrowers. Compared to cross border
lending, the foreign bank nances a smaller fraction (1  A) of borrowers with bad
projects. However, it incurs a larger xed entry cost FGR. The foreign banks prot in
market B is given by
GRA =


 
rGRA   iA
  (1  ) (1  A) (1 + iA)mGRA   FGR: (1.6)
Prots of host country banks now amount to
GRBj =
h


rGRBj   iB

  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)
i
mGRBj : (1.7)
Banks maximize their prot with respect to the interest rates they ask from bor-
rowers. The equilibrium prots of banks are stated in Lemma 1.2.
Lemma 1.2 In case of greeneld entry, the equilibrium prots of banks are given by
GRA = mt
eGRA 2   FGR (1.8)
GRBj = mt
eGRB 2  GRB 8j: (1.9)
Proof: see Appendix.
We show in the Appendix (see proof of Proposition 1.2) that due to the better
knowledge of the host banking market, the prot of the foreign bank rises more sharply
in the screening technology A in case of de novo investment than in case of cross
border lending. However, the xed entry cost is larger with greeneld entry. Hence, as
soon as the better market knowledge compensates for the larger xed entry cost, the
foreign bank shifts from cross border lending to de novo investment at the threshold
GRA , originating from 
GR
A  CBLA . Note that we concentrate our analysis on the
most interesting case of the richest possible entry mode pattern, i.e. we only consider
GRA > 
CBL
A .
7 Our results are given in Proposition 1.2.
7In principle, GRA < 
CBL
A is possible but in that case, cross border lending would be excluded
from the entry mode pattern.
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Proposition 1.2 The foreign bank opts for greeneld entry if its screening e¢ ciency
is higher than the threshold value GRA . That is, if
A  GRA =
p
XGR    56t
 (1 + ) (1  ) (1 + iA) : (1.10)
Proof: see Appendix.
1.4.3 Entry via Acquisition
By acquiring a host country bank, the foreign bank gets access to all the soft informa-
tion held by the target. However, it must pay the endogenous acquisition price PAC .
Furthermore, it incurs an additional xed entry cost FAC . This cost may originate
from the restructuring of the acquired bank or the amortization of bad credits due to
asymmetric information concerning the quality of the targets credit portfolio before
the acquisition. Note that the acquisition of a domestic bank allows the foreign bank
to capture a larger market share in comparison to all other entry modes. In addition,
the foreign bank gains from less intense competition since just two banks operate in
the market.8 The prot of the foreign bank in the host banking market if it acquires a
local bank is given by
ACA =


 
rACA   iA
  (1  ) (1  A) (1 + iA)mACA   FAC   PAC : (1.11)
The prot of the remaining host country bank amounts to
ACB =


 
rACB   iB
  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)mACB : (1.12)
We now derive the endogenous acquisition price PAC . Throughout our analysis,
we will assume that bargaining power is allocated to the foreign bank. In the range
of 0 < A < 
CBL
A , the foreign bank would make losses by entering the host banking
market via cross border lending or greeneld entry. Then, clearly, the acquisition price
is given by the prot of the domestic bank in case of no entry, that is, PAC = NEB =
mt
4
(for a derivation of NEB see proof of Proposition 1.3). For 
CBL
A  A < GRA , cross
border lending constitutes the second best entry mode for the foreign bank. Hence,
8Fiercer competition in the host banking market in case of greeneld compared to acquisition
entry is conrmed, for instance, by Claeys and Hainz (2006) and Maioli et al. (2006).
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by threatening to enter via cross border lending, the foreign bank can drive down the
acquisition price to the prot of the domestic bank if entry occurs via cross border
lending, i.e., PAC = CBLB = mt
eCBLB 2. For GRA  A < 1, greeneld entry
constitutes the second best entry mode for the foreign bank. Accordingly, bank A can
threaten to enter market B via greeneld entry and drive down the acquisition price
to the prot of the domestic bank in case of greeneld entry, that is, PAC = GRB =
mt
eGRB 2.
Banks maximize their prot with respect to the interest rates they ask from bor-
rowers. Equilibrium prots of banks are stated in Lemma 1.3.
Lemma 1.3 In case of acquisition entry, the equilibrium prots of banks are given by
ACA =
8>>>><>>>>:
mt
eACA 2   mt4   FAC for 0 < A < CBLA
mt[
eACA 2   eCBLB 2]  FAC for CBLA  A < GRA (1:13)
mt[
eACA 2   eGRB 2]  FAC for GRA  A < 1
ACB = mt
eACB 2 : (1.14)
Proof: see Appendix.
In the Appendix, we show that ACA is increasing in A and jumps upwards twice
due to the changing acquisition prices at CBLA and 
GR
A . Furthermore, 
AC
A is steeper
than both CBLA and 
GR
A . Hence, the richest possible entry mode pattern emerges
if ACA intersects with 
GR
A , determining the threshold for acquisition entry, 
AC
A with
ACA  GRA . Our results regarding acquisition entry are stated in Proposition 1.3.
Proposition 1.3 The foreign bank enters the host banking market via the acquisition
of a domestic bank if its screening e¢ ciency is higher than the threshold value ACA .
That is, if
A  ACA =
3t (5  2)  2 (9  5)
2 (92   5) (1  ) (1 + iA)

1 
p
XAC

: (1.15)
Proof: see Appendix.
Hence, only if the foreign bank has access to a highly sophisticated screening tech-
nique, acquisition entry can dominate all other possible entry modes. The intuition
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behind this result is as follows. In case of acquisition entry, the prot of the foreign
bank rises more sharply in its screening ability than it does in case of cross border
lending or greeneld entry. First, this is due to the access to soft information. Second,
the better the screening technology of the foreign bank, the lower is the prot of a
host country bank in case of de novo entry of the foreign bank and, accordingly, the
lower the acquisition price becomes.9 Hence, only if the screening technology of the
foreign bank is very powerful, it can drive down the acquisition price to the point that
acquisition entry becomes the dominant entry mode.
1.4.4 Entry Mode Pattern
According to our analysis so far, the richest entry mode pattern to emerge is given as
follows. If the foreign bank has access to a rather ine¢ cient screening ability, entry
is not protable. With an increasing quality of the screening technology, cross border
lending becomes feasible. As soon as the better market knowledge in case of greeneld
entry compared to cross border lending compensates for the larger xed entry cost, the
foreign bank shifts from cross border lending to de novo investment. Only if the foreign
bank is highly e¢ cient in screening borrowers, it can drive down the acquisition price
to the point that acquisition entry becomes the dominant entry mode.
Note that we limit our analysis to the richest entry mode pattern. Otherwise, it
would be possible that one or more entry modes dropped out of the pattern. However,
it is important to see that the order of the entry mode pattern can never be reversed.
Our results are summarized in Proposition 1.4.
Proposition 1.4 The richest possible entry mode pattern of foreign banks is given
as follows. Banks with the lowest screening e¢ ciencies do not expand abroad. With
increasing e¢ ciency, banks grant cross border loans. Still more e¢ cient banks opt for
de novo investment. The most e¢ cient banks choose to acquire a host country bank.
Hence, in line with ndings by Buch and Lipponer (2007) as well as Focarelli and
Pozzolo (2001) we nd that the more protable and e¢ cient a bank is, the more likely
9Note that as we limit our analysis to the richest possible entry mode pattern, the acquisition
price is given by GRB .
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it will expand abroad. Similar to the results in trade theory, we nd that rather less
e¢ cient rms engage in cross border lending, the equivalent to exports in our model,
whereas more e¢ cient banks operate in new markets via a nancial foreign direct
investment. However, our results contrast those derived in the industrial organization
literature with its focus on manufacturing industries in that we nd that the most
e¢ cient banks engage in acquisition entry whereas less e¢ cient banks expand abroad
via de novo investment. Similar to our results, Beermann (2007) shows that the most
e¢ cient banks choose to expand via the acquisition of a local bank whereas less e¢ cient
banks opt for greeneld entry.
1.5 Comparative Statics Analysis
Our framework allows us to study how the development of the host banking market
a¤ects the foreign banks entry mode pattern. In addition, we provide interesting
insights into how the foreign banks choice of entry mode depends on the size of the
host banking market.
1.5.1 Development of the Host Banking Market
In our model, several parameters can be interpreted as indicators of nancial develop-
ment. First, the less banks need to rely on soft information the more transparent and
developed a nancial market in general is. Second, better screening abilities and lower
renancing costs of host country relative to foreign banks serve as further indicators
of development. Finally, a high degree of competitive pressure in the host banking
market is yet another sign of increased development.
Importance of Access to Soft Information
In more developed banking markets characterized by rather high transparency,
banks should base the evaluation of borrowers projects to a lower extent on soft in-
formation. We nd that when foreign banks need to rely less on soft information,
i.e.  increases, entry turns out to be protable for foreign banks that have access to
The Entry Mode Choice of Multinational Banks 20
a less e¢ cient screening technique. Furthermore, greeneld entry becomes relatively
more attractive compared to cross border lending and acquisition entry. Our results
are summarized in Proposition 1.5.
Proposition 1.5 When foreign banks need to rely less on soft information, entry
becomes feasible for banks that have access to a less e¢ cient screening technique.
The range of greeneld entry expand whereas the ranges of cross border lending and
acquisition entry contract. That is,
dCBLA
d
< 0;
dGRA
d
< 0;
dACA
d
> 0 and
dCBLAd
 < dGRAd
 . (1.16)
Proof: see Appendix.
To understand the intuition for these results, let us rst look at the threshold CBLA ,
determining cross border lending. When the foreign bank depends less on the access to
soft information, it can increase its market share and, in addition, less borrowers with
bad projects are nanced. This makes cross border lending protable for less e¢ ciently
screening foreign banks.
Similar e¤ects are at work when we consider the threshold GRA . When the foreign
bank needs to rely to a lower extent on soft information, its market share increases and
less bad borrowers are nanced both with cross border lending and greeneld entry.
However, this e¤ect is the more pronounced, the larger the market share of the foreign
bank. Since the foreign banks market share is larger in case of a de novo investment
than with cross border lending, greeneld entry becomes relatively more attractive
compared to cross border lending when foreign banks depend less on soft information.
We now turn to the attractiveness of acquisition relative to greeneld entry. The
acquisition of a domestic bank ensures access to the soft information held by the target.
Note that the extent to which the foreign bank depends on access to soft information
a¤ects the acquisition price GRB . The less the foreign bank needs to rely on soft
information, the smaller the market share of the domestic bank is if the foreign bank
enters via de novo investment. In turn, the acquisition price GRB falls and the foreign
banks prot increases. While the fall in the acquisition price is due to a fall in the
domestic banks market share only, there are two e¤ects at work with respect to the
prot of the foreign bank if it enters via de novo investment. First, a lower information
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disadvantage of the foreign relative to the domestic bank implies a larger market share
of the foreign bank and, second, leads to a fall in the fraction of bad borrowers nanced
by the foreign bank. As a consequence, the increase of the foreign banks prot in case
of greeneld entry dominates the rise in its prot in case of acquisition entry. In sum,
greeneld entry becomes more attractive compared to the acquisition of a local bank
when access to soft information is less important.
We conclude that foreign banks tend to enter via greeneld entry into banking
markets with a higher degree of nancial development. In contrast, in less developed
banking markets, a wider range of foreign banks opt for cross border lending and
acquisition entry.
Quality of the Screening Ability of Host Country Banks
We nd that when the screening ability B of host country banks increases, foreign
banks must be relatively better at screening borrowers in order to protably enter a new
market. Furthermore, acquisition entry becomes relatively less attractive compared to
greeneld entry. Our results are stated in Proposition 1.6.
Proposition 1.6 An increase in the screening ability of host country banks leads to
an increase in all relevant threshold levels. Consequently, foreign banks must possess
a relatively better screening technology in order to protably enter the host banking
market. The range of acquisition entry contracts. That is,
dCBLA
dB
> 0;
dGRA
dB
> 0;
dACA
dB
> 0: (1.17)
Proof: see Appendix.
Again, let us rst look at the threshold CBLA , determining cross border lending.
When host country banks get access to a relatively better screening technique, the
foreign bank loses in terms of market share. Obviously, entry via cross border lending
is then protable for foreign banks having access to a relatively more sophisticated
screening technology only.
When the screening skills of domestic banks improve, the market share and prot
of a foreign bank also falls in case of greeneld entry. However, the fall in the foreign
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banks prot is larger with greeneld entry compared to cross border lending due
to the beforehand larger market share. Hence, greeneld entry becomes relatively
less attractive compared to cross border lending when domestic banks get better in
screening potential borrowers.
We nd that when host country banks get access to a better screening technology,
acquisition entry becomes less attractive to foreign banks compared to a de novo in-
vestment. This is due to a fall in the market share of a foreign bank entering the host
banking market via the acquisition of a domestic bank as well as an increase in the
acquisition price. Due to this combined e¤ect, the decrease in the foreign banks prot
in case of acquisition entry is larger than the fall of the foreign banks prot in case of
greeneld entry arising from a decreasing market share only. Thus, acquisition entry is
less appealing compared to greeneld entry when the screening e¢ ciency of domestic
banks increases.
When we interpret an increasing screening e¢ ciency of host country banks as a
signal for higher nancial development, we can state as before that the less developed
a banking market is, the more foreign banks tend to enter the market via the acquisition
of a domestic bank.
Size of Renancing Costs of Host Country Banks
We nd that when renancing costs iB of host country banks decrease, foreign banks
must possess a relatively better screening technology in order to protably enter a new
market. In addition, cross border lending and acquisition entry lose in attractiveness.
Our results are summarized in Proposition 1.7.
Proposition 1.7 When renancing costs of host country banks decrease, foreign
banks must have relatively better screening skills in order to protably enter a new
market. The ranges of cross border lending and acquisition entry contract. That is,
dCBLA
diB
< 0;
dGRA
diB
< 0;
dACA
diB
< 0; and
dCBLAdiB
 > dGRAdiB
 (1.18)
Proof: see Appendix.
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The intuition for these results is as follows. When host country banks incur rela-
tively lower renancing costs, foreign banks lose in terms of market share. Obviously,
entry becomes attractive only for relatively better screening foreign banks.
Since the e¤ect of a falling market share is larger in case of greeneld entry compared
to cross border lending due to the beforehand larger market share, greeneld entry
becomes relatively less attractive compared to cross border lending when renancing
conditions of domestic banks improve.
When renancing costs of host country banks decrease, acquisition entry becomes
less attractive compared to greeneld entry. Note that the market share of the foreign
bank in case of acquisition entry falls and, in addition, the acquisition price increases.
Due to this combined e¤ect, the fall of the prot of the foreign bank with acquisition
entry is larger than the decrease of the prot in case of de novo investment originating
from a declining market share only. Therefore, acquisition entry becomes less attractive
compared to greeneld entry when renancing costs of domestic banks fall.
By interpreting better renancing conditions of host country banks as a sign of
increased nancial development, we again conclude that in banking markets on a lower
stage of development, foreign banks tend to choose cross border lending and acquisition
entry when entering the host banking market.
Degree of Competitive Pressure in the Host Banking Market
We are further interested in how the degree of competition in the host banking
market inuences the entry mode decision of a foreign bank. The competitive pressure
in the local banking market can be expressed by the inverse of transportation cost 1
t
.
Note that the larger the transportation cost parameter t and the more costly it becomes
for borrowers to travel to a bank, the less intense price competition will be between
banks. Conversely, the higher is 1
t
, the more competitive is the market environment.
We nd that foreign banks must possess a relatively better screening technology in
order to protably enter highly competitive markets. Furthermore, acquisition entry
loses in attractiveness in host banking markets characterized by rather intense compe-
tition. The e¤ects on cross border lending and greeneld entry are ambiguous. Our
results are stated in Proposition 1.8.
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Proposition 1.8 When competitive pressure in the host banking market increases,
foreign banks must be relatively better at screening borrowers in order to protably enter
a new market. For GRA < eGRA , the range of cross border lending contracts whereas the
range of greeneld entry expands. For GRA > eGRA , the e¤ect of rising competition on
cross border lending and greeneld entry is ambiguous. The range of acquisition entry
unambiguously contracts. That is,
(1) d
CBL
A
d( 1t )
> 0;
dGRA
d( 1t )
< 0;
dACA
d( 1t )
> 0 for GRA <
15(FGR FCBL)
4m(1 )(1 )(1+iA)  eGRA (1.19)
(2) d
CBL
A
d( 1t )
> 0;
dGRA
d( 1t )
> 0;
dACA
d( 1t )
> 0 for GRA > eGRA . (1.20)
Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. Again, we rst turn to the threshold
CBLA . Increasing competitive pressure in the host banking market results in declining
interest rates of all banks. It follows that in order for cross border lending to be
protable, the foreign bank must have access to a relatively better screening technology.
The e¤ect of rising competition on the threshold GRA is ambiguous. Note, before-
hand, that the interest rate the foreign bank charges in case of cross border lending
is higher than in case of greeneld entry. In contrast, the market share of the foreign
bank in case of cross border lending is smaller compared to a de novo investment. In-
creasing competitive pressure leads to a fall both in interest rates and market shares.
Hence, the overall e¤ect is ambiguous. We nd that for A < eGRA , the interest rate
e¤ect dominates so that greeneld entry gains at the expense of cross border lending.
However, for A > eGRA , the market share e¤ect is the driving factor which implies that
cross border lending becomes relatively more attractive compared to greeneld entry.
We now examine the impact of an increase in competitive pressure on the attrac-
tiveness of acquisition entry. Note that an increase in competition implies lower interest
rates and prots both in case of greeneld and acquisition entry. In addition, the ac-
quisition price falls. Since, however, the fall in prot is larger in case of acquisition
compared to greeneld entry, the acquisition of a domestic bank is less appealing the
more intense competition is.
Note that tough competition serves as an indicator of high nancial development.
Falling transportation costs may reect an increased transparency in the market as
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well as a higher standardization of nancial products implying less pronounced prefer-
ences of borrowers for a certain type of bank. Alternatively, the introduction of new
information and communication technologies in banking may lead to a fall in physical
transportation costs of borrowers. We conclude as before that the less developed a host
banking market is, the more foreign banks opt for entry via acquisition.
1.5.2 Size of the Host Banking Market
We now turn to the impact of the size of the host banking market measured in terms
of the mass of borrowers m on the entry mode choice of foreign banks. We nd that
the larger the host banking market, the more easily entry becomes protable for less
e¢ ciently screening foreign banks. Furthermore, the larger the host country, the more
appealing greeneld entry and the less attractive acquisition entry become. Our results
are stated in Proposition 1.9.
Proposition 1.9 The larger the host banking market, the more easily entry becomes
protable for less e¢ ciently screening foreign banks. The range of greeneld entry
expands and the range of acquisition entry contracts. That is,
dCBLA
dm
< 0;
dGRA
dm
< 0;
dACA
dm
> 0 (1.21)
Proof: see Appendix.
Clearly, the prot of a foreign bank operating in the host banking market via cross
border lending is the higher, the larger the host banking market. It follows that in larger
markets, cross border lending becomes protable for foreign banks with relatively lower
screening skills.
The larger the host banking market, the higher a foreign banks prot both in case
of cross border lending and greeneld entry is. Again, the rise in the foreign banks
prot due to an increase in the market size is more pronounced in case of greeneld
entry due to the beforehand larger market share so that a de novo investment becomes
more attractive compared to cross border lending.
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In case of acquisition entry, a greater market size also allows the foreign bank to
serve more customers, implying an increase in its prot. However, there is a counter-
vailing e¤ect since the acquisition price rises, too. Overall, the increase in the prot of
a foreign bank in case of greeneld entry dominates the rise in prot in case of acqui-
sition entry. Hence, the larger the host banking market, the more appealing greeneld
entry compared to acquisition entry is for a foreign bank.
We can further conclude from our analysis that foreign banks tend to prefer nancial
foreign direct investments, i.e. de novo investments and acquisitions, over cross border
lending the more, the larger the host banking market is.
1.5.3 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we showed that in less developed banking markets, foreign banks tend
to opt for cross border lending and acquisition entry. In contrast, we found a tendency
towards greeneld entry in banking markets on a higher level of nancial development.
Empirical literature related to our comparative statics analysis is scarce. Nevertheless,
our result of a trend towards cross border lending in rather low developed banking
markets is conrmed by García Herrero and Martínez Pería (2007). Beermann (2007)
nds that greeneld entry becomes more likely compared to acquisition entry the more
developed a host banking market is.
Furthermore, we investigated how the entry mode decision of foreign banks depends
on the size of the host banking market. From our analysis, we concluded that foreign
banks tend to prefer nancial foreign direct investments, i.e. de novo investments and
acquisitions, over cross border lending the larger the host banking market is. Buch and
Lipponer (2007), García Herrero and Martínez Pería (2007) and Tekin-Koru (2006)
all nd empirical support for this outcome. We also demonstrated that the larger
a host country is, the larger the acquisition price becomes and the less attractive
the acquisition of a local bank is. Hence, we found that foreign banks tend to favor
acquisition entry in small host banking markets and greeneld entry in larger countries.
Evidence for this result is provided by Ra¤ et al. (2006). In addition, Correa (2008)
concludes that domestic banks that are located in small countries are more likely to be
acquired compared to banks operating in larger countries.
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1.6 Welfare Analysis and Implications for the
Regulation of Foreign Bank Entry
In this section we derive the preferred entry mode pattern of the host banking markets
policy maker and compare it to the entry mode pattern favored by the foreign banks.
The host countrys policy maker maximizes welfare consisting of the sum of borrower
rents and rents of domestic banks. Borrower rents are captured by the willingness to
pay of borrowers minus the repayments of borrowers to banks and their transport costs.
Bank rents comprise the revenues of banks minus their costs. Rents of foreign banks
are not included in welfare. Note, however, that the policy maker may appropriate the
rents of foreign banks via the introduction of a license fee. We discuss this scenario at
the end of this section.
We compare the di¤erent welfare functions in case of no entry, WNE, cross border
lending, WCBL, greeneld entry, WGR, and acquisition entry, WAC , in order to derive
the preferred entry mode pattern of the policy maker. Our results are summarized in
Proposition 1.10.
Proposition 1.10 The policy maker prefers a foreign bank not to enter the market
when it is rather ine¢ cient in screening borrowers. Greeneld entry is favored for
intermediate screening e¢ ciencies of foreign banks. If a foreign bank is highly e¢ cient
in screening borrowers, the policy maker prefers it to acquire a local bank. That is,
(1 ) WNE > WCBL;WGR;WAC for A < 
GR
W (1.22)
(2 ) WGR > WCBL;WNE;WAC for 
GR
W < A < 
AC
W (1.23)
(3 ) WAC > WCBL;WNE;WGR for 
AC
W < A (1.24)
Proof: see Appendix.
Note, beforehand, that cross border lending is strictly dominated by greeneld
entry. This result is mainly driven by the fact that interest rates of foreign banks are
lower in case of greeneld entry than cross border lending due to the better knowledge
of the market which benets local borrowers.
The intuition of our results mainly rests on the impact of the foreign banks screen-
ing ability on, rst, the payments of borrowers to foreign banks and, second, costs of
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domestic banks. Note that the payments of borrowers to foreign banks are zero in
case of no entry, of intermediate size in case of greeneld entry, and largest in case of
acquisition entry. In contrast, the costs of domestic banks vary with market shares and
are highest in case of no entry, lower if foreign banks enter via de novo investment, and
smallest with acquisition entry.
Obviously, if no foreign bank enters the market, an increasing screening e¢ ciency
of the foreign bank has no impact on the payments of borrowers to foreign banks and
costs of domestic banks. Yet, in case of greeneld entry, an increase in the quality of
the foreign banks screening technology drives down the interest rates foreign banks
ask as well as the costs of domestic banks due to falling market shares. Hence, as soon
as the screening ability of the foreign bank is larger than the threshold GRW , greeneld
entry is preferred to no entry by the policy maker. Moreover, the negative e¤ect of
an increasing screening e¢ ciency of the foreign bank on interest rates asked by foreign
banks and costs of domestic banks is even larger in case of acquisition entry. Thus,
for a screening ability of the foreign bank larger than ACW , the policy maker favors
acquisition over greeneld entry. We show in the Appendix that GRW < 
AC
W holds (see
proof of Proposition 1.10).
Note that if the transport cost parameter t is very small, GRW  0 is possible. In
this case, the policy maker would strictly prefer the entry of foreign banks to no entry
at all. Since foreign and domestic banks in our model di¤er with respect to renancing
costs, screening abilities and access to soft information, market shares are generally
asymmetric resulting in increased transportation costs of borrowers compared to a
symmetric set-up. Hence, it can well be that the policy maker prefers foreign banks
not to enter the market. However, if transportation costs are very low due to a low
value of t, the policy maker may strictly prefer foreign entry over no entry at all.
Before we turn to how the regulation of foreign bank entry is shaped, let us explain
that the policy maker may face di¢ culties when trying to enforce greeneld entry.
Greeneld entry is protable for foreign banks if GRA  0 holds which is equivalent to
A  bGRA (see proof of Proposition 1.11). If bGRA > GRW holds, de novo investment is
not protable for foreign banks with screening abilities in the range GRW  A < bGRA .
Hence, for this parameter range, greeneld entry cannot be implemented by the policy
maker.10
10In principle, the policy maker could also make a payment to the foreign bank in order to induce it
to enter the market compensating for the loss of the foreign bank from operating in the host country.
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However, acquisition entry can be enforced whenever the policy maker prefers this
entry mode. We show in the Appendix that ACW > 
AC
A holds (see proof of Proposition
1.11). Clearly, for A  ACA , foreign banks make prots by entering via acquisition
entry as ACA constitutes the threshold for which foreign banks prefer acquisition entry
over all other entry modes. Hence, no di¢ culties arise for the policy maker to enforce
entry via acquisition since ACW > 
AC
A .
Let us now look in more detail at the regulation of foreign bank entry. Although
- apart from cross border lending - the policy makers preferred entry mode pattern
is similar to the one favored by the foreign banks, our model still provides interesting
implications concerning the regulation of foreign bank entry. Our results from the
comparison of the threshold values GRW and 
AC
W that determine the policy makers
preferred entry mode pattern and the thresholds CBLA ; 
GR
A ; and 
AC
A dening the
entry mode pattern preferred by the foreign banks as derived in section 1.4 are given
in Proposition 1.11.
Proposition 1.11 Entry is permitted but to foreign banks that rather e¢ ciently screen
borrowers. The more competitive the host market environment is, the lower the require-
ments concerning a foreign banks screening e¢ ciency for entry are set. Cross border
lending is not allowed for. Moreover, only the most e¢ ciently screening foreign banks
are allowed to acquire a domestic bank. Foreign banks that wish to grant cross border
loans or acquire a local bank are forced to enter via de novo investment if their screening
skills are insu¢ ciently low. That is,
(1) CBLA < bGRA < GRW (1.25)
(2) ACA < 
AC
W (1.26)
(3) d
GR
W
d( 1t )
< 0. (1.27)
Proof: see Appendix.
Consider Figure 1.1 for our explanations. Three locations are possible for the thresh-
old GRW as is shown in the three di¤erent scenarios. Note that the more competitive
Then, greeneld entry could take place within the range GRW  A < bGRA . However, note that GRW
will move a little to the right since the payments to the foreign bank let the welfare function shift
downwards. Since our qualitative results do not change, we abstract from payments to foreign banks.
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the host market environment is, the more GRW shifts to the left and the lower the policy
maker sets the requirements concerning a foreign banks screening e¢ ciency for entry.
Let us rst look at foreign banks that wish to grant cross border loans. In scenario
(1), foreign banks with e¢ ciency level CBLA  A < GRW are denied entry whereas
foreign banks with e¢ ciency GRW  A < GRA are forced to enter via de novo investment
instead of cross border lending. Both in scenario (2) and (3), all foreign banks that
want to operate via cross border lending are denied entry.
forced to GR
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Ad0 1
GR
Ad
AC
AdGRAdˆ
AC
Wd
GR
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Scenario (1): high competitive pressure:
NE CBL GR AC
NE GR AC
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EMP: Entry Mode Pattern;   FB: Foreign Banks;   PM: Policy Maker
Figure 1.1: Regulation of Foreign Bank Entry
Second, consider foreign banks that favor entry via de novo investment. Depending
on the location of GRW , these banks may either enter via their preferred entry mode in
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scenario (1) or be denied entry in scenario (3). In scenario (2), banks with a screening
e¢ ciency in the range of GRA  A < GRW are not granted an entry permit whereas
banks with screening e¢ ciency GRW  A < ACA are allowed to enter via de novo
investment.
Finally, let us examine the situation of foreign banks that prefer to acquire a do-
mestic bank. Foreign banks with a screening e¢ ciency larger than ACW are in all three
scenarios allowed to acquire a local bank. In scenario (1) and (2), banks with screening
e¢ ciency ACA  A < ACW are forced to enter via de novo investment. In scenario (3),
banks with a screening e¢ ciency in the range ACA  A < GRW are denied entry and
banks with a screening e¢ ciency in the range GRW  A < ACW are forced to enter via
de novo investment.
Hence, the regulation of foreign bank entry is shaped as follows. Entry is permitted
but to foreign banks that rather e¢ ciently screen borrowers. The more competitive
the host market environment is, the lower the policy maker sets the requirements
concerning a foreign banks screening e¢ ciency for entry. Hence, the less competitive
the market environment is, the more likely it is that foreign banks are denied entry.
The policy maker does not allow for cross border lending. Moreover, regulators grant a
permit to acquire a domestic bank only to the most e¢ ciently screening foreign banks.
Foreign banks that intend to expand via cross border lending or the acquisition of
a local bank are forced to enter via de novo investment if their screening skills are
insu¢ ciently low.
Note that although the policy maker may not perfectly observe the screening ef-
ciency of a foreign bank, the quality of its screening technology may be proxied by
the size of loan loss provisions or the rating of the bank. Moreover, as has been found
by Berger (2007) and Köhler (2008), the regulation of acquisition entry not only takes
place explicitly via restrictions on ownership shares but also implicitly via, for instance,
the delay of licensing procedures.
García Herrero and Martínez Pería (2007) provide support for our nding that
cross border lending is least liked by the policy maker of the host country. However,
their argument is somewhat di¤erent. They suggest that cross border lending implies
a greater volatility in capital ows and is therefore often impeded by taxes or capital
controls on foreign loans. Peek and Rosengren (2000) point to the problem that cross
border lending is more di¢ cult for the host country supervisors to monitor or inuence.
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Although a large part of foreign bank entry into Latin American and transition
countries occurred via the acquisition of domestic banks, this was often due to the
need to recapitalize domestic banks in the aftermath of banking crises in Latin America
(Martínez Pería and Mody (2004)) as well as due to large privatization programs in
transition economies (Vo Thi and Vencappa (2007)). In fact, the literature generally
points to the extensive regulation of acquisition compared to greeneld entry. Examples
are Berger et al. (2008), Majnoni et al. (2003), and Peek and Rosengren (2000).
Let us now briey discuss a further possible scenario in which the policy maker
appropriates the rents of foreign banks via the introduction of a license fee. As a
consequence, the di¤erent welfare functions would shift upwards equal to the amount
of foreign banksprots in the host banking market. First, this implies that GRW moves
to the left meaning that the policy maker now allows for the entry of less e¢ cient foreign
banks. Second, cross border lending may now emerge as an entry mode preferred by
the policy maker for some parameter range A < 
GR
A . Note that for A < 
GR
A it
holds that CBLA > 
GR
A . Hence, since WCBL shifts upward more than WGR it becomes
possible that cross border lending is preferred over greeneld entry by the policy maker.
However, for A > 
GR
A , 
CBL
A < 
GR
A holds so thatWGR shifts upward more thanWCBL
which results in an even stricter dominance of greeneld entry over cross border lending.
Third, ACW will move to the left. This is due to the fact that 
AC
W > 
AC
A . Accordingly,
at ACW it must hold that 
AC
A > 
GR
A . Then, as WAC shifts upward more than WGR,
the policy maker prefers acquisition entry for less e¢ cient foreign banks.
1.7 Empirical Hypotheses
Our model gives rise to several testable hypotheses concerning both the entry mode
decision of multinational banks and the regulation of foreign bank entry. We state our
rst hypothesis with respect to the entry mode pattern favored by foreign banks.
Hypothesis 1.1 In a given banking market, banks with the lowest screening e¢ ciencies
do not expand abroad. With increasing e¢ ciency, banks grant cross border loans. Still
more e¢ cient banks opt for de novo investment. The most e¢ cient banks choose to
access a new market via the acquisition of a local bank.
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We further analyzed how the multinational banksentry mode choice is a¤ected by
the nancial development of host countries. Based on our results, we formulate our
second testable prediction.
Hypothesis 1.2 The less developed a host banking market is, the wider the range of
foreign banks that opt for cross border lending and acquisition entry. In more developed
banking markets a trend towards de novo investment exists.
Our ndings concerning the impact of the size of host countries on the entry mode
choice of foreign banks gives rise to our third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1.3 The larger a host banking market is, the wider the range of foreign
banks that expand via a nancial foreign direct investment compared to cross border
lending. More specically, foreign banks tend to favor the acquisition of a domestic bank
when they enter rather small countries and de novo investment when they commence
to operate in rather large banking markets.
We formulate our last testable prediction with respect to our ndings regarding the
regulation of foreign bank entry.
Hypothesis 1.4 Foreign banks present in a given host banking market are rather e¢ -
cient in screening borrowers. The more competitive the market environment, the lower
the requirements concerning a foreign banks screening e¢ ciency for entry are and,
accordingly, the lower the average screening e¢ ciency of foreign banks is expected to
be. Cross border lending tends to be most strictly regulated. The most e¢ cient foreign
banks in the market tend to be those that have acquired a domestic bank.
A test of our rst three hypotheses requires data on the home markets of multi-
national banks. Only then one can account for a certain range of banks actually not
expanding abroad. With respect to our second and third hypothesis, additional infor-
mation on the nancial development and the size of the host markets of multinational
banks are needed. Moreover, a test of our rst three hypotheses should be based on
rather little regulated host banking markets. Clearly, a test of our last prediction re-
quires data on host countries of foreign banks where regulation of foreign bank entry
indeed takes places.
Throughout the empirical analysis, the screening e¢ ciency of foreign and host coun-
try banks could be proxied by the size of loan loss provisions or the rating of a bank. Soft
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information problems may be captured by the physical, cultural, legal or economic dis-
tance between foreign and host banking markets. The soft information variable needs
to be interacted with a dummy variable that captures entry via cross border lending or
greeneld investment on the one hand and acquisition of a domestic bank on the other
hand. Competitive pressure may be proxied by the degree of product di¤erentiation
or by the degree of transparency in the banking market.
1.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we analyzed a foreign banks trade-o¤between cross border lending and
a nancial foreign direct investment, i.e. greeneld or acquisition entry. We showed
that if foreign banks are rather ine¢ cient in screening borrowers, they choose not to
expand abroad. With increasing e¢ ciency, banks grant cross border loans. Still more
e¢ cient banks opt for de novo investment whereas the most e¢ cient banks favor the
acquisition of a local bank.
Moreover, we investigated how the entry mode choice of foreign banks is a¤ected by
the host countrys development and size. We found that the less developed a banking
market is, the wider the range of foreign banks that opt for cross border lending and
acquisition entry and the smaller the range of foreign banks that expand via de novo
investment. Moreover, the smaller the host banking market, the larger the range of
foreign banks that prefer the acquisition of a domestic bank and the smaller the range
of foreign banks that favor greeneld entry.
Finally, we studied the regulation of foreign bank entry. We showed that entry is
permitted but to foreign banks that rather e¢ ciently screen borrowers. Furthermore,
the less competitive the market environment is, the more likely it is that foreign banks
are denied entry. Cross border lending is not allowed for. Foreign banks that intend to
expand via cross border lending or the acquisition of a local bank are forced to enter
via de novo investment if their screening e¢ ciency is insu¢ ciently low.
Our model set-up allows for several interesting extensions. First, we might not only
consider the inuence of the host countrys development but also the impact of the
development of a foreign banks home country on its entry mode choice. If we interpret
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a foreign banks screening e¢ ciency as an indicator of its home markets development,
our model implies the following results. Banks based in the most developed countries
would tend to expand via acquisitions. Banks from less developed countries would opt
for de novo investment. Banks based in still less developed countries would prefer to
grant cross border loans whereas banks located in the least developed countries would
not expand abroad.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to allow for asymmetries in domestic banks. If
local banks di¤ered in their screening abilities, the incentives of foreign banks to acquire
a domestic bank would depend on a trade-o¤as follows. A lower e¢ ciency would imply
a smaller acquisition price. However, costs related to restructuring processes or the
amortization of bad credits might be much higher for less e¢ cient local banks.
Note that - in order to keep our model tractable - we constrained our analysis to
the entry of one representative foreign bank only. In the next chapter, we lift this
restriction and study how the entry of a large number of foreign banks a¤ects host
banking markets.
Chapter 2
Entry of Foreign Banks and Their
Impact on Host Countries
2.1 Introduction
One of the most striking developments in the banking sector in transition and emerging
market economies has been the sharp increase of foreign bank entry during the last
decade. For instance, the market share of foreign banks in Eastern Europe has gone up
from on average around 11 percent in 1995 to around 65 percent in 2003 (Claeys and
Hainz, 2006). The situation looks similar in Latin America, and foreign bank entry is
likewise on the rise in other emerging economies in Asia, Africa and the Middle East,
albeit at a lower pace (Clarke et al, 2003).
Governments liberalize their banking markets with the intention to attract new cap-
ital and to promote the restructuring of their often rather ine¢ cient banking systems.
One possible channel for how foreign banks may foster such a restructuring process is
spillover e¤ects from foreign to domestic banks; another possible channel could be the
increase in competition (Goldberg, 2007). However, the opening up of banking markets
can also entail large risks since domestic banks need to undertake huge investments to
become competitive against foreign banks.
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the impact of foreign bank entry on host
countries, emphasizing the transition and emerging market context. We study two
This chapter is joint work with Monika Schnitzer, University of Munich and CEPR.
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channels through which foreign banks may inuence the domestic banking market,
namely spillovers and an increase in competition. We ask in particular how the two
channels interact, i.e. whether or not they reinforce each other. We determine how
foreign banks a¤ect the domestic banksincentives to improve on their e¢ ciency and
the host countriessocial welfare. We also investigate how di¤erent modes of foreign
bank entry di¤er in their impact on the domestic banking market.
For this purpose, we set up a model of spatial bank competition à la Salop. Banks
compete in prices for potential borrowers that engage in investment projects of un-
certain return. In our model, banks di¤er with respect to screening abilities. Foreign
banks have perfect screening ability while, for simplicity, domestic banks in the closed
economy are assumed not to have access to a screening technology. When the do-
mestic banking market opens up, foreign banks are given the possibility to enter the
market, either via acquisition of a domestic bank or through a greeneld investment.
Due to spillover e¤ects from foreign to domestic banks, domestic banks gain access to
a screening technology, albeit not as sophisticated as that of foreign banks. Domestic
banks then have the choice to undertake an investment in order to obtain the perfect
screening technology corresponding to that of the foreign banks.
Our rst focus is on the implications of spillover e¤ects on the e¢ ciency of liberal-
izing banking markets. We nd that with rising spillovers the incentives of domestic
banks to invest in the perfect screening technology fall because the higher the spillover
e¤ects, the less a bank gains by investing in screening. Thus, we identify a trade-o¤
between two regimes. High spillover e¤ects result in a market in which just a few banks
invest in perfect screening ability, while a large number of domestic banks know how
to screen fairly well due to the spillover e¤ects. In contrast, low spillovers imply a
situation in which a lot of domestic banks invest in the perfect screening technology
but some domestic banks screen only very imperfectly.
A second major issue we study is the role of competition in terms of the number of
banks operating in the market. Since the number of banks in the economy increases in
case of de novo investments but stays constant with acquisition entry, greeneld entry
corresponds to a more competitive market environment. Hence, analyzing the e¤ect of
competition allows us to draw some conclusions concerning the di¤erent implications
of acquisition and de novo entry for liberalizing banking markets. We nd that a larger
number of banks operating in the market leads to declining repayment rates as well as
to smaller market shares and, thus, tends to decrease the incentives of domestic banks
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to invest in screening. We conclude that investment incentives for domestic banks are
higher in the case of acquisition than in the case of greeneld entry.
A major focus of our analysis constitutes the interaction of spillovers and compe-
tition. We nd that spillovers and competition reinforce each other in their negative
impact on the number of domestic banks investing in screening. Thus, the di¤erent
implications of acquisition and greeneld entry widen when spillovers rise.
From a social welfare point of view, the impact of spillovers and an increase in the
number of banks is ambiguous and depends on the competitive environment in the
domestic banking market. When competition is low, welfare increases with spillovers
and decreases with the number of banks operating in the market, pointing to acquisition
as the preferable mode of entry. By contrast, in situations with high competitive
pressure, lower spillovers as well as a larger number of banks and, thus, greeneld
entry, is to be preferred.
Our major conclusions from the welfare analysis are thus as follows: both modes of
competition work as complements. In particular, a larger number of banks operating
in the market and thus greeneld entry can, in general, only be welfare enhancing
in rather competitive banking markets. Hence, one channel of competition is not
su¢ cient in order to raise welfare, but rather a high level of both competition e¤ects is
necessary for enhancing welfare. In contrast, we nd that spillovers constitute a form
of substitute relative to either channel of competition, i.e. potential positive welfare
e¤ects of spillovers are lower the stronger is competition.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We provide an overview of
related literature in the next section. Section 2.3 describes the set-up of the model.
In section 2.4 we study the equilibrium in the banking market. Section 2.5 analyzes
the comparative statics of spillover e¤ects and competitive pressure on the e¢ ciency of
the domestic banking market. We present the welfare analysis in section 2.6. Section
2.7 discusses empirical hypotheses that can be derived from our theoretical analysis.
Section 2.8 concludes.
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2.2 Related Literature
Foreign bank entry has received surprisingly little attention in the literature so far.
Goldberg (2007) raises the issue by comparing foreign direct investments in the nan-
cial and the manufacturing sector, focusing on the implications for emerging market
economies. Attempts to analyze foreign bank entry in a theoretical framework have
been scarce. DellAriccia et al. (1999) point to the problem potential entrant banks
may face in distinguishing good from bad borrowers that have already been rejected by
incumbent banks. In line with this approach, DellAriccia and Marquez (2004) analyze
the trade-o¤ between superior information of host country banks and lower renancing
costs of foreign banks entering the market. Buch (2003) sets up a theoretical model of
foreign bank entry and nds empirical support for the hypothesis that large information
barriers discourage entry of foreign banks. Hauswald and Marquez (2003) consider the
possibility of information spillovers from incumbent host country banks to potential en-
trants and show that, as a result, interest rates and bank prots decrease. Kaas (2004)
presents a model of spatial loan competition and arrives at the conclusion that foreign
bank entry is generally too low compared to the social optimum. Claeys and Hainz
(2006) as well as Van Tassel and Vishwasrao (2007) look at how di¤erent entry modes
of foreign banks a¤ect competition in a liberalized banking market. Both approaches
indicate that greeneld entry leads to more competition and thus lower interest rates
in the host banking market. The issue of di¤erent market entry modes of foreign banks
has also been addressed by De Haas and van Lelyveld (2006). Their study implies
that the credit supply of foreign banks remains stable during crisis periods in the host
country and that this e¤ect is mainly driven by greeneld foreign banks.
We contribute to this strand of literature by introducing spillover e¤ects into a
model of spatial bank competition. In this respect, our analysis corresponds to the-
oretical approaches examining the e¤ect of spillovers on R&D investment and cost
reduction. Negative e¤ects of spillovers on R&D incentives and cost reduction e¤ort
are stated by Spence (1984). In contrast, Cohen and Levinthal (1989) as well as Levin
and Reiss (1988) both nd theoretical and empirical support for the hypothesis that
intra-industry spillovers may lead to an increase in R&D investment.
Görg and Strobl (2001) nd that empirical evidence on spillovers is mixed and point
to the role of the underlying econometric framework. Coe and Helpman (1995) and
Coe et al. (1997) suggest that foreign R&D via international trade entails spillovers in
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the sense that total factor productivity rises both in developed and in developing coun-
tries. Similarly, Beck et al. (2000) conclude that nancial intermediary development
raises total factor productivity growth. Blomström and Kokko (1998) also support this
view. In their survey of literature on spillovers from multinational corporations to host
country rms they nd evidence that the e¤ect of spillovers is positive and increases
with the degree of competition in the host country. Ceccagnoli (2005) indicates that
spillovers increase R&D e¤ort when the number of innovating rms is small.
In addition to the impact of spillovers, we study the e¤ect of competition on the
incentives of host country banks to invest in better screening skills. Our model relates
to a strand of theoretical literature on the inuence of competition on innovation in-
centives. Vives (2004) shows that an increasing number of rms in the market imply
lower R&D investment while rising competition in terms of increasing product substi-
tutability encourages R&D incentives. Raith (2003) investigates the e¤ect of mounting
competition on cost reducing e¤ort in a principal agent setting and concludes that both
an increasing number of rms in the market and rising product substitutability increase
the incentives to invest in cost reduction. In contrast, Boot and Marinµc (2006) nd
that ercer competition in terms of an increasing number of banks operating in the
market reduces bankse¤orts to invest in better monitoring technologies. Schnitzer
(1999) studies the impact of competition on the e¢ ciency of credit allocation. She
nds that screening incentives rise with the number of informed banks and that in-
creasing competition raises the likelihood of bad loans. Hauswald and Marquez (2006)
present a model of spatial bank competition in which banks can invest in strategic
information acquisition about the quality of borrowersinvestment projects and nd
that rising competition decreases investment in screening. Similarly, Broecker (1990)
and Sharpe (1990) show that increasing competition decreases the quality of a banks
loan portfolio.
There are a number of empirical papers investigating increasing competition in the
light of foreign bank entry. Claessens et al. (2001) suggest that higher competitive
pressure due to foreign bank entry implies an increase in the e¢ ciency of host country
banks and, thus, higher welfare in economies liberalizing their banking markets. Clarke
et al. (2006) nd evidence that foreign bank presence implies lower nancing obstacles
for all rms in a market. De Haas and Naaborg (2006) conclude that due to increased
competition in the market for large corporations, foreign banks increased their lending
activities in the segment of small and medium enterprises and in retail banking. Fries
and Taci (2005) study the cost e¢ ciency of banks in Eastern European Countries
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and nd that the costs of all banks are lower when the presence of foreign banks
in a country is high. These results are conrmed by Bhaumik and Dimova (2004).
However, Sabi (1996) nds support for the hypothesis that foreign bank entry does
not help to improve the performance of domestic banks. Martínez Pería and Mody
(2004) distinguish between acquisition and greeneld entry in the context of Latin
America. They nd that the interest rate spread of foreign banks entering via a de novo
investment is lower than that of banks entering via the acquisition of a host country
bank. Moreover, their analysis suggests that a higher presence of foreign banks leads
to lower costs of all banks operating in the market.
2.3 The Model
Consider a continuum of borrowers with mass m that are uniformly distributed along
a circular road with circumference 1. Each borrower can engage in one investment
project that requires an initial outlay of i; i > 0. Borrowers are not endowed with
any initial wealth and therefore need to apply for credit at the banks, the only source
of nance in our model. Borrowers have either good or bad projects. It is common
knowledge that the fraction of borrowers with good projects is  and the fraction of
borrowers with bad projects is 1  ; 0 <  < 1. Individual borrowers know about the
quality of their own investment projects. In case the project is good, it generates a
return v > 0 with certainty while a bad project always fails, yielding a return of zero.
The returns of the projects are observable and contractible.
The banking sector consists of n banks that are located equidistantly along the
circular road.11 Banks compete in the repayments rj; j = 1; :::; n which they simulta-
neously ask from the borrowers. Borrowers whose investment projects yield a return
of v must repay rj to the bank whereas borrowers whose projects fail do not repay
their loan. We assume that banks in the closed domestic banking market do not have
access to a screening technology so that all borrowers are o¤ered a loan of size i be-
cause we assume v > i.12 We take it as given that each bank disposes of enough
funds to nance all borrowers applying for a loan. We assume that banks can observe
11For our analysis to be interesting we assume that the number of banks n in the market is not too
small.
12Think for instance of the transition countries where, due to the planning of the economy, no
screening took place during the communist era.
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the location of borrowers.13 Borrowers base their decision at which bank to apply for
credit on the repayments rj asked by the banks and the transport costs they have to
incur to travel to the bank. We assume that transport costs tx are proportional to
the distance x between the borrower and the bank. Furthermore, we assume that the
return of a good project v is high enough so that the market is covered at equilibrium
prices. Borrowers and banks are risk neutral and maximize prots.
We consider the situation where the domestic banking market is opened up to
a number l of foreign banks.14 We distinguish between two entry modes. Foreign
banks can enter either via a greeneld investment or via the acquisition of a domestic
bank. When banks enter via a de novo investment a foreign subsidiary is established
in the domestic banking market and so the number of banks operating in the market
increases.15 In contrast, entry via acquisition leaves the number of banks constant since
we consider an acquired domestic bank as a foreign bank. As a matter of simplicity, we
assume that there are no costs of entry. Banks locate equidistantly along the circular
road. We assume that foreign banks possess perfect screening ability.16 Consequently,
foreign banks nance all borrowers with good projects that ask for credit whereas a
borrower with a bad project is never o¤ered a loan.
Note that our model set-up allows us to distinguish between two channels of com-
petition. First, competition can be measured by the number of banks active in the
market. Second, the competitive pressure of the market environment expressed by the
inverse of transportation costs 1
t
acts as a further indicator of competition in our model:
the larger the transportation costs t, i.e. the more costly it becomes for borrowers to
travel to a bank, the less intense price competition will be between banks. Conversely,
the higher is 1
t
, the more competitive is the market environment. The important role of
transportation costs for the pricing of loans has been conrmed empirically by Degryse
and Ongena (2005).17
13As e.g. in DellAriccia (2001), this assumption considerably simplies our analysis. Note that we
abstract from the possibility of price discrimination of borrowers.
14For our analysis to be interesting we assume that there is a su¢ ciently large number of domestic
banks that can be a¤ected by foreign bank entry, i.e. ln is not close to 1.
15Note that we abstract from explicitly modeling supervisory issues so that the foreign banks
choice between establishing a branch or subsidiary in the host country is of no importance for our
results.
16The assumption of foreign banks disposing of perfect screening ability considerably simplies our
analysis. However, the relaxation of this assumption is further discussed in footnote 25.
17Alternatively, 1t could be interpreted as the degree of product di¤erentiation in the banking
market. In that case, the location of a bank would signify its specialization in a certain credit
product or industry and transport costs would express the preferences borrowers have for a particular
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We assume that with foreign banks entering the domestic banking market spillover
e¤ects occur. Spillovers may materialize through various channels. Authors such as
Blomström and Kokko (1998) and Saggi (2002) point to the importance of the host
countrys labor market for the occurrence of spillovers. As it has been empirically
conrmed by Görg and Strobl (2005), spillovers may occur when domestic banks get
their sta¤ trained abroad or when domestic sta¤ that has been employed and trained
by foreign banks uctuates to domestic banks. The replication of high quality nancial
services o¤ered by foreign banks may constitute a further channel for spillovers. In
addition, spillovers may be realized through the implementation of better risk manage-
ment techniques, superior forms of organization or better data processing technologies.
Moreover, foreign banks are likely to press for an improved regulatory supervision of
the banking markets they enter.
Spillover e¤ects are modeled as follows. With the entry of foreign banks domestic
banks obtain access to an imperfect screening technology. Domestic banks can therefore
identify the fraction 1 ; 0 <  < 1; of borrowers investing in bad projects but cannot
distinguish between the remaining fraction  of borrowers with bad projects and the
borrowers with good projects. Accordingly, domestic banks nance the fraction  of
borrowers investing in bad projects as well as all borrowers with good projects applying
for credit. However, the fraction 1  of borrowers with bad projects is denied credit.
Hence, the higher is the spillover e¤ect, the better is the quality of the screening
technology the domestic banks obtain and the lower is the fraction  of borrowers with
bad projects nanced in the banking market opened to foreign banks.18 Without loss
of generality, we assume that there are no per borrower screening costs for all banks.
Domestic banks have the possibility to invest a xed cost F > 0 in order to obtain
the perfect screening technology.19 This decision is taken simultaneously by all domestic
banks. Hence, domestic banks need to weigh the size of the xed cost against the
costs associated with the nancing of borrowers with bad projects in case they do
not invest in the perfect screening technology. As a result, the situation in the open
domestic banking market looks as follows. Three types of banks can operate in this
type of bank. Models in the banking literature based on a Salop approach referring to product
di¤erentiation in the nancial sector are, for instance, Besanko and Thakor (1992), Chiappori et al.
(1995), DellAriccia (2001), or Economides et al. (1996).
18In this chapter, we abstract from domestic banks having access to soft information. Note that
our results would remain qualitatively una¤ected if we introduced soft information advantages of
domestic banks as long as we ensured that foreign banks are still better in distinguishing bad from
good borrowers.
19Our qualitative results would remain una¤ected if we introduced the size of the xed cost to vary
with the degree of spillovers.
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market: foreign banks, domestic banks that possess the perfect screening technology,
and domestic banks that only screen imperfectly.
When borrowers apply for credit at the banks, banks engage in screening the bor-
rowers. Banks that have access to the perfect screening technology make credit o¤ers
only to borrowers with good projects whereas banks not having invested in screening
o¤er a loan to borrowers investing in good projects and the fraction  of borrowers
with bad projects. Borrowers with bad projects that are denied credit do not apply
for credit at another bank because banks can deduce from the borrowerslocation that
they have unsuccessfully applied for a loan at another bank.
The time structure of the model is as follows. At stage 1, the domestic banking
market is opened up to foreign banks and spillover e¤ects occur. At stage 2, domes-
tic banks have the possibility to invest in the perfect screening technology. At stage
3, banks simultaneously set repayment rates. At stage 4, borrowers apply for credit
and banks engage in screening borrowers. Borrowers that have successfully passed the
screening procedure are o¤ered a loan. At stage 5, returns realize and all borrow-
ers investing in good projects pay back their loan. We solve the game by backward
induction.
2.4 Equilibrium in the Banking Market
In this section, we study the equilibrium in the domestic banking market with foreign
bank entry.20 We rst calculate the equilibrium repayments that di¤erent types of
banks ask from the borrowers for a given number k of domestic banks that invest in
perfect screening. Then, we derive the equilibrium number of domestic banks k that
invest in the perfect screening technology. We assume that all banks are randomly but
equidistantly allocated along the circle, so that each location is equally likely for each
bank. Thus, we can dene the probability that the neighboring bank of a perfectly
screening bank also has access to the perfect screening technology as q  l+k 1
n 1 .
21
20Note that in our model, all domestic banks either stay in the market when covering a positive
market share or they leave the market when foreign banks charge such low interest rates that all
borrowers would apply for credit at foreign banks. Since we are interested in how foreign entry
a¤ects the domestic banksincentive to invest in more e¢ cient screening technologies, we restrict our
presentation to the second case.
21Note that banks can only build expectations about whether their neighbors invest in screening
or not and, accordingly, charge high or low repayments. This assumption is used as a modeling
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Proposition 2.1 In equilibrium, banks with perfect screening technology charge a re-
payment rL, whereas banks with imperfect screening technology charge a repayment
rH > rL, where
rL = i+
t
n
+
i (1  )

1  q
2
(2.1)
rH = i+
t
n
+
i (1  )


1  q
2

: (2.2)
Proof: see Appendix.
The equilibrium prices described in Proposition 2.1 result in the following equi-
librium prots of foreign banks, FB, of domestic banks that invest in the perfect
screening technology, DB;L, and of domestic banks that do not invest in screening,
DB;H :
FB =
m
t
[
1
2
(1  q) 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n
]2 (2.3)
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]2 (2.5)
Note that the prots of all banks depend negatively on the share of perfectly screen-
ing banks in the market. The intuition behind this is that rst, the more banks operate
in the market that screen perfectly, the lower will be the expected market share for any
individual bank in the market because the likelihood that it needs to share its mar-
ket with a perfectly screening bank increases. Second, a higher fraction of perfectly
screening banks in the market leads to lower repayments which both types of banks
can ask from the borrowers in equilibrium; this, in turn, decreases prots for all banks.
However, the prots of banks that have access to the perfect screening technology fall
by more than those of imperfectly screening banks. On the one hand, this is due to
the fact that the reduction in the size of the repayment is weighed by a larger expected
market share covered by these banks compared to the banks which screen imperfectly.
On the other hand, the more banks operate in the market that screen perfectly, the
lower are the costs arising from borrowers with bad projects if a bank does not invest
in the screening technology. This is due to the fall in the expected market share and
device in order to avoid asymmetric equilibria and keep the model tractable. We refer to Aghion and
Schankerman (2004) for further justications of this assumption.
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hence the smaller number of borrowers with bad projects asking for a loan.
Next, we derive the equilibrium number k of domestic banks that invest in the
perfect screening technology. When deciding about whether to invest in screening or
not, a domestic bank weighs the required xed cost against the costs associated with the
nancing of borrowers with bad projects if it does not invest in screening. Proposition
2.2 characterizes the three di¤erent kinds of equilibria we get for low, medium and high
xed costs for the perfect screening technology.
Proposition 2.2 There exist values of xed costs F and F , with F < F , such that
(1) for low values of the xed cost F  F; all domestic banks invest in the perfect
screening technology;
(2) for high values of the xed cost F  F ; no domestic bank invests in the perfect
screening technology;
(3) for intermediate values of the xed cost in the range F < F < F a number
k; 1  k  n  l; of domestic banks invests in the perfect screening technology. The
number k is the integer number that lies between
k =
n
2
  l   2t (n  1)
i (1  ) [
F
mi (1  )
(n  1)
(n  2)  
1
n
] (2.6)
and
k = k + 1: (2.7)
Proof: see Appendix.
The decision of a domestic bank to invest in screening or not clearly depends on
what all other domestic banks do. The higher the number of domestic banks that invest
in screening the less attractive it becomes for a bank to spend the xed cost. This is
due to the fact that with a rising fraction of perfectly screening banks in the market,
the prot of a bank that has access to the perfect screening technology decreases by
more than the prot of a bank screening imperfectly as explained above. If the xed
cost is very low, however, the investment incentives are so large that it pays for a
domestic bank to invest in the screening technology even if all other domestic banks
also invest in screening. If, instead, the xed cost is very large then it does not pay for
a domestic bank to spend the xed cost even if all other domestic banks do not invest
in the screening technology, either. For intermediate ranges of the xed cost these two
extreme equilibrium outcomes are not feasible.
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We can show that for intermediate values of the xed cost an equilibrium exists
in which exactly k domestic banks invest in the screening technology whereas the
remainder of domestic banks does not invest in screening. Such an equilibrium is stable
if DB;L (k = k)  DB;H (k = k   1) and DB;H (k = k)  DB;L (k = k + 1). The
value k that satises these two conditions is described in Proposition 2.2. Note that in
equilibrium, banks are not indi¤erent between investing and not investing in screening
since the prot of banks that screen perfectly lies slightly above the prot of banks
screening imperfectly. Given k, however, no domestic bank has an incentive to deviate
because that would imply even lower prots.
2.5 Impact of Spillovers and Competition on the
E¢ ciency of the Domestic Banking Market
In this section we study the impact of spillovers as well as competition on the e¢ ciency
of the domestic banking market. In a rst step, we analyze how spillovers on the one
hand and competition in the number of banks on the other hand a¤ect the equilibrium
number of domestic banks investing in screening, k. Second, we concentrate on how
the interaction of these two e¤ects inuences the domestic banksincentive to invest
in screening. Finally, we are interested in how the competitive pressure prevailing
in the domestic banking market, as measured by the inverse of transportation costs,
inuences the strength of spillover e¤ects and competition in the number of banks in
their impact on the domestic banking markets e¢ ciency. Yet, before investigating
these interdependencies and in order to clarify the analysis, we give an intuition on
how the number of domestic banks investing in screening k depends on 1
t
. In the
remainder we focus on the case of intermediate xed costs of screening in which k
domestic banks invest in the perfect screening technology.
The following Proposition characterizes how k is inuenced by spillover e¤ects.
We use ( ) to capture the size of the spillovers. The larger ( ) ; i.e. the smaller ;
the larger are the spillover e¤ects.
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Proposition 2.3 The equilibrium number of domestic banks that invest in perfect
screening is a decreasing and concave function of the size of the spillover e¤ect. That
is,
dk
d ( ) < 0 and
d2k
d ( )2 < 0. (2.8)
Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is as follows: with rising spillover e¤ects even those
domestic banks that do not invest in perfect screening are able to identify a larger
fraction of borrowers with bad projects. This, in turn, allows the banks to become
more competitive in the sense that they can decrease the repayment they ask from the
borrowers because the negative e¤ect of an increasing market share, i.e. losses from
bad projects, is reduced.
Consequently, banks investing in the perfect screening technology also need to lower
their repayment o¤ers and, in addition, their expected market share will fall. Thus,
domestic banks that do not invest in the perfect screening technology obtain larger
prots whereas prots of banks with perfect screening ability decrease. Hence, the
incentives to invest in the perfect screening technology and, accordingly, the number
of domestic banks investing in screening falls when spillovers rise.
Note, however, that spillover e¤ects have a positive inuence on the overall e¢ ciency
of the domestic banking market in the sense that the domestic banks that did not screen
at all in the closed banking market obtain access to an imperfect screening technology.
Consequently, we identify a clear trade-o¤: with low spillover e¤ects a large number
of perfectly screening domestic banks operates in the market but there are also a few
banks that screen very imperfectly. The situation is di¤erent with high spillovers: the
number of domestic banks screening perfectly is rather low but all other domestic banks
not investing in screening operate quite e¢ ciently due to the large spillovers.
Next, we analyze the impact of competition in terms of the number of banks op-
erating in the market n on the equilibrium number of domestic banks that invest in
screening.22 Thereby, we capture the impact of the di¤erent entry modes on the invest-
ment incentives of domestic banks. Note that when banks enter via de novo investment
22We treat the number of banks in the market as exogenous. Note that entry during the early
liberalization period in transition countries was in general heavily regulated. Hence, we think of
the number of banks in the market as a policy makersdecision variable and will derive the welfare
maximizing policy regarding n later on.
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a foreign subsidiary is established in the domestic banking market and so the number
of banks operating in the market increases.23 In contrast, entry via acquisition leaves
the number of banks operating in the economy constant since only the ownership of a
domestic bank that is acquired by a foreign bank changes. Proposition 2.4 characterizes
how competition as measured by the number of banks a¤ects k.
Proposition 2.4 The number of domestic banks that invest in perfect screening is a
decreasing and concave function of the overall number of banks in the market. That is,
dk
dn
< 0 and
d2k
dn2
< 0. (2.9)
Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition here is as follows: an increasing number of banks lead to lower equi-
librium repayment rates as well as to lower market shares for all banks. However,
domestic banks not investing in screening lose relatively less since a falling market
share also means a smaller number of bad borrowers nanced.
Proposition 2.4 further implies that entry via greeneld investment will decrease
the equilibrium number of domestic banks investing in screening by more than entry
via acquisition.
We now turn to the interaction of spillovers and competition in the number of banks
operating in the market. Our results are summarized in Proposition 2.5.
Proposition 2.5 Spillovers and competition in the number of banks operating in the
market reinforce each other in their negative impact on the number of domestic banks
investing in screening, k. That is,
@2k
@ ( ) @n < 0. (2.10)
Proof: see Appendix.
23Thereby, we account for the major di¤erence between greeneld and acquisition entry, namely
the higher competitiveness prevailing in a market when entry occurs via de novo investment.
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We nd that the larger the spillovers the higher is the absolute marginal negative
impact of an increasing number of banks operating in the market on the incentives of
domestic banks to invest in screening and vice versa. Hence, spillovers and competition
reinforce each other in their negative impact on the number of perfectly screening
domestic banks. We conclude that spillovers and competition work as complements
with respect to the investment incentives of domestic banks.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Higher spillovers entail larger market
shares of domestic banks not investing in screening. Thus, higher spillovers imply
that an increase in the number of banks operating in the market results in a loss
of relatively more borrowers with bad projects. Hence, the negative impact of an
increasing number of banks on the investment incentives of domestic banks is reinforced
with larger spillovers.
It is interesting to see that contrary to the often claimed positive role of spillovers
and competition for nancial development we arrive at the opposite result.24 Even
more, in our model one e¤ect cannot substitute for the other; instead, both e¤ects
reinforce each other in their negative impact on the incentives of domestic banks to
invest in screening.
Note also that the higher the spillovers, the more distinct the implications of de
novo and acquisition entry. This is due to the fact that with larger spillovers the
negative impact of de novo investments on the equilibrium number of domestic banks
investing in screening becomes stronger.25
For our policy conclusions it is important to know how the strength of the spillover
and competition e¤ects just described depends on the competitive environment in the
domestic banking market as measured by the inverse of transportation costs. Before
we address this issue in more detail, we rst give an intuition of how competitive
24In our model, higher spillovers and more competition through bank entry make domestic banks
invest less in the perfect screening technology.
25Throughout our analysis, we assume that foreign banks can perfectly screen borrowers which
considerably simplies our analysis. If we allowed for an imperfect but still more e¢ cient screening
technology of foreign compared to domestic banks, our results would change as follows. The advantage
of foreign over domestic banks in screening borrowers would be lower. Our calculations show that
allowing for an imperfect screening technology for foreign banks results in a lower equilibrium number
of domestic banks investing in screening. Furthermore, we arrive at even stronger results concerning
our comparative statics analysis: the negative impact of spillovers as well as the number of domestic
banks on the equilibrium number of domestic banks investing in screening is reinforced. Moreover,
spillovers and the number of banks in the market more strongly reinforce each other in their negative
impact on the incentives of domestic banks to invest in screening.
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pressure 1
t
a¤ects the incentives of domestic banks to invest in screening. Our results
are summarized in Proposition 2.6.
Proposition 2.6 In the case of l < n 2
2
, there exists a xed cost F1 such that the
number of domestic banks that invest in perfect screening is a decreasing and convex
function of competitive pressure 1
t
for low values of the xed cost F , i.e. F < F1, and
an increasing and concave function of competitive pressure 1
t
for high values of F , i.e.
F > F1. In the case of l > n 22 , the number of domestic banks that invest in perfect
screening is a decreasing and convex function of competitive pressure 1
t
independent of
the size of the xed cost F . That is,
(1) if l < n 2
2
:
for F < F1, dk

d( 1t )
< 0 and d
2k
d( 1t )
2 > 0 (2.11)
for F > F1, dk

d( 1t )
> 0 and d
2k
d( 1t )
2 < 0; (2.12)
(2) if l > n 2
2
: dk

d( 1t )
< 0 and d
2k
d( 1t )
2 > 0. (2.13)
Proof: see Appendix.
Here, we identify two countervailing e¤ects, a price e¤ect and a market share e¤ect.
On the one hand, with higher competitive pressure 1
t
all banks need to lower the
repayments they charge the borrowers. As a consequence, prots of all banks fall.
However, the prot of banks investing in screening decreases by more than that of
banks not investing in screening since the former cover a larger expected market share.
Thus, this negative price e¤ect works against investment incentives of domestic banks.
On the other hand, increasing competitive pressure 1
t
implies higher market shares
of perfectly screening and lower market shares of imperfectly screening banks. The
resulting higher asymmetry of banks with respect to their market shares leads to an
increase in the prots of banks investing in screening and a decrease in the prots of
banks not investing. Hence, the driving factor implying higher screening incentives
when competitive pressure rises is the higher asymmetry of banks in market shares.
The overall outcome depends on whether the market share e¤ect outweighs the price
e¤ect or vice versa. The rising asymmetry in market shares is the dominating e¤ect
when the number of perfectly screening banks in the market is rather small. For this
to be true it must hold that the share of foreign banks in the market is not too large,
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i.e. l < n 2
2
, and that the xed cost for the screening technology takes on rather high
values, i.e. F > F1, ensuring rather low incentives to invest in better screening. Then,
with increasing competitive pressure 1
t
the di¤erence in the market shares of investing
and not investing banks widens and, thus, a bank can gain a lot when investing in
the screening technology. For F < F1, instead, the negative price e¤ect dominates the
positive market share e¤ect. In this case, a rise in competitive pressure 1
t
has a negative
impact on the number of domestic banks investing in screening. Note that when foreign
banks dominate roughly more than one half of the banking market, i.e. l > n 2
2
, the
negative price e¤ect always outweighs the positive market share e¤ect, independent of
the size of the xed cost F . In that case, increasing competitive pressure always has a
negative impact on investment incentives.
It is interesting to observe that a rising number of banks operating in the market
and higher competitive pressure 1
t
can have the opposite e¤ect on the incentives of
domestic banks to invest in screening. This is due to the fact that both channels of
competition in our model work in quite di¤erent ways. In the rst case, the decisive
e¤ect leading to a fall in screening incentives is the smaller fraction of bad borrowers
nanced by imperfectly screening banks while in the second case, the higher investment
incentives are driven by a larger asymmetry of banks in market shares.
We now turn to the impact of the competitive pressure 1
t
in a market on the strength
of the spillover and competition e¤ects. Our ndings are summarized in Proposition
2.7.
Proposition 2.7 Increasing competitive pressure 1
t
decreases the absolute marginal
negative inuence of spillovers and competition in the number of banks on the incentives
of domestic banks to invest in perfect screening. That is,
@2k
@ ( ) @  1
t
 > 0 (2.14)
@2k
@n@
 
1
t
 > 0: (2.15)
Proof: see Appendix.
Hence, increasing competitive pressure 1
t
mitigates the negative impact of spillovers
and competition in the number of banks on the incentives of domestic banks to invest
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in screening. Accordingly, the more competitive the market environment, the less
pronounced is the e¤ect of the di¤erent entry modes on the investment incentives of
domestic banks.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Higher competitive pressure 1
t
corresponds
to smaller market shares of imperfectly screening domestic banks. Thus, larger com-
petitive pressure 1
t
implies that an increase in spillovers or the number of banks in the
market results in a smaller loss of borrowers with bad projects. Hence, the negative
impact of rising spillovers and competition in the number of banks on the incentives
to invest in screening is dampened with rising competitive pressure.
We conclude that both channels of competition work as substitutes with respect
to the incentives of domestic banks to invest in screening. Interestingly, spillovers and
the competitive pressure of the market environment constitute substitutes whereas
spillovers and the number of banks in the market behave as complements regarding
the investment incentives of domestic banks.
2.6 Impact of Spillovers and Competition on
Welfare
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of spillovers and competition on welfare, W .
Welfare consists of the sum of borrower rents and bank rents. Borrower rents are
captured by the willingness to pay of borrowers minus the repayments of borrowers
to banks and their transport costs. Bank rents include the revenues of banks minus
their costs. We could consider two possible welfare functions. The rst possibility is
to include the prots of foreign banks in the welfare function. This approach could
be justied by assuming that in case of acquisition entry, the price paid to acquire a
domestic bank equals all future expected prots of the foreign bank merged with the
domestic bank. In case of greeneld entry, a foreign bank may be forced to buy a
license equal to all future expected prots of the bank in order to be allowed to enter
the market. Alternatively, we could exclude the prots of foreign banks from welfare
in the domestic economy. However, since the results of both set-ups turn out to be
fairly similar we will restrict our presentation to the rst approach.26
26In order to analytically solve for the welfare implications, we focus on the following parameter
ranges throughout section 2.6. We assume that the share of borrowers with good projects is larger
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In what follows, we study the impact of spillovers as well as the number of banks
in the market and, thus, the entry mode on welfare. Our analysis will show that
the inuence of both e¤ects on welfare is ambiguous and depends on the degree of
competitive pressure as measured by 1
t
. Therefore, we will rst give an intuition for
the implications of the degree of competitive pressure 1
t
on welfare. Our ndings are
summarized in Proposition 2.8.
Proposition 2.8 Increasing competitive pressure 1
t
unambiguously increases welfare.
That is,
@W
@
 
1
t
 > 0. (2.16)
Proof: see Appendix.
As stated in Proposition 2.8, rising competition unambiguously increases welfare.
This is mainly due to the fact that borrowers incur lower costs when traveling to a bank.
In addition, mounting competitive pressure leads to larger market shares of perfectly
and to smaller market shares of imperfectly screening banks entailing less nancing of
bad borrowers.
Note that according to our previous analysis the strength of the spillover and com-
petition e¤ects decreases with increasing competitive pressure 1
t
. Hence, surprisingly,
welfare is the higher the lower is the marginal impact of spillovers and competition
in the number of banks. We conclude that in a highly competitive market, the often
mentioned importance of spillovers and the number of banks operating in a market for
nancial development may be overestimated.
We will now study the inuence of the size of spillovers and competition in terms
of the number of banks on welfare. Both e¤ects depend on the competitive pressure 1
t
prevailing in the market as well as the size of the xed cost F . First, we look at the
e¤ect of spillovers on welfare. Our results are summarized in Proposition 2.9.
than one half and not arbitrarily close to its boundary values, and that spillovers are not too large
i.e. 1   < 0:75.
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Proposition 2.9 There exists a threshold F2 for xed costs and three thresholds T1,
T2 and T3, T1 < T2 < T3, for the level of competitive pressure 1t with the following
properties:
(1) suppose F < F2, then
(i) @W
@( ) < 0 if
1
t
< T1 (2.17)
(ii) @W
@( ) > 0 if T1 <
1
t
< T2 (2.18)
(iii) @W
@( ) < 0 if
1
t
> T2; (2.19)
(2) suppose F > F2, then
(i) @W
@( ) > 0 if
1
t
< T3 (2.20)
(ii) @W
@( ) < 0 if
1
t
> T3. (2.21)
Proof: see Appendix.
Abstracting from the case of low xed costs combined with low competitive pres-
sure, welfare increases in spillovers when competitive pressure 1
t
is rather small and
decreases in spillovers when the competitive pressure 1
t
of the market environment is
rather large. Hence, in general, spillovers and competitive pressure 1
t
tend to work
as substitutes with respect to welfare. This corresponds to our previous ndings of
spillovers and competitive pressure 1
t
behaving as substitutes with respect to the in-
centives of domestic banks to invest in screening.
Intuitively, these results can be explained as follows. Consider a situation of rather
low competitive pressure 1
t
. In the case of low xed costs, the incentives of domestic
banks to invest in screening are high and rise further when spillovers fall. In contrast,
for rather large values of the xed cost, a small number of domestic banks invest in
screening and rising spillovers lower the investment incentives even more. As a result,
in both cases, the composition of the banking market becomes more homogeneous in
the sense that either perfectly or imperfectly screening banks dominate the market. It
follows that transport costs paid in the economy fall and, in turn, welfare increases.
However, in the presence of rather high competitive pressure 1
t
, investment incen-
tives of domestic banks cease to vary a lot with the level of spillovers. For su¢ ciently
large competitive pressure, it is welfare optimal to limit spillover e¤ects, independent
of the size of the xed cost. As a consequence, market shares of domestic banks not
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investing in screening fall whereas the market shares of perfectly screening banks rise
entailing a decrease in the number of bad borrowers nanced and, in turn, an increase
in welfare.
From Proposition 2.9 it can be inferred that, in general, it is welfare optimal to
foster spillover e¤ects when competitive pressure 1
t
is rather low. For instance, the
host countrys policy maker could encourage spillovers by supporting domestic banks in
getting their sta¤ trained abroad or by imposing regulations on foreign banks implying
that a certain fraction of their sta¤must be of the host countrys nationality. However,
Proposition 2.9 also entails the limitation of spillovers in the presence of relatively large
competitive pressure. In that case, the host countrys policy maker may abstain from
implementing measures that foster spillovers.
Now, we turn to the impact of competition in terms of the number of banks oper-
ating in the market and, thus, the entry mode of foreign banks on welfare. Our results
are stated in Proposition 2.10.
Proposition 2.10 There exists a threshold F3 for xed costs and three thresholds T4,
T5 and T6, T4 < T5 < T6, for the level of competitive pressure 1t with the following
properties:
(1) suppose F < F3, then
(i) @W
@n
< 0 if 1
t
< T6 (2.22)
(ii) @W
@n
> 0 if 1
t
> T6; (2.23)
(2) suppose F > F3, then
(i) @W
@n
> 0 if 1
t
< T4 (2.24)
(ii) @W
@n
< 0 if T4 <
1
t
< T5 (2.25)
(iii) @W
@n
> 0 if 1
t
> T5. (2.26)
Proof: see Appendix.
Foreign banks should enter the domestic banking market via de novo investment if
an increase in the number of banks operating in the market raises welfare. Abstracting
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from the case of large xed costs combined with very low competitive pressure, green-
eld entry is to be preferred from a welfare perspective when competitive pressure 1
t
is rather large whereas acquisition entry is considered welfare optimal in the presence
of rather low competitive pressure. It follows that both channels of competition in our
model tend to work as complements with respect to welfare.
The intuition for these results corresponds to the previous reasoning regarding
spillover e¤ects. Consider a situation of rather low competitive pressure 1
t
. In the
case of low xed costs, the incentives of domestic banks to invest in screening are high
and rise further when the number of banks operating in the market falls. In contrast,
for large xed costs, a small number of domestic banks invest in screening and a rising
number of banks in the market lowers the investment incentives even more. Again,
the composition of the banking market becomes more homogeneous, leading to a fall
in the transport costs paid in the economy and, in turn, an increase in welfare.
Yet, with rising competitive pressure 1
t
, investment incentives of domestic banks
cease to vary a lot with the number of banks operating in the market. Then, for
su¢ ciently high competitive pressure 1
t
, an increase in the number of banks operating
in the market is welfare improving, independent of the size of the xed costs. Due
to the fall in the market shares of all banks less borrowers with bad projects obtain
nancing and welfare rises.
It is interesting to see that both rising spillovers and competition in the number
of banks operating in the market have a clear-cut negative e¤ect on the incentives of
domestic banks to invest in screening whereas their impact on welfare is ambiguous. In
contrast, although the inuence of competitive pressure 1
t
on the incentives of domestic
banks to invest in screening is ambiguous, its e¤ect on welfare is clearly positive.
Our main results from the welfare analysis can be summarized as follows. First,
increasing competitive pressure 1
t
clearly raises welfare. Second, both modes of compe-
tition work as complements when looking at welfare. In particular, a larger number of
banks operating in the market and thus greeneld entry can, in general, only be welfare
increasing when competitive pressure 1
t
is also su¢ ciently large. In that case, one sole
channel of competition cannot be welfare enhancing, but rather high levels of both
modes of competitive pressure are necessary for raising welfare. Third, we conclude
that spillovers constitute a type of substitute relative to the competitive pressure of
the market environment, i.e. potential positive welfare e¤ects of spillovers are higher
the lower is competition.
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2.7 Empirical Hypotheses
Our model gives rise to several testable hypotheses concerning the impact of spillovers
and competition on the incentives of domestic banks to invest in screening.
We nd that the incentives of domestic banks to invest in a better screening tech-
nology fall with rising spillovers. Hence, we state our rst testable prediction as follows.
Hypothesis 2.1 The larger the spillover e¤ects from foreign to domestic banks, the
fewer domestic banks are expected to invest in better screening.
Similarly, we concluded that the investment incentives of domestic banks fall with
the number of banks active in the market. Due to greeneld entry leading to a larger
number of banks in the market than acquisition entry, we formulate the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2.2 The number of domestic banks that invest in better screening tech-
nologies tends to be lower in the case of greeneld entry as compared to entry via
acquisition.
Moreover, we found that spillovers and competition in the number of banks in the
market reinforce each other in their negative e¤ect on the incentives of domestic banks
to invest in better screening, as is stated in hypothesis 2.3.
Hypothesis 2.3 The negative impact of spillovers on the number of domestic banks
investing in screening tends to be larger in the case of greeneld as compared to acqui-
sition entry.
In addition, we concluded that the competitive pressure of the market environment
mitigates the negative impact of spillovers and competition in terms of the number of
banks on domestic banksinvestment incentives. This gives rise to our fourth hypoth-
esis.
Hypothesis 2.4 The higher the competitive pressure of the market environment, the
less severe the negative impact of spillovers and greeneld entry tends to be on the
number of domestic banks that invest in screening.
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Furthermore, we found that the impact of the competitive pressure of the market
environment on domestic banksincentives to invest in screening depends on the extent
of foreign bank entry as well as the costs of acquiring a better screening technology.
We state the following prediction:
Hypothesis 2.5 The number of domestic banks that invest in screening
a) increases in the competitive pressure of the market environment when few foreign
banks are present and investment in screening is costly;
b) decreases in the competitive pressure of the market environment when investment in
screening is cheap or many foreign banks are present.
Stylized facts often stated in the context of foreign bank entry into transition coun-
tries point to the positive role of spillovers and competition for raising domestic banks
e¢ ciency and overall welfare (Claessens (2006), Levine (1996)). Our analysis conrms
the often mentioned positive role of the competitive pressure of the market environment
for welfare. However, we demonstrate that spillovers and competition in the number of
banks active in a market may just as well have a negative impact on the incentives of
domestic banks to invest in superior screening technologies and, thus, their e¢ ciency.
Furthermore, we point to possible interactions of spillovers and competition, an aspect
that has been largely neglected in the literature so far.
Claessens et al. (2001) and Fries and Taci (2005) nd empirical support for the
hypothesis that higher competitive pressure due to foreign bank entry increases the
cost e¢ ciency of host country banks. Sabi (1996) contrasts these ndings and con-
cludes that foreign bank entry does not help to improve the performance of domestic
banks. Our analysis shows that a rising number of banks in the market may even entail
lower incentives of domestic banks to invest in screening. Moreover, we demonstrate
that increasing competitive pressure in the market environment, e.g. through lower
transportation costs or less product di¤erentiation, may have ambiguous e¤ects on the
e¢ ciency of domestic banks, depending both on the extent of foreign bank entry and
the costs of acquiring a better screening technology. Hence, we provide a framework
in which the di¤erent e¤ects competition may have on bank e¢ ciency can be tested.
In addition, our analysis gives rise to some testable predictions pointing to the role of
spillovers for the e¢ ciency of liberalizing banking markets. So far, no empirical study
has addressed this issue in detail.
In order to test our hypotheses, panel data for transition countries on a bank level
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basis are needed since the e¤ects of competition and spillovers may only be realized
over time. An obvious challenge is to test for the impact of spillovers. Here, as a
proxy one might think of the extent to which uctuations of domestic workers between
foreign and domestic banks take place, the amount of workers being trained abroad,
or disclosure requirements imposed on foreign banks that facilitate the replication of
sophisticated nancial services. Competitive pressure of the market environment could
be proxied by the distance between banks and their customers, the degree of product
di¤erentiation, or the degree of transparency in the banking market.
2.8 Conclusions
We have set up a model of spatial bank competition to analyze the impact of foreign
bank entry on a liberalized banking market. In particular, we studied how the interac-
tion of spillovers and competition a¤ect both the incentives of domestic banks to invest
in screening and welfare.
We found that spillovers and competition in the number of banks reinforce each
other in their negative impact on the incentives of domestic banks to invest in screen-
ing but that the strength of both e¤ects is mitigated in a highly competitive market
environment. With respect to welfare, however, spillovers and either channel of compe-
tition tend to work as substitutes whereas both modes of competitive pressure behave
as complements.
We conclude our analysis with some policy conclusions based on the results from our
welfare analysis. Consider e.g. di¤erent values of the xed cost spent in order to obtain
the perfect screening technology as corresponding to di¤erent stages of development
in countries liberalizing their banking markets. Very underdeveloped countries would
thus be characterized by larger costs for investing in screening than emerging economies
on a higher development stage. This could be due to higher costs related to the
development of human capital, necessary restructuring processes or the upgrading of
technical facilities. Then, when the competitive pressure of the market environment
is weak, it would be considered welfare optimal for very underdeveloped countries
to let foreign banks enter their markets via greeneld investments whereas emerging
markets characterized by a higher level of development should open up for foreign banks
via acquisition. However, in banking markets characterized by high competitiveness,
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greeneld entry constitutes the favored entry mode independent of the development
status of countries.
We could also apply our model to a dynamic liberalization process by assuming
that shortly after the opening up of a banking market the xed costs spent to attain
better screening skills are larger than during later periods of liberalization. In addi-
tion, we could think of transportation costs to be falling over time. On the one hand,
this could result from an increasing transparency of the banking market or a mount-
ing standardization of nancial products which could make preferences of borrowers
for a certain type of bank less pronounced. On the other hand, by the introduction
of new information and communication technologies, physical transportation costs of
borrowers may fall alike (Petersen and Rajan (2002)). Hence, we could state that a
country liberalizing its banking market shifts from a situation of high xed costs and
high transportation costs to an environment of low xed costs and low transportation
costs. A policy maker should then try to restrict the entry mode of foreign banks to de
novo investments in the early stages of liberalization. Then, after allowing for acquisi-
tion entry in an environment of intermediate competitive pressure, in later periods of
liberalization the policy maker should try to shift back to greeneld entry again.
Chapter 3
Group Lending versus Individual
Lending in Micronance
3.1 Introduction
In 2006, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Mohammad Yunus. Since he founded
the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh in the late 1970s, micronance has experienced
an impressive growth. This is largely due to the many positive e¤ects attributed
to micronance programs. Micronance schemes have been found to reduce poverty
and to positively a¤ect nutrition, health and education as well as gender empowerment
(Littleeld et al. (2003)). In 2006, micronance institutions reached around 130 million
customers around the world (Daley-Harris (2007)).
Typically, micronance is associated with joint liability lending. When borrowers
form groups and are held liable for each other, lending to the poor can be protable
even if borrowers do not possess any collateral and lack a credit history. Interestingly,
however, a large part of micronance institutions does not o¤er group but individual
loans. This gives rise to several questions: what are the incentive mechanisms that
play a role in individual and group lending schemes and how do they di¤er? Under
which circumstances do micronance institutions o¤er group or individual loan con-
tracts? What are the di¤erences between individual lending programs of micronance
institutions and the individual lending technology applied by commercial banks?
According to Giné and Karlan (2006), the di¤erent features of group and individual
lending schemes have not yet been studied in detail "despite being a question of rst-
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order importance".27 With the aim to contribute to a theoretical foundation of this
topic, we set up a model of spatial competition between micronance institutions.
Micronance institutions o¤er either group or individual loans and compete in the
repayments they charge their clients. Borrowers di¤er in their success probabilities
and lack pledgeable collateral. As borrowers have no documented credit history, they
are unable to provide hard information.
Consequently, in contrast to commercial banks, micronance institutions cannot
screen borrowers and secure loans with collateral. Screening borrowers is feasible only
when a relatively standardized evaluation procedure based on the analysis of hard
information such as balance sheet data is applicable. In addition, any lending strategy
pursued by micronance institutions must ensure monitoring of borrowers in order to
prevent the diversion of loans to urgent consumption needs.
When a micronance institution opts for the group lending technology, it transfers
the monitoring role to borrowers. Joint liability ensures strong incentives of group
members to monitor each other in order to make their peers succeed. Furthermore,
self-selection of borrowers into di¤erent credit contracts can be achieved.
In case it grants individual loans, the micronance institution specializes in closely
monitoring clients. Borrowers are o¤ered a pooling contract. However, borrowers
are exempt from negative e¤ects of group lending schemes such as bearing additional
risk, loss of privacy from disclosing their nancial situation and investment projects to
potential peers, or time spent on group meetings.
Our rst focus of interest lies on how the decision of a micronance institution
to o¤er either group or individual loans depends on the size of a loan. Controversial
arguments are brought forward in the so far rather descriptive literature on this topic.
For instance, Kota (2007) and Harper (2007) state that micronance institutions o¤er
individual contracts if clients are in need for larger loans. In contrast, Giné and Karlan
(2006) advocate precisely the reverse correlation. Our analysis aims to contribute to a
theoretical foundation of this discussion.
Another major focus of our study is to investigate how the choice of lending tech-
nology depends on renancing conditions and competitive pressure in the micronance
market. According to Isern and Porteous (2005) as well as Reddy and Rhyne (2006),
27Giné and Karlan (2006, p. 3)
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the world of micronance currently changes substantially in both these respects. The
emergence of rating agencies specializing in the micronance business and the growing
awareness regarding the potential of the micronance industry makes investors chan-
nel more and more funds into this market. Enhanced access to capital markets, in
turn, implies improved renancing conditions for micronance institutions. In addi-
tion, competition among micronance banks steadily intensies. Our analysis provides
a theoretical framework that allows us to study in detail how changes in renancing
conditions and competition a¤ect a micronance institutions lending strategy.
Interestingly, our results show that micronance institutions decide to o¤er indi-
vidual loans when the loan size is rather small. Moreover, micronance institutions
favor individual over group contracts when renancing costs are low and when compe-
tition is intense. Hence, our analysis allows for some interesting predictions concerning
the future shape of the micronance industry. Given that access to capital markets
continues to improve and competition between micronance institutions rises further,
our results imply that individual loan contracts in the micronance market will gain
in importance over the next years.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the
literature. Section 3.3 describes the set-up of the model. In section 3.4, we study the
choice of lending technology of micronance institutions. We present our comparative
statics analysis in section 3.5. Empirical hypotheses are stated in section 3.6. Section
3.7 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
Although individual loans account for a large portion of micronance loans, the liter-
ature is heavily biased towards an analysis of group loan contracts. Individual lending
schemes have only very recently attracted the interest of researchers.
Numerous theoretical papers have addressed the positive e¤ects of group lending
mechanisms. Ghatak and Guinnane (1999), Ghatak (2000) as well as Van Tassel (1999)
show that group lending achieves self-selection of borrowers and acts as a screening
device. Armendáriz de Aghion and Gollier (2000) nd that even if borrowers do not
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know each others type, group lending may be feasible due to lower interest rates
as a result of cross subsidization of borrowers. Stiglitz (1990) outlines the role of
peer-monitoring in group lending schemes, which transfers the monitoring role from
the bank to the borrowers and acts as an incentive device. Armendáriz de Aghion
(1999) demonstrates that the benets from peer monitoring are largest when risks
are positively correlated among borrowers. La¤ont and NGuessan (2000) conclude
that social connections facilitate the monitoring and enforcement of joint liability loan
contracts. This result has been conrmed in an empirical study by Karlan (2007).
Furthermore, Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2000) point to a fall in transaction
costs when - instead of individual visits of clients - group meetings are held. In addition,
the contact with banks to which poor borrowers typically are not used to is facilitated.
However, certain drawbacks of group lending exist. Giné and Karlan (2006) state
that the demand for credit within a group may change over time, forcing clients with
small loans to be liable for larger loans of their peers. Furthermore, the growth of group
lending programs may slow down when new borrowers with looser social ties enter and,
consequently, the group lending technology loses some of its power. Besley and Coate
(1995) stress negative welfare e¤ects if the group as a whole defaults even if some
members had repaid under individual lending. In a case study, Montgomery (1996)
outlines the unnecessary social costs of repayment pressure. Stiglitz (1990) points to
the higher risk borrowers assume when they are not only liable for themselves but also
for their group partners.
The so far rather descriptive literature on individual lending schemes typically fo-
cuses on the crucial role of closely monitoring borrowers. Navajas et al. (2003), Ar-
mendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) as well as Giné et al. (2006) describe the
problem that poor borrowers may divert a loan, at least partly, to urgent consump-
tion needs. In order to ensure the use of the loan for the agreed upon investment
project, Champagne et al. (2007) as well as Zeitinger (1996) stress the importance
of regularly visiting clients. In a theoretical analysis of individual lending schemes by
Gangopadhyay and Lensink (2007), the monitoring of borrowers by informal lenders
plays a central role. Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2000) as well as Dellien et
al. (2005) also point to the importance of monitoring borrowers in individual lending
schemes.
Only recently, researchers have been interested in comparing group lending pro-
grams to individual lending schemes. Giné and Karlan (2006) conduct a eld exper-
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iment in the Philippines. They nd that by o¤ering individual loans, a micronance
institution can attract relatively more new clients. Yet, both lending schemes do not
di¤er in repayment rates. In a recent empirical study, Ahlin and Townsend (2007) nd a
U-shaped relationship between joint liability contracts relative to individual contracts
and a borrowers wealth. Furthermore, they conclude that higher correlation across
projects makes group lending contracts more likely relative to individual contracts. In
her theoretical analysis, Madajewicz (2008) shows that, in general, borrowers prefer
individual loans the wealthier they are. Nevertheless, she demonstrates that for very
low levels of borrower wealth, group loans are larger than individual loans. Moreover,
she nds that businesses funded with individual loans grow more than those funded
with group loans.
3.3 The Model
Consider a continuum of borrowers with mass 2 that is uniformly distributed along
a straigt line of length 1. Each borrower can engage in one investment project that
requires an initial outlay of i; i > 0. Borrowers are not endowed with any initial wealth
and therefore need to apply for credit at a micronance institution, the only source
of nance in our model. Borrowers have either safe or risky projects. It is common
knowledge that the fraction of borrowers with safe projects is  and the fraction of
borrowers with risky projects is 1  ; 0 <  < 1. We assume that borrowers with safe
and risky projects are distributed with density 2 and 2 (1  ) along the Hotelling line,
respectively. As a result, two borrowers of the same type are located at a certain point
of the Hotelling street. As will be explained in more detail later on, this assumption
ensures costless formation of groups. Individual borrowers know about the type of
their own and the other borrowersinvestment projects. In case a project is successful
it generates a return of v > 0 and zero otherwise. The success probability of safe and
risky projects is given by pS and pR, respectively, with 0 < pR < pS < 1. The returns
of the projects are observable and contractible. We assume that borrowers must be
monitored closely in order to prevent the diversion of the loan to consumption needs.28
The nancial sector serving the borrowers consists of two representative micro-
28We could as well assume that borrowers divert a certain part of their loans for household needs
if not monitored. As a result, borrowers could only a¤ord low quality inputs for their investment
projects implying returns too low to pay back their loans.
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nance institutions A and B that are located at the two ends of the Hotelling line.
In our model, both micronance institutions are protable and compete with each
other. Note that the protability of micronance institutions has risen considerably
over the last few years (Christen and Cook (2001)). Some micronance institutions are
now even listed at stock exchanges, such as Compartamos in Mexico or Equity Bank in
Kenya. Furthermore, due to the immense growth of the micronance industry, in many
countries, there is now erce competition between micronance institutions (Fernando
(2007), McIntosh et al. (2005), and Christen and Rhyne (1999)).
Micronance institutions A and B compete in the repayments they simultaneously
ask from borrowers. Micronance institutions incur renancing costs c > 0 per loan of
size i. We take it as given that each micronance institution disposes of enough funds
to nance all borrowers applying for a loan. Micronance institutions do not know
whether borrowers have safe or risky projects.
A micronance institution may choose to o¤er either group or individual loans. We
abstract from the possibility that a bank o¤ers both group and individual contracts.
In fact, most micronance institutions o¤er either one or the other type of loan as
is pointed out in Ahlin and Townsend (2007), Giné and Karlan (2006) as well as
Madajewicz (2008).
If a micronance institution opts for the group lending technology, loans are o¤ered
to groups consisting of two borrowers each. Note that limiting the group size to two
borrowers is a standard assumption in the literature and greatly simplies our analysis
(see, for instance, Ghatak (2000) or La¤ont and NGuessan (2000)). Group contracts
imply a transfer of the monitoring role to the group members. Due to joint liability,
group members have a strong incentive to monitor each other in order to ensure the
correct investment of the loan and to make their partners succeed. We assume that
due to close social ties between group members, borrowers monitor each other at zero
cost.29 The size of a loan a group receives is 2i so that each borrower receives an
amount i of the loan. In case both group members are successful, the loan is fully paid
back with interest. If both partners fail, no repayments are made. In the case that
only one of the two group members is successful, the successful borrower pays back her
part of the loan plus interest and, in addition, the loan share of her peer with interest,
29One might argue that borrowers incur costs of monitoring. However, the monitoring costs should
clearly be lower for borrowers than for banks due to strong social ties between borrowers (Karlan
(2007)). By normalizing monitoring costs of borrowers to zero, our results remain qualitatively unaf-
fected.
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weighed by a joint liability parameter  > 0. The joint liability parameter expresses
the degree of joint liability to which group members stand in for each other. Micro-
nance institutions compete both in interest rates and the joint liability parameters.
Micronance institutions can induce self-selection of borrowers by o¤ering two di¤erent
contracts. A contract with a low interest rate rS and a high degree of joint liability
S will attract safe borrowers whereas risky borrowers prefer a contract with a high
interest rate rR and a low joint liability factor R.30 Borrowers incur some disutility d
from group lending. The disutility d captures drawbacks of group loans such as time
spent on nding a partner and group meetings (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch
(2000)), the higher risk borrowers bear due to joint liability (Stiglitz (1990)) or social
costs of repayment pressure (Montgomery (1996)). Borrowers may also su¤er from
reduced privacy when disclosing details of their investment project or their nancial
situation to their peers (Harper (2007)).
In the case a micronance institution decides to o¤er individual loans, it has no
mechanism at hand to assess a borrowers type. Note, rst, that a collateralized con-
tract cannot be o¤ered since borrowers lack any pledgeable assets. Second, screening
borrowers is not an option as potential clients are unable to provide hard information.
Hence, micronance institutions o¤er a pooling contract with repayment rate rSR per
credit of size i. In order to prevent the diversion of the loan for consumption needs once
it is received, micronance institutions need to closely monitor clients. This imposes
a per borrower cost of k on the micronance institution.31 The crucial role of closely
monitoring clients in individual lending programs has been stressed, for instance, by
Champagne et al. (2007) as well as Zeitinger (1996). Armendáriz de Aghion and
Morduch (2000) and Dellien et al. (2005) conrm the importance of regularly visiting
clients in individual lending schemes.
Borrowers base their decision at which micronance institution to apply for credit on
the repayments rj, j = A;B, and the joint liability factors j asked by the micronance
institutions as well as on the transport costs they incur by travelling to a micronance
institution. We assume that transport costs tx are proportional to the distance x
between the borrower and the micronance institution. If borrowers apply for a group
contract, transportation costs arise for both group members. Furthermore, we assume
that the return of a project v is high enough so that the market is covered at equilibrium
30See Ghatak (2000), Stiglitz (1990) or Van Tassel (1999) for a similar set-up.
31Evidence for larger costs per loan in case of individual compared to group lending schemes is
provided by Giné and Karlan (2006). They nd that credit o¢ cers spend more time per borrower
when individual contracts are o¤ered.
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prices. Borrowers and micronance institutions are risk neutral and maximize prots.
The time structure of the game is as follows. At stage 1, micronance institutions
decide which lending technology to apply and simultaneously set interest rates and
joint liability parameters. At stage 2, borrowers decide at which institution to apply
for credit and form groups when applying for a group contract. At stage 3, returns
realize and borrowers make repayments if they have been successful. We solve the game
by backward induction.
3.4 Choice of Lending Technology
In this section, we derive the choice of lending technology of micronance institutions.
Both institutions can pursue the lending strategy "group loans" (G) or "individual
loans" (I). In order to solve the game we compare the prot of a micronance insti-
tution in case it o¤ers group loans to the case it grants individual loans given that its
competitor, rstly, o¤ers group loans and, secondly, concedes individual loans.
Both Micronance Institutions O¤er Group Loans
If both micronance institutions o¤er group contracts, borrowers form groups of
two borrowers each in order to apply for a loan. Before we turn to the prots of
micronance institutions when they both o¤er group loans, we show that a borrower
group always consists of borrowers of the same type.
Consider, rst, a safe borrower forming a group with another safe borrower. Any
contract with interest rate r and degree of joint liability  gives the borrower a utility
US;S = i+ p
2
S[v   (1 + r) i] + pS (1  pS) [v   (1 + r) i   (1 + r) i]  tx  d: (3.1)
That is, the safe borrower receives her part of the credit, i. With probability p2S
both group members are successful so that the borrower receives return v and pays back
her part of the loan with interest (1 + r) i. With probability pS (1  pS) the borrower
is successful but her group partner is not. Then, the borrower pays back her part of the
loan with interest (1 + r) i and also stands in for her group partner with the amount
Group Lending versus Individual Lending in Microfinance 70
 (1 + r) i. If the borrower is unsuccessful, her return is zero and she does not make
any repayments to the micronance institution. The borrowers utility is reduced by
the costs for travelling to the micronance institution tx and the disutility related to
group contracts d.
When the safe borrower has a risky partner, her utility from any contract with
interest rate r and degree of joint liability  is given by
US;R = i+ pSpR[v   (1 + r)i] + pS(1  pR)[v   (1 + r)i  (1 + r)i]  tx  d: (3.2)
Now, both group members are successful with probability pSpR. Then, the safe
borrower receives return v and pays back her part of the loan with interest (1 + r) i.
With probability pS (1  pR), the safe borrower is successful but her risky partner is
not. In that case, the safe borrower pays back her part of the loan with interest (1 + r) i
and, in addition, the amount  (1 + r) i in lieu of her risky partner.
The di¤erence in a safe borrowers utility stemming from the formation of a group
with a safe versus a risky borrower is given by US;S   US;R = pS (pS   pR) (1 + r) i.
This expression is clearly positive. Hence, a safe borrower always prefers to be part of
a group with a borrower of her own type.
Second, let us look at the preferences of a risky borrower concerning her partner.
The utility of a risky borrower when having a risky peer amounts to
UR;R = i+ p
2
R[v   (1 + r) i] + pR (1  pR) [v   (1 + r) i   (1 + r) i]  tx  d: (3.3)
With probability p2R both group members are successful. The borrower receives
return v and pays back her part of the loan with interest (1 + r) i. With probability
pR (1  pR) the borrower is successful but her partner is not. Then, the borrower pays
back her part of the loan with interest (1 + r) i and, in addition, she stands in for her
peer with the amount  (1 + r) i.
When a risky borrower forms a group with a safe borrower, she attains the utility
level
UR;S = i+ pRpS[v   (1 + r)i] + pR(1  pS)[v   (1 + r)i  (1 + r)i]  tx  d: (3.4)
Now, projects of both borrowers turn out to be successful with probability pRpS.
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In that case, the risky borrower pays back her part of the loan with interest (1 + r) i.
With probability pR (1  pS), only the risky borrower is successful. Then, the risky
borrower pays back her part of the loan with interest (1 + r) i and, in addition, the
amount  (1 + r) i for her partner.
The di¤erence in the utility of a risky borrower when being part of a group with
a risky versus a safe borrower amounts to UR;R   UR;S =  pR (pS   pR) (1 + r) i. As
this expression is negative, a risky borrower clearly prefers to have a safe borrower as
her partner. However, as safe borrowers prefer to form groups with safe borrowers,
risky borrowers will not nd a safe borrower willing to form a group with them. As
a consequence, risky borrowers form groups with partners of their own type as well.
Note that our assumption concerning the density of the borrowersdistribution along
the Hotelling line ensures that two borrowers of the same type are located at a certain
point of the Hotelling street. Since we have shown that borrowers form groups with
borrowers of their own type, we can abstract from costs related to the formation of
groups such as costs of searching for a partner.
Let us now turn to the prots micronance institutions achieve when they both
o¤er group contracts. Micronance institutions can induce self-selection of borrowers
according to their types into two di¤erent kinds of contracts. Safe borrower will accept
a contract dened by a low interest rate rS and a high degree of joint liability S. In
contrast, risky borrowers prefer a loan contract based on a high interest rate rR and
a low joint liability factor R. Both interest rates and the joint liability factors are
set endogenously. In the Appendix we show that contracts indeed exist that achieve
self-selection of borrowers (see proof of Lemma 3.1).32
When borrowers decide about where to apply for credit, they compare the utility
they obtain when borrowing from micronance institution A to the utility level they
achieve when accepting a loan from micronance institution B. The resulting mar-
ginal borrowers in the segment of safe and risky borrowers xS (G;G) and xR (G;G),
respectively, determine the micronance institutionsprots as given below. Note that
throughout this chapter, the rst letter in brackets stands for the strategy pursued by
micronance institution A and the second letter for the strategy followed by micro-
nance institution B.
32In the Appendix, we show that an equilibrium in which no self-selection of borrowers is achieved
also exists. However, in our analysis, we focus on separating equilibria. It seems realistic to assume that
the generation of information about borrowers is always benecial to banks. For instance, information
about borrowers may be valuable for additional products o¤ered to borrowers or in a dynamic model
set-up.
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A(G;G) = xS(G;G)[2p
2
S(1 + r
A
S ) + 2pS(1  pS)(1 + AS )(1 + rAS )  2(1 + c)]i+
(1  )xR(G;G)[2p2R(1 + rAR) + 2pR(1  pR)(1 + AR)(1 + rAR)  2(1 + c)]i (3.5)
B(G;G) = [1  xS(G;G)][2p2S(1 + rBS ) + 2pS(1  pS)(1 + BS )(1 + rBS )  2(1 + c)]i+
(1 )[1 xR(G;G)][2p2R(1+rBR)+2pR(1 pR)(1+BR)(1+rBR) 2(1+c)]i. (3.6)
Due to our assumption concerning the distribution of borrowers, in the case of group
lending, a certain point on the Hotelling line represents a group consisting of two bor-
rowers. Hence, micronance institution A serves xS (G;G) safe and (1  )xR (G;G)
risky clients. With probability p2S, both members of a group of safe borrowers succeed so
that the micronance institution receives 2
 
1 + rAS

i. With probability 2pS (1  pS),
the project of only one group member turns out to be successful. Then, the suc-
cessful borrower stands in for her partner and repays the amount
 
1 + AS
  
1 + rAS

i.
No repayments are made if both group members fail which happens with probability
(1  pS)2. Micronance institutions incur renancing costs 2 (1 + c) i per group of bor-
rowers. Similar considerations hold for the market share the micronance institution
holds in the segment of risky borrowers. The prot of micronance institution B is
derived analogously.
Both micronance institutions maximize their prot with respect to the interest
rates and the degree of joint liability they demand from the two types of borrowers.
The resulting equilibrium prots are stated in Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.1 If both micronance institutions o¤er group loan contracts, equilibrium
prots of micronance institutions are given by
A (G;G) = B (G;G) = t: (3.7)
Proof: see Appendix.
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Both Micronance Institutions O¤er Individual Loans
We now analyze the situation in which both micronance institutions o¤er individ-
ual loans. Borrowers compare the utility they achieve when borrowing from micro-
nance institution A to the utility they obtain when funded by micronance institution
B. The resulting marginal borrowers in the segment of safe and risky borrowers xS (I; I)
and xR (I; I), respectively, determine the prots of micronance institutions given as
follows:
A (I; I) = 2xS (I; I) [pS
 
1 + rASR

i  (1 + c) i  k]+
2 (1  )xR (I; I) [pR
 
1 + rASR

i  (1 + c) i  k] (3.8)
B (I; I) = 2[1  xS (I; I)][pS
 
1 + rBSR

i  (1 + c) i  k]+
2 (1  ) [1  xR (I; I)][pR
 
1 + rBSR

i  (1 + c) i  k]. (3.9)
Due to our assumptions concerning the borrowersdistribution, a certain point on
the Hotelling line represents two borrowers in the case of individual lending. Hence,
micronance institutionA serves 2xS (I; I) safe and 2 (1  )xR (I; I) risky borrowers.
Micronance institution A charges the pooled lending rate rASR to both safe and risky
clients. It receives the amount
 
1 + rASR

i from safe borrowers with probability pS
and from risky borrowers with probability pR. Monitoring clients amounts to a per
borrower cost of k. Micronance institutions incur renancing costs of (1 + c) i per
client. The prot of micronance institution B is derived analogously.
Both micronance institutions maximize their prot with respect to the interest
rates they charge borrowers. Our results are stated in Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 3.2 If both micronance institutions o¤er individual loan contracts, equilib-
rium prots of micronance institutions are given by
A(I; I) = B(I; I) =
t[pS + pR(1  )]2   (pS   pR)2(1  )[k + (1 + c)i]
p2S + (1  )p2R
: (3.10)
Proof: see Appendix.
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Micronance Institution A O¤ers Individual Loans and Micronance Insti-
tution B O¤ers Group Loans
Let us now turn to the situation in which micronance institution A o¤ers indi-
vidual loan contracts and micronance institution B o¤ers group loans. The marginal
borrowers in the safe and risky market segment xS (I;G) and xR (I;G), respectively,
determine the prots of micronance institutions. Analogous to our reasoning above,
prots of both micronance institutions are now given as follows:
A(I;G) = 2xS(I;G)[pS(1 + r
A
SR)i  (1 + c)i  k]+
2(1  )xR(I;G)[pR(1+ rASR)i  (1+ c)i  k] (3.11)
B(I;G) = [1  xS(I;G)][2p2S(1 + rBS ) + 2pS(1  pS)(1 + BS )(1 + rBS )  2(1 + c)]i+
(1  )[1 xR(I;G)][2p2R(1+ rBR)+2pR(1  pR)(1+BR)(1+ rBR)  2(1+ c)]i. (3.12)
Both micronance institutions set interest rates and micronance institution B, in
addition, the joint liability factors in order to maximize prot. The resulting equilib-
rium prots are stated in Lemma 3.3.
Lemma 3.3 If micronance institution A o¤ers individual loan contracts and micro-
nance institution B o¤ers group loans, equilibrium prots of both micronance insti-
tutions are given by
A (I;G) = 2[pS+pR(1 )]
2(d k+3t)2 9(pS pR)2(1 )[k+(1+c)i][d+3t+(1+c)i]
18t[p2S+(1 )p2R]
(3.13)
B (I;G) = 4[pS+pR(1 )]
2(d k 3t)2+9(pS pR)2(1 )[d t+(1+c)i]2
36t[p2S+(1 )p2R]
. (3.14)
Proof: see Appendix.
Micronance Institution A O¤ers Group Loans andMicronance Institution
B O¤ers Individual Loans
Clearly, this case is symmetric to the situation described before. For the sake of
completeness, the equilibrium prots of both micronance institutions are stated in
Lemma 3.4.
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Lemma 3.4 If micronance institution A o¤ers group contracts and micronance in-
stitution B o¤ers individual loans, equilibrium prots of both micronance institutions
are given by
A (G; I) = 4[pS+pR(1 )]
2(d k 3t)2+9(pS pR)2(1 )[d t+(1+c)i]2
36t[p2S+(1 )p2R]
(3.15)
B (G; I) = 2[pS+pR(1 )]
2(d k+3t)2 9(pS pR)2(1 )[k+(1+c)i][d+3t+(1+c)i]
18t[p2S+(1 )p2R]
: (3.16)
Proof: analogous to proof of Lemma 3.3.
Nash Equilibrium
We now turn to the Nash equilibrium in this market. We determine micronance
institution As best response both given that micronance institution B o¤ers group
loans and individual contracts. With respect to micronance institution B, we proceed
analogously. Due to reasons of symmetry, we limit our exposition to the point of view
of micronance institution A. The matrix of the game is given in Figure 3.1.
Individual Loans
Group Loans
Group Loans Individual Loans
A
B
( ) ( )GGGG BA ,,, pp
( ) ( )IIII BA ,,, pp( ) ( )GIGI BA ,,, pp
( ) ( )IGIG BA ,,, pp
Figure 3.1: Matrix of the Game
Given that micronance institution B o¤ers group loans, micronance institution
A o¤ers individual contracts if A(I;G)  A(G;G) > 0 holds. Our results are stated
in Proposition 3.1.
Group Lending versus Individual Lending in Microfinance 76
Proposition 3.1 Given that micronance institution B o¤ers group loans, micro-
nance institution A o¤ers individual loan contracts if A(I;G)   A(G;G) > 0 holds.
That is, if
9 (pS   pR)2 (1  ) [(k + i+ ci) (d+ i+ ci) + (3k + 2t+ 3i+ 3ci) t] 
2 (pR + pS   pR)2 (d  k) (d  k + 6t) < 0. (3.17)
Proof: straight forward.
Given that micronance institution B o¤ers individual loans, micronance insti-
tution A o¤ers individual contracts if A(I; I)   A(G; I) > 0 holds. Our results are
given in Proposition 3.2.
Proposition 3.2 Given that micronance institution B o¤ers individual loans, mi-
cronance institution A o¤ers individual contracts if A(I; I)   A(G; I) > 0 holds.
That is, if
9 (pS   pR)2 (1  ) [(d+ i+ ci)2 + (4k   2d+ t+ 2i+ 2ci) t] 
4 (pR + pS   pR)2 (6t  d+ k) (d  k) < 0. (3.18)
Proof: straight forward.
We cannot unambiguously determine whether the above two expressions are positive
or negative. That is why we now turn to a comparative statics analysis. In doing so, we
gain interesting insights in how the choice of lending technology is inuenced by the size
of credit, the renancing conditions of micronance institutions and the competitive
pressure of the market environment.
3.5 Comparative Statics Analysis
The rst focus of our comparative statics analysis lies on the impact of the loan size for
a micronance institutions decision to grant individual or group loans. Controversial
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arguments are brought forward in the so far rather descriptive literature on this topic.
For instance, Kota (2007) and Harper (2007) state that micronance institutions o¤er
individual contracts if clients are in need for larger loans. In contrast, Giné and Karlan
(2006) advocate precisely the reverse correlation. Our analysis aims to contribute to a
theoretical foundation of this discussion.
We are further interested in how a micronance institutions choice of lending tech-
nology depends on renancing conditions and competitive pressure in the micronance
market. According to Isern and Porteous (2005) as well as Reddy and Rhyne (2006),
the world of micronance currently changes substantially in both these respects. Mi-
cronance institutions get increasingly better access to capital markets which should
transform into improved renancing conditions. In addition, competition among mi-
cronance banks steadily intensies, in large part due to the enormous growth of the
industry. Our analysis provides a theoretical framework that allows us to study in
detail how changes in renancing conditions and competition a¤ect a micronance
institutions lending strategy.
3.5.1 Size of Credit
When we look at the role of the loan size, interestingly, we nd that a micronance
institution prefers to o¤er individual contracts when the size of credit is rather small, ir-
respective of whether its competitor grants individual or group loans. Conversely, when
a loan is relatively large, micronance institutions favor the group lending technology.
Our results are stated in Proposition 3.3.
Proposition 3.3 Micronance institutions o¤er individual contracts when a loan is
rather small. Group contracts are preferred by micronance institutions when a loan is
rather large. That is,
A(I;G)  A(G;G) > 0 if i < i1 and A(I;G)  A(G;G) < 0 if i > i1 (3.19)
A(I; I) A(G; I) > 0 if i < i2 and A(I; I) A(G; I) < 0 if i > i2 (3.20)
B(G; I) B(G;G) > 0 if i < i1 and B(G; I) B(G;G) < 0 if i > i1 (3.21)
B(I; I) B(I;G) > 0 if i < i2 and B(I; I) B(I;G) < 0 if i > i2. (3.22)
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Proof: see Appendix.
Hence, given that micronance institution B o¤ers group loans, the incentives of
micronance institution A to o¤er individual instead of group loans will be the smaller,
the larger the loan size. Note that by granting individual loans, micronance institution
A su¤ers more from a borrowers default than by o¤ering group loans due to the lack
of joint liability. The larger a loan is, the relatively more micronance institution A
su¤ers from defaulting borrowers when conceding individual instead of group loans.
Hence, given that the competing micronance institution engages in group lending,
o¤ering individual contracts only pays up to a certain amount of the loan size.
The situation of micronance institution A given that micronance institution B
o¤ers individual loans is similar. The relative loss from a borrowers default when
o¤ering individual compared to group contracts becomes the larger, the larger a loan
is. Hence, the larger the loan size, the higher a micronance institutions incentives are
to o¤er group instead of individual loans given that its competitor grants individual
loans.
Consequently, irrespective of whether micronance institution B o¤ers group or in-
dividual loans, the group lending technology becomes more attractive for micronance
institution A with an increasing loan size. Analogous arguments hold for micronance
institution B. Accordingly, a Nash equilibrium in which both micronance institutions
o¤er group contracts tends to emerge when the size of a credit is rather large. With
a rather small loan size, an equilibrium in which both micronance institutions o¤er
individual loans is more likely to result.
Our ndings contradict the point of view of authors such as Kota (2007) and Harper
(2007). In a theoretical analysis, Madajewicz (2008) shows that individual loans tend
to be larger than group loans. However, her result only holds for borrowers that
already have accumulated a certain level of wealth. For low levels of individual wealth,
she demonstrates that group loans are larger than individual loans. In line with our
results, Giné and Karlan (2006) conclude from their empirical study that the loan size is
smaller for individual than for group contracts. However, their argument is somewhat
di¤erent. They state that when credit o¢ cers concede individual loans, they alone
assume the monitoring role and, thus, bear a higher responsibility. This is why they
argue that credit o¢ cers may be stricter on the size of individual loans.
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3.5.2 Renancing Conditions
We now turn to the impact of renancing conditions on a micronance institutions
choice of lending technology. We nd that when renancing costs are relatively low, a
micronance institution favors individual over group contracts, irrespective of the be-
havior of its competitor. Conversely, group loans tend to be preferred when renancing
costs are rather high. Our results are stated in Proposition 3.4.
Proposition 3.4 Micronance institutions o¤er individual contracts when renancing
costs are rather low. Group loans are preferred in the presence of rather high renancing
costs. That is,
A(I;G) A(G;G) > 0 if c < c1 and A(I;G) A(G;G) < 0 if c > c1 (3.23)
A(I; I) A(G; I) > 0 if c < c2 and A(I; I) A(G; I) < 0 if c > c2 (3.24)
B(G; I) B(G;G) > 0 if c < c1 and B(G; I) B(G;G) < 0 if c > c1 (3.25)
B(I; I) B(I;G) > 0 if c < c2 and B(I; I) B(I;G) < 0 if c > c2. (3.26)
Proof: see Appendix.
Given that micronance institution B o¤ers group loans, micronance institution
As incentives to o¤er individual instead of group loans will be the smaller, the higher
renancing costs are. Similar to above, the larger renancing costs are, the relatively
more micronance institution A su¤ers from a borrowers default when granting indi-
vidual instead of group loans due to the lack of joint liability. Hence, o¤ering individual
loans given that the competing micronance institution o¤ers group loans is feasible
only in the presence of rather low renancing costs.
The same reasoning applies to the situation of micronance institution A given that
micronance institution B o¤ers individual loans. The relative losses from a borrowers
default when individual instead of group loans are o¤ered become the larger, the higher
renancing costs are. Hence, a micronance institution favors group over individual
loans in the presence of rather high renancing costs, given that its competitor o¤ers
individual loans.
Consequently, irrespective of whether micronance institution B o¤ers group or in-
dividual loans, the group lending technology becomes more attractive for micronance
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institution A when renancing costs increase. Clearly, the same arguments apply to
micronance institution B. Thus, a Nash equilibrium in which both micronance insti-
tutions o¤er group contracts tends to emerge in the presence of rather high renancing
costs. When renancing costs are rather low, an equilibrium in which both micronance
institutions o¤er individual loans is more likely to result.
The emergence of rating agencies specialized in the evaluation of micronance insti-
tutions and the growing awareness of the industrys potential makes investors channel
more and more funds into this market. By now, some micronance institutions are
listed at stock exchanges, such as Compartamos in Mexico or Equity Bank in Kenya.
Clearly, enhanced access to capital markets implies reduced renancing costs. Given
a continuation of this trend, interestingly, our model predicts that individual lending
schemes in micronance will gain in importance in the future.
3.5.3 Competitive Pressure
Finally, we analyze the inuence of competition on a micronance institutions choice
of lending technology. The competitive pressure of the market environment can be
expressed by the inverse of transportation cost, 1
t
. Note that the larger the trans-
portation cost parameter t and the more costly it becomes for borrowers to travel to a
micronance institution, the less intense price competition will be between micronance
institutions. Conversely, the lower t is, the stronger is competition.
We nd that with increasing competitive pressure, a micronance institution prefers
to o¤er individual contracts, irrespective of whether its competitor grants individual
or group loans. Conversely, the less intense competition is, the more attractive group
lending becomes for micronance institutions. Our results are stated in Proposition
3.5.
Proposition 3.5 If the market environment is rather competitive, micronance insti-
tutions prefer to grant individual loans. Group loans are o¤ered if competitive pressure
is rather low. That is,
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A(I;G) A(G;G) > 0 if t < t1 and A(I;G) A(G;G) < 0 if t > t1 (3.27)
A(I; I) A(G; I) > 0 if t < t2 and A(I; I) A(G; I) < 0 if t > t2 (3.28)
B(G; I) B(G;G) > 0 if t < t1 and B(G; I) B(G;G) < 0 if t > t1 (3.29)
B(I; I) B(I;G) > 0 if t < t2 and B(I; I) B(I;G) < 0 if t > t2. (3.30)
Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition of this result is as follows. Consider, rst, the situation of micro-
nance institution A given that micronance institution B o¤ers group contracts. If
micronance institution A o¤ers individual loans, the pooled interest rate it charges
decreases with increasing competition. The repayments asked by micronance insti-
tution B also decline when competition becomes stronger. However, the fall in the
repayments is more pronounced for risky than for safe borrowers. Hence, micronance
institution B loses in attractiveness for safe borrowers whereas micronance institu-
tion A becomes relatively more attractive for this borrower segment. Accordingly, the
quality of micronance institution As borrower pool will improve. As a consequence,
the more competitive the market environment is, the larger the incentives for a micro-
nance institution are to o¤er individual loans given that its competitor o¤ers group
loans.
Now, look at the case in which micronance institution A o¤ers group loans given
that micronance institution B o¤ers individual loans. If competitive pressure in-
creases, analogous to above, micronance institution B becomes relatively more and
micronance institution A relatively less attractive for safe borrowers. Since, how-
ever, micronance institution A receives larger overall repayments from safe than from
risky borrowers, the incentives of micronance institution A to o¤er individual loans
increase with rising competition. Thus, the more intense competition is, the larger
the incentives for a micronance institution are to o¤er individual loans given that its
competitor grants individual loans.
Consequently, irrespective of whether micronance institution B o¤ers group or
individual loans, the individual lending technology becomes more attractive for mi-
cronance institution A when competition toughens. Analogous considerations hold
for micronance institution B. Hence, a Nash equilibrium in which both micronance
institutions o¤er individual contracts tends to emerge when competition is intense. In
contrast, in markets characterized by rather low competitive pressure, an equilibrium
in which both micronance institutions o¤er group loans is more likely to result.
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According to Fernando (2007), McIntosh et al. (2005) and Christen and Rhyne
(1999), markets for micronance are often no more characterized by local monopo-
lies of micronance banks. Instead, due to the immense growth of the micronance
industry, there is now erce competition between micronance institutions in many
countries. Given a continuation of this trend, interestingly, our analysis again predicts
that individual lending techniques will play a more important role in the future. This
hypothesis is in line with Dellien et al. (2005) who argue that due to rising competition,
individual lending schemes already gained in importance over the last few years.
Summing up our ndings from the comparative statics analysis, we conclude that
a Nash equilibrium in which both micronance institutions apply the group lending
technology is the more likely to emerge when loans are rather large, renancing costs
are relatively high and competitive pressure is rather low. Otherwise, micronance
institutions favor individual loan contracts. Our results predict that when renanc-
ing conditions continue to improve and competition rises further, individual lending
schemes in micronance will become more important in the future.
3.6 Empirical Hypotheses
Our model gives rise to several testable hypotheses concerning a micronance institu-
tions choice of lending technology.
We found that the smaller the loan size, the more likely it is that micronance
institutions o¤er individual loans. Hence, our rst hypothesis is stated as follows.
Hypothesis 3.1Micronance institutions are more likely to grant individual loans the
smaller the size of a loan. The larger the amount of credit is, the more likely it is that
micronance institutions o¤er group loans.
Next, we demonstrated that the lower renancing costs are, the more micronance
institutions prefer to o¤er individual loans. This gives rise to our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3.2The higher renancing costs are, the more likely it is that micronance
institutions o¤er group contracts. The lower renancing costs are, the more likely
micronance institutions are to grant individual loans.
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Third, we showed that the more intense competition is, the more micronance
institutions tend to o¤er individual instead of group contracts. Based on this result,
we formulate our third testable prediction.
Hypothesis 3.3 Micronance institutions are more likely to o¤er individual loans the
stronger competition is. The lower the competitive pressure, the more micronance
institutions tend to o¤er group contracts.
Data best suited for testing our hypotheses concerning a micronance institutions
lending strategy are cross country data. In that case, cultural e¤ects that may inuence
a micronance institutions choice of lending technology could be controlled for. Fur-
thermore, panel data would render possible an analysis of how the relative importance
of group and individual loans altered following past changes in renancing conditions
and competitive pressure in the market for micronance.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have set up a model of competition between micronance institu-
tions in order to study a micronance banks choice of lending technology. We found
that micronance institutions tend to prefer individual loans over group loans when
the size of a loan is small, renancing costs are low, and competition is intense.
Currently, micronance institutions obtain increasingly better access to capital mar-
kets. Moreover, competition among micronance institutions increases steadily. Given
a continuation of these trends, our analysis predicts that individual lending schemes
will become more important in the micronance industry in the future.
Interestingly, when we interpret our results in the context of a recent trend in mi-
cronance, namely upscaling and downscaling, we can give further predictions about
future trends in the market for micronance. On the one hand, micronance institu-
tions increasingly start to invest in traditional banking technologies such as screening
techniques, a process called upscaling. On the other hand, commercial banks begin to
downscale, i.e. to invest in micronance technologies.
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As mentioned earlier, micronance banks typically o¤er either group or individual
loans. Even more so, very often either group or individual loans dominate the market
for micronance in a given country or region (Madajewicz (2008)). Let us rst consider
an environment in which micronance banks primarily o¤er group loans. Then, a
micronance bank would only have an incentive to invest in screening if this technique
were better in terms of assessing a borrowers type than the group lending technology.
Analogously, commercial banks would have an incentive to invest in group lending only
if this technology would ensure a better evaluation of a borrowers type. Hence, in such
a setting, upscaling and downscaling would constitute a form of substitutes.
Second, consider an environment characterized by micronance banks granting in-
dividual loans. In such a situation, upscaling would allow a micronance institution
to (more or less e¤ectively) assess a borrowers type through screening in addition to
the realization of high repayment rates by using the micronance monitoring technol-
ogy. Similarly, a commercial bank would gain from downscaling since in addition to
assessing a borrowers type via screening, it can ensure higher repayment rates due
to the micronance monitoring technology. Hence, in such a setting, upscaling and
downscaling tend to work as a form of complements. As a consequence, the gains from
upscaling and downscaling should be much higher in an environment where individual
instead of group lending dominates the market for micronance.
Coming back to our model, if due to rising competition and better access to cap-
ital markets individual loan contracts in micronance will become more important in
the future, this development may at the same time boost upscaling of micronance
institutions and downscaling of commercial banks.
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Proof of Lemma 1.1:
The marginal borrower between bank A and B1 and bank A and B2 is given by
xCBLA;B1 =
1
6
+
rCBLB1
 rCBLA
2t
and xCBLA;B2 =
1
6
+
rCBLB2
 rCBLA
2t
.
It follows that the market share of banks can be expressed by mCBLA , m
CBL
B1
and
mCBLB2 with 
CBL
A  13 +
rCBLB1
+rCBLB2
 2rCBLA
2t
, CBLB1  13 +
rCBLA +r
CBL
B2
 2rCBLB1
2t
and CBLB2 
1
3
+
rCBLA +r
CBL
B1
 2rCBLB2
2t
.
Hence, banksprot functions are given by
CBLA =


 
rCBLA   iA
  (1  ) (1  A) (1 + iA)mCBLA   FCBL
CBLBj =
h


rCBLBj   iB

  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)
i
mCBLBj .
dCBLA
drCBLA
!
= 0,
dCBLB1
drCBLB1
!
= 0, and
dCBLB2
drCBLB2
!
= 0 implies
erCBLA = 15f53t + 2iB + 3iA + (1  ) [5  2B (1 + iB)  3A (1 + iA)]gerCBLB1 = rCBLB2 = 15f53t+4iB + iA+(1  ) [5  4B (1 + iB) A (1 + iA)]g  rCBLB
CBLA = mt
eCBLA 2   FCBL
CBLB1 = 
CBL
B2
= mt
eCBLB 2  CBLB
with market shares eCBLA  25t [56t ++  (1  ) (1 + iA) A] and eCBLB1 = eCBLB2 =
1
5t
[5
3
t     (1  ) (1 + iA) A]  eCBLB and   iB   iA   (1  ) (1 + iB) B.
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Proof of Proposition 1.1:
Note that d
CBL
A
dA
= 4m(1 )(1+iA)
5
eCBLA > 0 and d2CBLAd2A = 2mt [25 (1  ) (1 + iA)]2 > 0
so that CBLA is increasing and convex in A. Cross border lending is feasible for bank
A if CBLA  0. Solving for bank As screening ability yields
A 
5
2
q
tFCBL
m
   5
6
t
(1 )(1+iA)  
CBL
A .
Note that since CBLA is increasing and convex in A it follows that argmin
A2R
fCBLA g =
  56 t+
(1 )(1+iA) < 0. Hence,
5
6
t + > 0 must hold. We will refer to this condition as
Condition (1): 5
6
t + > 0.
Proof of Lemma 1.2:
The marginal borrower between bank A and B1 and bank A and B2 is given by
xGRA;B1 =
1
6
+
rGRB1
 rGRA
2t
and xGRA;B2 =
1
6
+
rGRB2
 rGRA
2t
.
It follows that the market shares of banks can be expressed bymGRA , m
GR
B1
andmGRB2
with GRA  13 +
rGRB1
+rGRB2
 2rGRA
2t
, GRB1  13 +
rGRA +r
GR
B2
 2rGRB1
2t
and GRB2  13 +
rGRA +r
GR
B1
 2rGRB2
2t
.
Hence, banksprot functions are given by
GRA =


 
rGRA   iA
  (1  ) (1  A) (1 + iA)mGRA   FGR
GRBj =
h


rGRBj   iB

  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)
i
mGRBj .
dGRA
drGRA
!
= 0,
dGRB1
drGRB1
!
= 0, and
dGRB2
drGRB2
!
= 0 implies
erGRA = 15f53t + 2iB + 3iA + (1  ) [5  2B (1 + iB)  3A (1 + iA)]gerGRB1 = rGRB2 = 15f53t + 4iB + iA + (1  ) [5  4B (1 + iB)  A (1 + iA)]g  rGRB
GRA = mt
eGRA 2   FGR
GRB1 = 
GR
B2
= mt
eGRB 2  GRB
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with market shares eGRA  25t [56t +  +  (1  ) (1 + iA) A] and eGRB1 = eGRB2 =
1
5t
[5
3
t     (1  ) (1 + iA) A]  eGRB .
Proof of Proposition 1.2:
Note that d
GR
A
dA
= 4m(1 )(1+iA)
5
eGRA > 0 and d2GRAd2A = 2mt [25 (1  ) (1 + iA)]2 > 0.
Further, due to eGRB > eCBLB and 0 <  < 1 it holds that dGRAdA > dCBLAdA and d2GRAd2A >
d2CBLA
d2A
. Since it also holds that CBLA jA=0= mtf 25t [56t + (iB   iA)]g2   FCBL >
GRA jA=0= mtf 25t [56t + (iB   iA)]g2   FGR due to FGR > FCBL, it follows that
only one intersection between GRA and 
CBL
A is possible for A > 0. Greeneld entry
is feasible for bank A in case of GRA  CBLA . Solving for bank As screening ability
yields
A 
p
XGR   56 t
(1+)(1 )(1+iA)  
GR
A
with XGR  ( + 56t)2 + 25t(1+)(FGR FCBL)4m(1 ) .
Proof of Lemma 1.3:
The marginal borrower between bank A and B is given by xACA;B =
1
4
+
rACB  rACA
2t
.
It follows that the market share of banks can be expressed by mACA and m
AC
B with
ACA  12 +
rACB  rACA
t
and ACB  12 +
rACA  rACB
t
.
Hence, banksprot functions are given by
ACA =


 
rACA   iA
  (1  ) (1  A) (1 + iA)mACA   FAC   PAC
ACB =


 
rACB   iB
  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)mACB .
dACA
drACA
!
= 0 and d
AC
B
drACB
!
= 0 implies
erACA = 13f32t + iB + 2iA + (1  ) [3  B (1 + iB)  2A (1 + iA)]gerACB = 13f32t + 2iB + iA + (1  ) [3  2B (1 + iB)  A (1 + iA)]g
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ACA = mtf
eACA 2g   PAC   FAC
ACB = mt
eACB 2
with eACA = 13t [32t++(1  ) (1 + iA) A] and eACB = 13t [32t  (1 )(1+iA)A].
Proof of Proposition 1.3:
Derivation of Domestic BanksProts with no Foreign Bank Entry
The marginal borrower between bank B1 and B2 is given by xNEB1;B2 =
1
4
+
rNEB2
 rNEB1
2t
.
It follows that the market share of banks can be expressed by mNEB1 and m
NE
B2
with
NEB1  12 +
rNEB2
 rNEB1
t
and NEB2  12  
rNEB2
 rNEB1
t
.
Hence, banksprot functions are given by
NEB1 =


 
rNEB1   iB
  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)mNEB1
NEB2 =


 
rNEB2   iB
  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)mNEB2 .
dNEB1
drNEB1
!
= 0 and
dNEB2
drNEB2
!
= 0 implies
erNEB1 = erNEB2 = 12 [t + 2iB + 2 (1  B (1 + iB)) (1  )]  erNEB
NEB1 = 
NE
B2
= mt
4
 NEB .
Derivation of ACA
Note, rst, that it is useful to show that (1) d
AC
A
dA
>
dCBLA
dA
in the range of CBLA  A <
GRA and (2)
dACA
dA
>
dGRA
dA
in the range of GRA  A < 1:
(1) proof of d
AC
A
dA
>
dCBLA
dA
for CBLA  A < GRA
Note that d
AC
A
dA
= 2m (1  ) (1 + iA)

1
3
eACA + 15eCBLB  > 0 and
d2ACA
d2A
= 2m
t
(1  )2(1 + iA)2
 
1
9
  1
25
22

> 0.
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Note also, beforehand, that by abstracting from exit of domestic banks, eGRA  23 must
hold due to the symmetric location of banks on the Salop circle. eGRA  23 is equivalent
to 5
6
t     (1  ) (1 + iA) A  0. We will use this condition further on and refer
to it as
Condition (2): 5
6
t     (1  ) (1 + iA) A  0.
From Condition (2) follows a further useful condition which we will refer to as
Condition (3): 5
6
t   > 0.
Note that d
AC
A
dA
>
dCBLA
dA
is equivalent to 5
6
t 5(9 5)
9(5 2) 
5(922 5)
9(5 2) (1  ) (1 + iA) A >
0 which is fullled due to Condition (2) since numerical simulations show that
 1 < 5(9 5)
9(5 2) < 1 and
5(922 5)
9(5 2) < . Hence, 
AC
A and 
CBL
A may intersect only once.
(2) proof of d
AC
A
dA
>
dGRA
dA
for GRA  A < 1
Note that d
AC
A
dA
= 2m (1  ) (1 + iA) [13eACA + 5eGRB ] > 0 and d2ACAd2A = 2mt (1  )2
(1 + iA)
2

1
9
  2
25

> 0.
dACA
dA
>
dGRA
dA
is equivalent to 9
8
t      9 5
4
(1  ) (1 + iA) A > 0 which is fullled
due to Condition (2) as 9 5
4
< . Hence, ACA and 
GR
A may intersect only once.
As a consequence, ACA is increasing in A and jumps upwards twice due to the changing
acquisition prices at CBLA and 
GR
A . Since, according to the above calculations, 
AC
A
is steeper than both CBLA and 
GR
A , in principle, four possible locations exist for 
AC
A .
First, ACA could lie above 
CBL
A and 
GR
A , thus eliminating cross border lending and
greeneld entry from the entry mode pattern. Second, ACA could intersect with 
CBL
A
which would exclude greeneld entry from the entry mode pattern. Third, and most
interesting for us, ACA could intersect with 
GR
A , allowing for the richest possible entry
mode pattern. Fourth, ACA may be located below 
CBL
A and 
GR
A , thus excluding
acquisition entry from the entry mode pattern.
Since we concentrate throughout our analysis on the richest possible entry mode pat-
tern, bank A chooses acquisition entry for ACA  GRA . Solving for bank As screening
ability yields
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A  3t(5 2) 2(9 5)2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC
  ACA
with XAC  1 + (9
2 5)[(5t22+36t 162)+ 180tm (FGR FAC)]
(3t(5 2) 2(9 5))2 .
Proof of Proposition 1.5:
dCBLA
d
=   1

CBLA < 0
dGRA
d
=   1

GRA < 0dCBLAd  < dGRAd  is fullled since CBLA < GRA .
dACA
d
=  9[(9
2 5)( 13 t+)+45](1 
p
XAC)
(1 )(1+iA)(92 5)2  
9[45+2(92 5)( 13 t+)]
2(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC(92 5)2
(92 5)[(5t22+36t 162)+ 180tm (FGR FAC)]
(3t(5 2) 2(9 5))2
with   1
45
[3t (5  2)  2 (9  5)].
Since (
92 5)[(5t22+36t 162)+ 180tm (FGR FAC)]
(3t(5 2) 2(9 5))2 = XAC   1 =
 p
XAC   1
  p
XAC + 1

,
it follows that
dACA
d
=  9[(9
2 5)( 13 t+)+45](1 
p
XAC)
(1 )(1+iA)(92 5)2 +
9[45+2(92 5)( 13 t+)]
2(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC(92 5)2
 
1 pXAC
  
1 +
p
XAC

or, equivalently,
dACA
d
= 3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC

2
5
p
XAC
[ 3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC

 (1  ) (1 + iA) +
 
1
3
t +

].
Due to 3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC

= ACA , this expression can be written as
dACA
d
=
2ACA
5
p
XAC
[ (1  ) (1 + iA) ACA + 13t +] or, equivalently,
dACA
d
=
4ACA
25
p
XAC
f5
6
t ++ 3
2
[ + 5
3
 (1  ) (1 + iA) ACA ]g.
Note, rst, that 5
6
t +  > 0 due to Condition (1). Second, as we assume A > B
it must hold that eACB = 13t [32t     (1  ) (1 + iA) A] < 12 . This is equivalent to
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+(1  ) (1 + iA) A > 0. By assuming 53  1, or, respectively,   0:6, we have that
3
2
[ + 5
3
 (1  ) (1 + iA) ACA ]  0.33 Third,  = 145 [3t (5  2)  2 (9  5)] > 0 is
equivalent to 5
6
t  5(9 5)
9(5 2) > 0 which holds due to Condition (3) since 0 <
5(9 5)
9(5 2) < 1.
Hence, it holds that d
AC
A
d
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.6:
dCBLA
dB
= 1+iB
(1+iA)
> 0
dGRA
dB
= (1 )(1+iB)p
XGR
GRA > 0
dACA
dB
=
(1+iB)(9 5)(1 
p
XAC)
(1+iA)(92 5) +
(1+iB)(9 5)
(1+iA)(92 5)
p
XAC
(92 5)[(5t22+36t 162)+ 180tm (FGR FAC)]
(3t(5 2) 2(9 5))2 +
8(1+iB)( 98 t )
45(1+iA)
p
XAC
.
Since (
92 5)[(5t22+36t 162)+ 180tm (FGR FAC)]
(3t(5 2) 2(9 5))2 = XAC   1 =
 p
XAC   1
  p
XAC + 1

,
it follows that
dACA
dB
=
(1+iB)(9 5)(1 
p
XAC)
(1+iA)(92 5)  
(1+iB)(9 5)
(1+iA)(92 5)
p
XAC
 
1 pXAC
  
1 +
p
XAC

+
8(1+iB)( 98 t )
45(1+iA)
p
XAC
or, equivalently,
dACA
dB
= 2(1+iB)(1 )(9 5)
45
3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC
 
2(1+iB)(1 )(9 5)(1+
p
XAC)
45
p
XAC
3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC

+
8(1+iB)( 98 t )
45(1+iA)
p
XAC
.
Since 3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC

= ACA it follows that
dACA
dB
= 2(1+iB)(1 )(9 5)
45
ACA  
2(1+iB)(1 )(9 5)(1+
p
XAC)
45
p
XAC
ACA +
8(1+iB)( 98 t )
45(1+iA)
p
XAC
which, in turn, is equivalent to
33In order to keep our analysis tractable, we henceforth assume  > 0:6. We think this is justied
since in that case, the foreign bank would not lose more than 40 percent of its screening e¢ ciency due
to soft information problems which seems reasonable.
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dACA
dB
=
2(1+iB)[4( 98 t ) (1 )(1+iA)(9 5)ACA ]
45(1+iA)
p
XAC
.
Note that 4
 
9
8
t     (1  ) (1 + iA) (9  5) ACA > 0 is equivalent to 98t     
9 5
4
(1   )(1 + iA)ACA > 0 which is fullled due to Condition (2) since 9 54 < .
Hence, d
AC
A
dB
> 0 holds.
Proof of Proposition 1.7:
dCBLA
diB
=   1 (1 )B
(1 )(1+iA) < 0
dGRA
diB
=  1 (1 )Bp
XGR
GRA < 0
Note that
dCBLAdiB  > dGRAdiB  is equivalent to 1 >   56 t+pXGR which is fullled as 56t+ >
0 due to Condition (1).
dACA
diB
=
2( 19  15)[1 (1 )B ]

3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC
  8[1 (1 )B ]( 98 t )
45(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC
+
[1 (1 )B ]( 19  15)
(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC

2
5
  1
9
 (92 5)[(5t22+36t 162)+ 180tm (FGR FAC)]
(3t(5 2) 2(9 5))2 .
Since (
92 5)[(5t22+36t 162)+ 180tm (FGR FAC)]
(3t(5 2) 2(9 5))2 = XAC   1 =
 p
XAC   1
  p
XAC + 1

,
it follows that
dACA
diB
=
2( 19  15)[1 (1 )B ]

3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC
  8[1 (1 )B ]( 98 t )
45(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC
 
[1 (1 )B ]( 19  15)
(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC

2
5
  1
9
  1 pXAC  1 +pXAC
or, equivalently,
dACA
diB
=
2( 19  15)[1 (1 )B ]

3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC
  8[1 (1 )B ]( 98 t )
45(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC
 2[1 (1 )B ](
1
9
  1
5
)(1+
p
XAC)

p
XAC
3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC

.
Since 3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC

= ACA it follows that
dACA
diB
=
2( 19  15)[1 (1 )B ]

ACA  
8[1 (1 )B ]( 98 t )
45(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC
  2[1 (1 )B ](
1
9
  1
5
)(1+
p
XAC)

p
XAC
ACA
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which is equivalent to
dACA
diB
=  2[1 (1 )B ][4(
9
8
t ) (1 )(1+iA)(9 5)ACA ]
45
p
XAC(1 )(1+iA) .
Note that 4
 
9
8
t     (1  ) (1 + iA) (9  5) ACA > 0 is equivalent to 98t     
9 5
4
(1   )(1 + iA)ACA > 0 which is fullled due to Condition (2) since 9 54 < .
Hence, it holds that d
AC
A
diB
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.8:
dCBLA
d 1
t
= 5t
2
4(1 )(1+iA)

2
3
 
q
FCBL
mt

Note, rst, that CBLA < 1 is equivalent to
q
FCBL
mt
< 1
3
+ 2(1 )(1+iA)+2
5t
. Second, as
we abstract from exit of domestic banks it must hold that eCBLB  16 which is equivalent
to 5
6
t       (1  ) (1 + iA) A  0. Accordingly, 2(1 )(1+iA)+25t  13 which is
equivalent to 5
6
t    (1  ) (1 + iA)  0 is fullled. Consequently, it must hold
that
q
FCBL
mt
< 2
3
. Hence, it holds that d
CBL
A
d 1
t
> 0.
dGRA
d 1
t
= 5t
2
6
p
XGR
[GRA   15(FGR FCBL)4m(1 )(1 )(1+iA) ]
Note that d
GR
A
d 1
t
> 0 is equivalent to GRA >
15(FGR FCBL)
4m(1 )(1 )(1+iA) . Thus, it holds that
dGRA
d 1
t
> 0 for GRA >
15(FGR FCBL)
4m(1 )(1 )(1+iA) and
dGRA
d 1
t
< 0 for GRA <
15(FGR FCBL)
4m(1 )(1 )(1+iA) .
dACA
d 1
t
=  t
2(1  25)
3
3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC
  t2[  101360 t+ 15( 98 t )  (FGR FAC)m ]
(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC
 
t2(1  25)
6(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC

2
5
  1
9
 (92 5)[(5t22+36t 162)+ 180tm (FGR FAC)]
(3t(5 2) 2(9 5))2 .
Since (
92 5)[(5t22+36t 162)+ 180tm (FGR FAC)]
(3t(5 2) 2(9 5))2 = XAC   1 =
 p
XAC   1
  p
XAC + 1

,
it follows that
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dACA
d 1
t
=  t
2(1  25)
3
3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC
  t2[  101360 t+ 15( 98 t )  (FGR FAC)m ]
(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC
+
t2(1  25)
6(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC

2
5
  1
9
  1 pXAC  1 +pXAC
or, equivalently,
dACA
d 1
t
=  t
2(1  25)
3
3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC
  t2[  101360 t+ 15( 98 t )  (FGR FAC)m ]
(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC
+
t2(1  25)
3
(1+
p
XAC)p
XAC
3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC

.
Using 3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC

= ACA we arrive at
dACA
d 1
t
=  t
2(1  25)
3
ACA  
t2[  101
360
t+ 1
5(
9
8
t )  (FGR FAC)m ]
(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC
+
t2(1  25)
3
(1+
p
XAC)p
XAC
ACA
which is equivalent to
dACA
d 1
t
=
t2[(1 )(1+iA)(5 2)ACA + 56 t+3+ 15m (FGR FAC)]
15(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC
.
We now prove that d
AC
A
d 1
t
> 0. d
AC
A
d 1
t
> 0 is equivalent to FAC   FGR < m15 [56t +
 + 2 + (5  2) (1  ) (1 + iA) ACA ]. Note, beforehand, that in case of acquisition
entry eACB  12 must hold due to iB   iA > 0, A > B and  = 0. eACB  12
is equivalent to 2 + 2 (1  ) (1 + iA) A  0. As the minimum of (5  2) is 3,
2 + (5  2) (1  ) (1 + iA) ACA > 0 must then also hold. As 56t +  > 0 due to
Condition (3), it follows that the right hand side of the above inequality is positive.
However, the left hand side of that expression is negative. As a consequence, the above
inequality is fullled and it holds that d
AC
A
d 1
t
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.9:
dCBLA
dm
=   5t
4m(1 )(1+iA)
q
FCBL
mt
< 0
dGRA
dm
=   25t(FGR FCBL)
8m2(1 )(1 )(1+iA)
p
XGR
< 0
dACA
dm
= t(FGR FAC)
m2(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC
> 0
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Proof of Proposition 1.10:
Welfare functions:
(1) No Entry:
Consumer surplus is given by vm + 0 m (1  )  erBNEm   4m
1
4Z
0
xtdx.
Producer surplus is given by 2NEB = mt 
 
1
2
2
.
Hence, by rearranging we yield the welfare function
WNE = m[ (v   iB)  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)  t8 ].34
(2) Cross Border Lending:
Consumer surplus is given by
vm+0m (1  ) 
erCBLA eCBLA + 2erCBLB eCBLB m 2m
0B@
1
6Z
0
xtdx+
xCBLA;B1Z
0
xtdx+
xCBLA;B2Z
0
xtdx
1CA.
Producer surplus is given by 2CBLB .
Hence, by rearranging we yield the welfare function
WCBL = mfv   t12   13
 erCBLA + 2erCBLB + 1t     12  erCBLB   erCBLA 2+
2[1
3
  1
2t
 erCBLB   erCBLA ][  erCBLB   iB  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)]g.
34For our analysis to be interesting, we assume WNE > 0.
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(3) Greeneld Entry
Consumer surplus is given by
vm+0m (1  ) 
erGRA eGRA + 2erGRB eGRB m 2m
0B@
1
6Z
0
xtdx+
xGRA;B1Z
0
xtdx+
1
3
 xGRA;B1Z
0
xtdx
1CA.
Producer surplus is given by 2GRB .
Hence, by rearranging we yield the welfare function
WGR = mfv  t12  13
 erGRA + 2erGRB + 1t     12  erGRB   erGRA 2+2[13  12t  erGRB   erGRA ]
[
 erGRB   iB  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)]g.
(4) Entry via Acquisition
Consumer surplus is given by
vm + 0 m (1  ) 
erACA eACA + erACB eACB m   2m
0B@
xACA;BZ
0
xtdx+
1
2
 xACA;BZ
0
xtdx
1CA.
Producer surplus is given by ACB and the acquisition price amounts to 
GR
B .
Hence, by rearranging we yield the welfare function
WAC = mf[v   erACA  12 + 1t  erACB   erACA    12   1t  erACB   erACA  iB]  
1
2
  1
t
 erACB   erACA  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)  t2 [14 + 1t2  erACB   erACA 2]+
1
25t
[5
3
t     (1  ) (1 + iA) A]2g.
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Shape of Welfare Functions:
dWNE
dA
= 0
dWCBL
dA
jA=0= m(1 )(1+iA)75t2 [5t2 + 12 (3   1) (iB   iA)] > 0
d2WCBL
d2A
=
m(1 )(4 1 32)
t

2(1+iA)
5
2
> 0
dWGR
dA
jA=0= m(1 )(1+iA)75t2 [5t2 + 12 (3   1) (iB   iA)] > 0
d2WGR
d2A
=
m(1 )(4 1 32)
t

2(1+iA)
5
2
> 0
dWAC
dA
jA=0= m(1+iA)(1 )450t2 [15t2 (5  4) + 2 (100 + 18   25) (iB   iA)] > 0
d2WAC
d2A
=
m(182+100 25)
t

(1 )(1+iA)
15
2
> 0
Note that 4   1   32 > 0 as well as 182 + 100   25 > 0 hold for  > 0:5 which
we will assume henceforth. We nd, rst, that WNE is independent of A. Second,
WCBL, WGR, and WAC are quadratic, increasing, and convex functions in A with
argmin
A2R
(WCBL) < 0, argmin
A2R
(WGR) < 0, and argmin
A2R
(WAC) < 0 since the second
order conditions with respect to A are positive and since the rst order conditions
with respect to A at A = 0 are positive as well.
Next, we show that WGR > WCBL always holds. WGR  WCBL > 0 is equivalent to
2
25t
mA(1  )(1 + iA)(1  )f56t + 2 (3 1) [ + 12A (1  ) (1 + iA) (1 + )]g > 0
which is fullled if we assume  > 0.35
Hence, we only need to calculate the intersection points of WNE, WGR, and WAC .
35Regarding the welfare analysis, we only look at host banking markets on a rather low nancial
development stage and assume henceforth  = iB   iA   (1  ) (1 + iB) B > 0. This expression is
the more likely fullled the larger is the di¤erence in renancing conditions of foreign and host country
banks and the lower is the screening ability of host country banks. This limitation seems justied as
the entry of foreign banks into nancially very well developed countries is, in general, not very much
regulated.
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(a) Intersection between WNE and WGR
Note that WGR  WNE > 0 is equivalent to
1
1800
m
t2
f1442 (3   1) (1  )2 (1 + iA)2 (A)2 + 24 (1  ) (1 + iA) [5t2+
12(3   1)]A   5t2[5t (8   3)  24] + 144 (3   1)2g > 0.
Solving for A yields A <
5
12
t

 
p
252 17+3 

 (3 1)
(1 )(3 1)(1+iA) and A >
5
12
t

+
p
252 17+3 

 (3 1)
(1 )(3 1)(1+iA) .
Since, as derived above, argmin
A2R
(WGR) < 0, dWNEdA = 0 and
dWGR
dA
jA=0> 0, only one
intersection between WNE and WGR for 0 < A < 1 is possible so that we only need to
consider the intersection point A =
5
12
t
p
252 17+3 

 (3 1)
(1 )(3 1)(1+iA) .
Hence, WGR > WNE is equivalent to A >
5
12
t
p
252 17+3 

 (3 1)
(1 )(3 1)(1+iA)  
GR
W .
(b) Intersection between WGR and WAC
Note that WAC  WGR > 0 is equivalent to
1
1800
m
t2
f4 (1  )2 (1 + iA)2 (100   25 + 362   902) (A)2   4 (1  ) (1 + iA)
[(15t2 (6  5)  2 (100   25 + 36  90))]A + 4 (10 + 11)2   25t22
(2 + 3)  60t2g > 0.
Solving for A yields A < xWAC   5
p
XWAC
2(1 )(1+iA)[25(4 1) 182(5 2)] and
A > x
W
AC +
5
p
XWAC
2(1 )(1+iA)[25(4 1) 182(5 2)]
with xWAC  [
15
2
t(6 5) [25(4 1) 18(5 2)]]
(1 )(1+iA)[25(4 1) 182(5 2)] and
XWAC  t2ft[25 (10 + 172   3) + 18 (6  302   11+ 82)]+
72 (1  ) [5 (4  3) + 6  5]g+ 72 (1  )2 (4   1) (5   2)2.
In principle, two intersections of WAC and WGR for A > 0 are possible. However,
remember that dWGR
dA
jA=0> 0 as well as dWACdA jA=0> 0. Hence, by proong that
WGR jA=0> WAC jA=0 we show that we only need to consider the upper intersec-
tion point xWAC +
5
p
XWAC
2(1 )(1+iA)[25(4 1) 182(5 2)] . Note that WGR jA=0  WAC jA=0=
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m25t
22(2+3) 42(10+11)+60t2
1800t2
. Further, 25t22 (2 + 3)  42 (10 + 11) > 0 is equi-
valent to 5
6
t   1
3
q
(10+11)
(2+3)
 > 0. Numerical solutions show that 0 < 1
3
q
(10+11)
(2+3)
< 1
so that Condition (2) is fullled and, hence, it must hold that WGR jA=0> WAC jA=0.
It follows that WAC > WGR holds for
A > x
W
AC +
5
p
XWAC
2(1 )(1+iA)[25(4 1) 182(5 2)]  
AC
W .
As we can abstract from the lower threshold, it must further hold that dWAC
dA
jA=ACW >
dWGR
dA
jA=ACW .
(c) Intersection of WNE and WAC and proof of 
GR
W < 
AC
W
Note, rst, that it is useful to show that GRW < 
AC
W . 
GR
W < 
AC
W is equivalent to
5
2[25(4 1) 182(5 2)](t
2ft[25 (10 + 172   3) + 18 (6  302   11+ 82)]+
72 (1  ) [5 (4  3) + 6  5]g+ 72 (1  )2 (4   1) (5   2)2) 12 >
1
2(3 1)[25(4 1) 182(5 2)]f  (90+ 100 + 2342   270   722   25)+
[25 (4   1)  182 (5   2)]
p
 17 + 252 + 3]g
[5
6
t +  50(4 1)(3 1)(1 )
[25(4 1) 182(5 2)]
p
 17+252+3 (90+100+2342 270 722 25)
].
Numerical simulations show that 25 (4   1)  182 (5   2) > 0 so that the left hand
side of this expression is clearly positive. The right hand side is also positive as
numerical simulations show that f  (90+ 100 + 2342   270   722   25) +
[25 (4   1)  182 (5   2)]
p
 17 + 252 + 3g is positive and
 1 <  50(4 1)(3 1)(1 )p
 17+252+3(100 902+362 25) (90+100+2342 270 722 25)
< 1 such that
[5
6
t +  50(4 1)(3 1)(1 )p
 17+252+3(100 902+362 25) (90+100+2342 270 722 25)
] > 0 holds ac-
cording to Condition (1). Squaring and rearranging yields
[25 (4   1)  182 (5   2)]f144
5
(3   1) (1  )[ (18 (3   1)  5 (4   1))+
5
p
 17 + 252 + 3 (4   1)][5
6
t   5(4 1)(3 1)(1 )
[18(3 1) 5(4 1)]+5(4 1)
p
 17+252+3
] + t22
[18 ( 10 + 17+ 302   95+ 1302)  25 (4   1) ( 17 + 262 + 3)+
2[25 (4   1) + 18 (13+ 5  15   4)]
p
 17 + 252 + 3]g > 0
Numerical simulations show that [18 (3   1)  5 (4   1)] > 0,
 1 < 5(4 1)(3 1)(1 )
[18(3 1) 5(4 1)]+5(4 1)
p
 17+252+3
< 1 and
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[18 ( 10 + 17+ 302   95+ 1302)  25 (4   1) ( 17 + 262 + 3)+
2[25 (4   1) + 18 (13+ 5  15   4)]
p
 17 + 252 + 3] > 0 for  > 0:75.36
Hence, the whole expression is positive since due to Condition (3)
[5
6
t   5(4 1)(3 1)(1 )
[18(3 1) 5(4 1)]+5(4 1)
p
 17+252+3
] > 0.
The above calculations show that GRW < 
AC
W . Remember that we also found that
argmin
A2R
(WGR) < 0, dWGRdA jA=0> 0, argmin
A2R
(WAC) < 0, dWACdA jA=0> 0, and
dWAC
dA
jA=ACW >
dWGR
dA
jA=ACW . Hence, we can neglect the intersection point between
WNE and WAC , since the policy maker would always prefer greeneld or acquisition
entry to the right hand side of this point.
(d) Entry Mode Pattern Preferred by the Social Planner
It follows from the analysis above that the entry mode pattern the social planner prefers
is - increasing in the screening ability of the foreign bank: no entry - greeneld entry
- acquisition entry. Again, one or both entry modes could drop out of the pattern
depending on the parameter constellations, but the sequence of the pattern can never
be di¤erent.
Proof of Proposition 1.11:
(1) Proof of CBLA < bGRA < GRW
Note that the policy maker cannot require that the foreign bank enters via a
de novo investment if the foreign bank makes losses in case of greeneld entry.
Hence, greeneld entry is only possible for GRA  0 which is equivalent to A 
1
(1 )(1+iA)

5
2
q
tFGR
m
  5
6
t  

 bGRA . Note that bGRA > CBLA holds.
(2) Proof of ACW > 
AC
A
Note that ACW > 
AC
A is equivalent to
36In order to keep our analysis tractable, we henceforth assume  > 0:75.
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6
5
[25 (15 + 2  2  5) + 92 ( 25   8  10+ 20)]
[5
6
t   25(1 )(10 1)
(25(15+2 2 5)+92( 25 8 10+20)) ] <
15[25 (4   1)  182 (5   2)]pXAC + 53 (92   5)
p
XWAC .
The right hand side of this expression is positive since 25 (4   1)   182 (5   2)
> 0 as shown before. The left hand side is positive if 25 (15 + 2  2  5) +
92 (20  25   8  10) > 0 and 5
6
t   25(1 )(10 1)
25(15+2 2 5)+92(20 25 8 10) > 0.
Numerical simulations show that the rst expression is fullled and that  1 <
30(1 )(10 1)
25(15+2 2 5)+92( 25 8 10+20) < 1 holds, which, in turn, guarantees that Con-
dition (3) is fullled and, accordingly, 5
6
t   25(1 )(10 1)
25(15+2 2 5)+92(20 25 8 10) > 0
holds. Squaring both sides and rearranging results in
t22(400+2162 720 1712+100) 12(1 )(27 27 90 70t2+10t+90+135t2 36t)
25(4 1) 182(5 2) <
36t
m
(FGR   FAC) + 90
p
XWAC XAC
25(4 1) 182(5 2) .
The right hand side of this inequality is positive. The left hand side, however, is
negative. To see this, note, rst, that (400 + 2162   720   1712 + 100) < 0.
Second, 27   27   90   70t2 + 10t + 90 + 135t2   36t > 0 is
equivalent to 6
5
(135 + 10  36  70)

5
6
t   15(10 3)(1 )
2(135+10 36 70)

> 0. Note that
 1 < 15(10 3)(1 )
2(135+10 36 70) < 1 holds for not too small (; ) combinations
37 ; then,
135 + 10   36   70 > 0 also holds. Accordingly, Condition (3) is fullled and
it follows that 6
5
(135 + 10  36  70)

5
6
t   15(10 3)(1 )
2(135+10 36 70)

> 0. As a
consequence, the left hand side of the above expression is negative. Hence, the above
expression is true and, consequently, it holds that ACW > 
AC
A .
(3) Proof of d
GR
W
d( 1t )
< 0
dGRW
d( 1t )
=   5t2
12(1 )(3 1)(1+iA)
p
252   17 + 3  

< 0.
37To keep our analysis tractable, we assume  > 53
58 13
140 39 , which is slightly larger than 0.75.
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Proof of Proposition 2.1:
From the point of view of an arbitrary bank that maximizes its prot by choosing the
repayment r it demands from its borrowers, the condition determining the marginal
borrower is given by
xz =
rz r
2t
+ 1
2n
with z = L;H.
Note that for bad borrowers, only transportation costs and not repayments asked by
banks matter for their decision where to apply for credit. However, since banks can
observe the location of borrowers, bad borrowers must imitate the behavior of good
borrowers. Hence, for the fraction of bad borrowers, the marginal borrower is also
located at xz = rz r2t +
1
2n
.38
It follows that the expected market share of a bank can be expressed by
2m[(1  q)xH + qxL] = m[ (1 q)rH r+qrLt + 1n ].
Hence, the prot of a domestic bank investing in screening DB;L, the prot of a
domestic bank not investing in screening DB;H , and the prot of a foreign bank FB
are given by:
DB;L = (r   i) m[ (1 q)rH r+qrLt + 1n ]  F
DB;H = (r   i) m[ (1 q)rH r+qrLt + 1n ]  i (1  )m[ (1 q)rH r+qrLt + 1n ]
FB = (r   i) m[ (1 q)rH r+qrLt + 1n ].
38In order for bad borrowers to apply for credit, we assume that i > tn holds.
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Banks maximize their prots with respect to the repayment they ask from borrowers
which gives rL = i+ tn +
i(1 )

1 q
2
and rH = i+ tn +
i(1 )

 
1  q
2

. Clearly, it holds
that rL < rH .
Proof of Proposition 2.2:
(1) Equilibrium in which All Domestic Banks Invest in Perfect Screening
It must hold that k = n   l. Since there must not be any incentives to deviate from
the equilibrium it must be satised that:
DB;L (k = n  l)  DB;H (k = n  l   1) which is equivalent to
m
t
[1
2
n l (n l)
n 1
i(1 )

+ t
n
]2   F  m
t
[ 1
2
l+(n l 1) 1
n 1
i(1 )

+ t
n
]2 or
F  n 2
n 1 [
mi(1 )
n
  m(i(1 ))2
4t
n 2
n 1 ]  F .
(2) Equilibrium in which No Domestic Bank Invests in Perfect Screening
It must hold that k = 1.39 Since there must not be any incentives to deviate from the
equilibrium, it must be satised that:
DB;H (k = 1)  DB;L (k = 2) which is equivalent to
m
t
[ 1
2
l+1 1
n 1
i(1 )

+ t
n
]2  m
t
f1
2
[1  l+2 1
n 1 ]
i(1 )

+ t
n
g2   F or
F  n 2
n 1 [
mi(1 )
n
+ m(i(1 ))
2
4t
n 2l 2
n 1 ]  F .
(3) Equilibrium in which the Domestic Banks Coordinate about a Certain Number of
Banks Investing in Perfect Screening
In an equilibrium in which the domestic banks coordinate about a certain num-
ber k of banks investing in the perfect screening technology it must hold that
39since q is dened as q = l+k 1n 1 ; k
 is dened to be equal to 1 in case no domestic bank invests
in screening. The probability that the neighboring bank is a perfectly screening bank is then equal to
l
n 1 :
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given that k domestic banks invest in screening all domestic banks are indi¤er-
ent between investing or not investing in the screening technology. However, for
DB;H

k = ek = DB;L k = ek there are incentives to deviate from ek as it holds
that dH
dk
=  mi(1 )
t(n 1) [
t
n
  1
2
l+k 1
n 1
i(1 )

] which is negative since the term in brackets
corresponds to the market share of a domestic bank not investing in screening which
must be positive. Hence, DB;H

k = ek   1 > DB;L k = ek holds and the condi-
tion guaranteeing that there are no incentives to deviate from the equilibrium in which
the domestic banks coordinate about a certain number k of banks investing in perfect
screening is given by:
DB;L (k = k
)  DB;H (k = k   1) ^ DB;H (k = k)  DB;L (k = k + 1).
This is equivalent to
m
t
f1
2
[1  l+k 1
n 1 ]
i(1 )

+ t
n
g2   F  m
t
[ 1
2
l+(k 1) 1
n 1
i(1 )

+ t
n
]2 ^
m
t
[ 1
2
l+k 1
n 1
i(1 )

+ t
n
]2  m
t
f1
2
[1  l+(k+1) 1
n 1 ]
i(1 )

+ t
n
g2   F
It follows that k must lie in the range
n
2
  l   2t(n 1)
i(1 ) [
F
mi(1 )
(n 1)
(n 2)   1n ]  k  n2   l + 1  2t(n 1)i(1 ) [ Fmi(1 ) (n 1)(n 2)   1n ].
We dene k =: n
2
  l   2t(n 1)
i(1 ) [
F
mi(1 )
(n 1)
(n 2)   1n ] +  with  2 [0; 1].
Further, it must hold that
1 < n
2
  l  2t(n 1)
i(1 ) [
F
mi(1 )
(n 1)
(n 2)   1n ] and n2   l+1  2t(n 1)i(1 ) [ Fmi(1 ) (n 1)(n 2)   1n ] < n  l
which simplies to
F < n 2
n 1 [
mi(1 )
n
+ m(i(1 ))
2
4t
n 2l 2
n 1 ] and F >
n 2
n 1 [
mi(1 )
n
  m(i(1 ))2
4t
n 2
n 1 ].
Hence, an equilibrium in which the domestic banks coordinate about a certain number
k of banks investing in perfect screening exists for F < F < F .
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Proof of Proposition 2.3:
dk
d( ) =
2t(n 1)
2i(1 ) [
1
n
  2F
mi(1 )
n 1
n 2 ] and
dk
d( ) < 0 if F >
1
2
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 .
Note that from the condition that the marginal borrower must be located in between
two neighboring banks it follows that (1 )i
2t
 1
n
. Note also that with (1 )i
2t
=
1
n
the lowest possible value of F is reached and equals 1
2
mi(1 )
(n 1)
n 2
n 1  F . Since
1
2
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 < F it holds that
dk
d( ) < 0.
d2k
d( )2 =
4t(n 1)
(1 )i3 [
1
n
  3F
mi(1 )
n 1
n 2 ] and
d2k
d( )2 < 0 if F >
1
3
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 .
Since 1
3
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 < F it holds that
d2k
d( )2 < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.4:
dk
dn
= 1
2
  2t
i(1 ) [
F (n 1)(n 3)
mi(1 )(n 2)2   1n2 ].
Consider rst bF = mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1   m[i(1 )]
2
4t
(n 6)(n 2)
(n 1)2 for which k
 = n  l  2 holds. In
that case, we arrive at
dk
dn
= 1
2
  2t
i(1 )f (n 1)(n 3)mi(1 )(n 2)2 [
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1   m(i(1 ))
2
4t
(n 6)(n 2)
(n 1)2 ]  1n2g.
If follows that dk

dn
< 0 if i(1 )
2t
< 1
n
(n 1)(n2 4n+2)
n(n2 6n+10) .
Since i(1 )
2t
 1
n
and
(n 1)(n2 4n+2)
n(n2 6n+10) > 1, it follows that
dk
dn
< 0. Since @
2k
@n@F
=  
2t(n 1)(n 3)
m[i(1 )]2(n 2)2 < 0,
dk
dn
< 0 also holds for F > bF .
Consider second eF = mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1   m[i(1 )]
2
4t
(n 4)(n 2)
(n 1)2 for which k
 = n  l  1 holds.
In that case, we arrive at
dk
dn
= 1
2
  2t
i(1 )f (n 1)(n 3)mi(1 )(n 2)2 [
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1   m(i(1 ))
2
4t
(n 4)(n 2)
(n 1)2 ]  1n2g.
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If follows that dk

dn
< 0 if i(1 )
2t
< 1
n
(n 1)(n2 4n+2)
n(n2 5n+7) .
Since i(1 )
2t
 1
n
but
(n 1)(n2 4n+2)
n(n2 5n+7) < 1 is possible,
dk
dn
> 0 is feasible for F = eF .
However, k

n+ 1; eF < k n; eF if i(1 )
2t
< 1
n+1
2n(n 1)(n 3)
2n3 10n2+16n 5 . Since
i(1 )
2t

1
n+1
must hold and 2n(n 1)(n 3)
16n 10n2+2n3 5 > 1, k


n+ 1; eF < k n; eF holds. Thus, with a
rising number of banks, the number of domestic banks investing in perfect screening
falls.
d2k
dn2
=   2t
i(1 ) [
2
n3
+ 2F
mi(1 )(n 2)3 ] is clearly negative.
Proof of Proposition 2.5:
@2k
@( )@n =
2t
n22i(1 )   4tFm3i2(1 )2
(n 1)(n 3)
(n 2)2 and
@2k
@( )@n < 0 if F >
1
2
mi(1 )
(n 1)
(n 2)2
n2(n 3) .
Since 1
2
mi(1 )
(n 1)
(n 2)2
n2(n 3) < F it holds that
@2k
@( )@n < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.6:
dk
d( 1t )
= 2t
2(n 1)
i(1 ) [
F
mi(1 )
n 1
n 2   1n ] and
dk
d( 1t )
> 0 if F > mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 and
dk
d( 1t )
< 0 if F < mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 .
We dene F1  mi(1 )n n 2n 1 .
d2k
d( 1t )
2 =
4t3(n 1)
i(1 ) [
1
n
  F
mi(1 )
n 1
n 2 ] and
d2k
d( 1t )
2 > 0 if F < F1 and d
2k
d( 1t )
2 < 0 if F > F1.
Note that F > F1 is only possible if F1 < F which holds for l < n 22 .
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Proof of Proposition 2.7:
@2k
@( )@( 1t )
= 2t
2(n 1)
2i(1 ) [
2F (n 1)
mi(1 )(n 2)   1n ] and
@2k
@( )@( 1t )
> 0 if F > 1
2
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 .
Since 1
2
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 < F it holds that
@2k
@( )@( 1t )
> 0.
@2k
@n@( 1t )
= 2t
2
i(1 ) [
F (n 1)(n 3)
mi(1 )(n 2)2   1n2 ] and
@2k
@n@( 1t )
> 0 if F > mi(1 )
n2
(n 2)2
(n 1)(n 3) .
Since mi(1 )
n2
(n 2)2
(n 1)(n 3) < F it holds that
@2k
@n@( 1t )
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.8:
Set-up of the Social Welfare Function:
Welfare consists of the sum of borrower rents and bank rents. Borrower rents are
captured by the willingness to pay of borrowers minus the repayments of borrowers to
banks and their transport costs. Bank rents include the revenues of banks minus their
costs.40
Transport costs are given by
2m (k + l) [n l k

n 1
1
2n
+
i(1 )
4tZ
0
txdx+ l+k
 1
n 1
1
2nZ
0
txdx]+
2m (n  l   k) [n l k
n 1
1
2nZ
0
txdx+ l+k
 1
n 1
1
2n
 i(1 )
4tZ
0
txdx] =
tmfn k l
n 1
i(1 )
4t
[i(1 )
4t
(2k + 2l   1) + 1
n
] + 1
4n
g.
40In order to analytically solve for the welfare implications, we focus on the following parameter
ranges throughout section 2.6. We assume that the share of borrowers with good projects is larger
than one half and not arbitrarily close to its boundary values, and that spillovers are not too large
i.e. 1   < 0:75.
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Since the repayments of borrowers to banks equal the revenues of banks, welfare can
be expressed as
W = vm + 0 m (1  )  tmfn k l
n 1
i(1 )
4t
[i(1 )
4t
(2k + 2l   1) + 1
n
] + 1
4n
g 
kmi[n l k

n 1
i(1 )
2t
+ 1
n
]  kF   lmi[n l k
n 1
i(1 )
2t
+ 1
n
] 
(n  l   k) im[  l+k 1
n 1
i(1 )
2t
+ 1
n
][ + (1  )].
E¤ect of Competitive Pressure 1
t
on Welfare:
@W
@( 1t )
= 1
32mn2[i(1 )]2(n 1)(n 2)2{[mi (1  ) (n  2)]2[ (1  ) i2n (n  2)
( (1  ) (4   1) (n  1 + 2)  4 ( (1  ) + 2))  8t22 (n  1)] F
[4t (n  1)]2[Fn (n  1) (n  4   1) mi (1  ) (n  2) (2n  4   1)]}.
@W
@( 1t )
> 0 holds if
 
1
t
2
> 8(n 1)[mi(1 )(n 2)]
2+F [4(n 1)]2[Fn(n 1)(n 4 1) mi(1 )(n 2)(2n 4 1)]
inm2[i(1 )]3(n 2)2(n 2)[(1 )(4 1)(n 1+2) 4((1 )+2)] .
41
@W
@( 1t )
> 0 is satised for
8(n 1)[mi(1 )(n 2)]2+F [4(n 1)]2[Fn(n 1)(n 4 1) mi(1 )(n 2)(2n 4 1)]
inm2[i(1 )]3(n 2)2(n 2)[(1 )(4 1)(n 1+2) 4((1 )+2)] < 0.
This inequality holds for
F2[1 
q
1  2n(n 4 1)
(2n 4 1)2 ] < F < F2[1 +
q
1  2n(n 4 1)
(2n 4 1)2 ]
with F2  12 mi(1 )n n 2n 1 2n 4 1n 4 1 .
(i) Proof of F > F2[1 
q
1  2n(n 4 1)
(2n 4 1)2 ]:
Since F2[1 
q
1  2n(n 4 1)
(2n 4 1)2 ] < F for n > 5 it holds that F > F2[1 
q
1  2n(n 4 1)
(2n 4 1)2 ].
41We assume that n is not too small and that  is not too close to its boundary values such that
 (1  ) (4   1) (n  1 + 2)  4[ (1  ) + 2] > 0.
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(ii) Proof of F < F2[1 +
q
1  2n(n 4 1)
(2n 4 1)2 ]:
Note that with (1 )i
2t
= 1
n
the highest possible value of F is reached and equals
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 [
3
2
  2l+1
2(n 1) ]. Further, F2[1 +
q
1  2n(n 4 1)
(2n 4 1)2 ] >
3
2
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 holds for
n > 5 such that F < F2[1 +
q
1  2n(n 4 1)
(2n 4 1)2 ] holds.
Proof of Proposition 2.9:
@W
@( ) =   1mn(n 1)[4i(1 )(n 2)]2{ m2 (n  2)2 [i (1  )]3[ int (n  2)
[4 ( +  (1  ))   (1  ) (4   1) (n  1 + 2)]+
2[4 (n  1)2 + (2  1) ((n  1) (4   1)  n)]] 8Ft2 (n  1)2
[2Fn (n  1) (n  4   1) mi (1  ) (n  2)  2n  4   1 + 2in
t

]}.
@W
@( ) > 0 holds if
T1 <
1
t
< T2
with T1  A
 
1 p1 B and T2  A  1 +p1 B and
A  8Fin3(n 1)2 m[i(1 )]2(n 2)C1
m[i(1 )]2n(n 2)(n 2)C2
B  8Fi(1 )2n(n 1)2(n 2)[2Fn(n 1)(n 4 1) mi(1 )(n 2)(2n 4 1)]C2
[8Fi3n(n 1)2 m(i(1 ))2(n 2)C1]2
C1  4 (n  1)2 + (2  1) [(n  1) (4   1)  n] > 0
C2  i[4[ +  (1  )]   (1  ) (4   1) (n  1 + 2)] < 0.
Note that A > 0 holds if F < mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1
(1 )C1
82(n 1) .
Remember that F  3
2
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 . Further,
(1 )C1
82(n 1) >
3
2
is satised for n > 13. Hence,
F < mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1
(1 )C1
82(n 1) is fullled and A > 0 holds.
It follows from A > 0 that
(i) T2 > 0 and
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(ii) T1 > 0 if 0 < B < 1 and T1 < 0 if B < 0.
Note that B > 0 is equivalent to F < F2.
Further, it is easily veried that T2 jF>F2> T2 jF<F2 . We dene T3  T2 jF>F2 .
It follows that
(i) for F < F2, @W@( ) < 0 if
1
t
< T1 or 1t > T2 and
@W
@( ) > 0 if T1 <
1
t
< T2;
(ii) for F > F2, @W@( ) > 0 if
1
t
< T3 and @W@( ) < 0 if
1
t
> T3.
Proof of Proposition 2.10:
@W
@n
=   1
32(i(1 ))2mn2t2(n 1)2(n 2)3{(mi (1  ))
2 (n  2)3[2i (1  )[i (1  )n2
[(4   1) (1  2) + 4(1 + 2
(1 ))]+4t(n
2   (n  1)2 (4   1))]+4t[(n  1)2
(8i2 (1  ) + i (8   1) + 2t)+i (n2 (2   1)   (2n  1))]  (ni (1  ))2
[((4   1) (n  1)2+4)+ 82
(1 ) ]] 4t (n  1)2 F [4tFn2 (n  1) [(n  1) (n  4)
+8] mi (1  ) (n  2)[in2[ (1  )(4 (n  1) (n  2)  4 (n  4) + 1
 4) 82]+4t[n2 (4   1)  2 (4 + 1) (n  1)]]]}.
@W
@n
< 0 holds if
T4 <
1
t
< T5
with T4  D
 
1 p1  E and T5  D  1 +p1  E and
D   2i[mi(1 )(n 2)2G1+n2(n 1)2FG4]
m[i(1 )]3n2(n 2)2G2
E  2(n 2)[(1 )n(n 1)]2[(mi(1 ))2(n 2)3 2FG3]G2
[mi(1 )(n 2)2G1+n2(n 1)2FG4]2
G1  4 (n  1)2 [ (1  ) + 2]   (1  ) (1  2) [2n (n  1) + 1  4 (n  1)2]
G2  [8   1 + 82(1 ) ] (2  1)  (4   1) [n (n  2) + 42]
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G3  Fn2 (n  1) [(n  1) (n  4) + 8] 
mi (1  ) (n  2) [n2 (4   1)  2 (4 + 1) (n  1)]
G4   (1  ) [4 (n2   4n+ 2) + 1 + 4 (4   1)]  82
It is useful to show for further proofs that (i) G1 > 0, (ii) G2 < 0 and (iii) G4 > 0.
(i) Proof of G1 > 0:
Note that for  = 1, G1 simplies to 82 (n  1)2 +  (1  ) [2n (n  1) + 1] which
clearly is positive. Note that dG1
d
= 2 (1  ) [2n (n  1) + 1   4 (n  1)2]. Since
2n (n  1) + 1  4 (n  1)2 < 042 it follows that G1 > 0 holds also for  < 1.
(ii) Proof of G2 < 0:
For  = 1, G2 equals 8  1+ 82(1 )   (4   1) [n (n  2)+ 4] < 0.43 Further, dG2d > 0
for  < 8 1
4(4 1) +
22
(1 )(4 1) . Since
8 1
4(4 1) +
22
(1 )(4 1) > 1 it holds that G2 < 0.
(iii) Proof of G4 > 0:
G4 > 0 holds if  >
82
(1 )[4(n2 4n+2)+1+4(4 1)] . Further, for  = 0 the condition sim-
plies to  > 8
2
(1 )[4(n2 4n+2)+1] which holds.
42 Hence,  > 8
2
(1 )[4(n2 4n+2)+1+4(4 1)]
is also satised for  > 0 and thus, G4 > 0 holds.
We now show that D > 0. D > 0 holds if G2 < 0 and mi (1  ) (n  2)2G1 +
n2 (n  1)2 FG4 > 0, with the rst condition already proved. The second condition is
equivalent to F >  mi(1 )
n2
(n 2)2
(n 1)2
G1
G4
. Since G1 > 0 and G4 > 0, this condition clearly
is satised and D > 0 holds.
It follows from D > 0 that
(i) T5 > 0 and
(ii) T4 > 0 if 0 < E < 1 and T4 < 0 if E < 0.
42 for  not too close to 0:5 and n not too small
43 for  not too close to 1 and n not too small
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Note that E < 0 is equivalent to
F4 < F < F3
with F4  H
 
1 p1 + J and F3  H  1 +p1 + J and
H  mi(1 )(n 2)[n2(4 1) 2(4+1)(n 1)]
2n2(n 1)[(n 1)(n 4)+8]
J  2(n 1)(n 2)n2[(n 1)(n 4)+8]
[n2(4 1) 2(4+1)(n 1)]2 .
Note that since n2 (4   1)   2 (4 + 1) (n  1) > 0 it holds that H > 0 and J > 0
clearly holds.
It follows from J > 0 that F4 < 0. Hence, it holds that E < 0 and thus T4 < 0 for
F < F3 and E > 0 and thus T4 > 0 for F > F3.
Further, it is easily veried that T5 jF<F3> T5 jF>F3 . We dene T6  T5 jF<F3 .
It follows that
(i) for F < F3, @W@n < 0 if
1
t
< T6 and @W@n > 0 if
1
t
> T6;
(ii) for F > F3, @W@n > 0 if
1
t
< T4 or 1t > T5 and
@W
@n
< 0 if T4 < 1t < T5.
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Proof of Lemma 3.1:
The utility of a safe borrower if she receives a loan from micronance institution A is
given by
UAS = i+ p
2
S[v  
 
1 + rAS

i] + pS (1  pS) [v  
 
1 + rAS

i  AS
 
1 + rAS

i]  tx  d.
The utility of a safe borrower if she receives a loan from micronance institution B is
given by
UBS = i+ p
2
S[v 
 
1 + rBS

i]+ pS (1  pS) [v 
 
1 + rBS

i BS
 
1 + rBS

i]  t (1  x)  d.
Hence, the marginal borrower in the segment of safe borrowers is given by
xS (G;G) =
t ipS [AS (1 pS)(1+rAS )+rAS BS (1 pS)(1+rBS ) rBS ]
2t
.
The utility of a risky borrower if she receives a loan from micronance institution A is
given by
UAR = i+ p
2
R[v  
 
1 + rAR

i] + pR (1  pR) [v  
 
1 + rAR

i  AR
 
1 + rAR

i]  tx  d.
The utility of a risky borrower if she receives a loan from micronance institution B is
given by
UBR = i+p
2
R[v 
 
1 + rBR

i]+pR (1  pR) [v 
 
1 + rBR

i BR
 
1 + rBR

i]  t (1  x) d.
Hence, the marginal borrower in the segment of risky borrowers is given by
xR (G;G) =
t ipR[AR(1 pR)(1+rAR)+rAR BR(1 pR)(1+rBR) rBR ]
2t
.
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Prots of micronance institutions are given as follows:
A(G;G) = xS(G;G)[2p
2
S(1 + r
A
S ) + 2pS(1  pS)(1 + AS )(1 + rAS )  2(1 + c)]i+
(1  )xR(G;G)[2p2R(1 + rAR) + 2pR(1  pR)(1 + AR)(1 + rAR)  2(1 + c)]i
B(G;G) = [1  xS(G;G)][2p2S(1 + rBS ) + 2pS(1  pS)(1 + BS )(1 + rBS )  2(1 + c)]i+
(1 )[1 xR(G;G)][2p2R(1+rBR)+2pR(1 pR)(1+BR)(1+rBR) 2(1+c)]i.
Micronance institutions maximize their prot with respect to interest rates and the
joint liability factors. Note that the following relationships hold:
d(j(G;G))
drjS
!
= 0 is equivalent to
d(j(G;G))
djS
!
= 0
d(j(G;G))
drjR
!
= 0 is equivalent to
d(j(G;G))
djR
!
= 0.
The rst order conditions imply the following equilibrium interest rates dependent on
the joint liability parameters:
rjS (G;G) =
t+(1+c)i pS [1+jS(1 pS)]i
pS [1+
j
S(1 pS)]i
rjR (G;G) =
t+(1+c)i pR[1+jR(1 pR)]i
pR[1+
j
R(1 pR)]i
.
In order to induce self-selection of borrowers into di¤erent contracts o¤ered, the incen-
tive constraints for both safe and risky borrowers must be fullled:
If a group of risky borrowers truly reveals its type, the utility of a group member is
given by
UR (R) = i+ p
2
R[v  
 
1 + rjR (G;G)

i]+
pR (1  pR) [v  
 
1 + rjR (G;G)

i  jR
 
1 + rjR (G;G)

i]  tx  d.
If a group of risky borrowers pretends to be of the safe type, the utility of a group
member is given by
UR (S) = i+ p
2
R[v  
 
1 + rjS (G;G)

i]+
pR (1  pR) [v  
 
1 + rjS (G;G)

i  jS
 
1 + rjS (G;G)

i]  tx  d.
Note that UR (R)  UR (S) > 0 is equivalent to jS > 1pR+pS 1 .44
44We will assume throughout our analysis that pR + pS   1 > 0 holds.
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If a group of safe borrowers truly reveals its type, the utility of a group member is
given by
US (S) = i+ p
2
S[v  
 
1 + rjS (G;G)

i]+
pS (1  pS) [v  
 
1 + rjS (G;G)

i  jS
 
1 + rjS (G;G)

i]  tx  d.
If a group of safe borrowers pretends to be of the risky type, the utility of a group
member is given by
US (R) = i+ p
2
S[v  
 
1 + rjR (G;G)

i]+
pS (1  pS) [v  
 
1 + rjR (G;G)

i  jR
 
1 + rjR (G;G)

i]  tx  d.
Note that US (S)  US (R) > 0 is equivalent to jR < 1pS+pR 1 .
As a consequence, if jR <
1
pS+pR 1 < 
j
S is ensured, self-selection of borrowers into the
di¤erent contracts can be achieved when interest rates are set accordingly.
We now show that rjS (G;G) < r
j
R (G;G) holds for contracts that achieve self-selection
of borrowers. This expression is equivalent to pS[1+
j
S (1  pS)] pR[1+jR (1  pR)] >
0. We now dene jR   1pS+pR 1 with 0 <  < 1. We can then rewrite the ex-
pression as pS (1  pS) [jS (pS + pR   1)   1] + pR (1  pR) (1  ) > 0. Note that
jS (pS + pR   1)  1 > 0 is equivalent to jS > 1pS+pR 1 which holds when the incentive
constraint of the safe borrowers holds.
Hence, we have shown that if jR <
1
pS+pR 1 < 
j
S and r
j
S (G;G) < r
j
R (G;G) holds,
self-selection of borrowers can be achieved.
Note that jR =
1
pS+pR 1 = 
j
S implies r
j
S (G;G) = r
j
R (G;G). In this case, self-selection
of borrowers cannot be achieved.
We now show that equilibria exist both in which self-selection of borrowers is and is
not achieved.
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Case 1: Equilibrium with Contracts that Achieve Self-selection of Borrowers
We will now examine whether micronance institution A has an incentive to devi-
ate from o¤ering contracts that achieve self-selection of borrowers given that mi-
cronance institution B o¤ers contracts that achieve self-selection and, thus, satisfy
BR <
1
pS+pR 1 < 
B
S . We dene 
B
R  B 1pR+pS 1 with 0 < B < 1 and 
B
S  B 1pR+pS 1
with B > 1. Then, interest rates of micronance institution B can be expressed as
rBS

BR = 
B 1
pR+pS 1 ; 
B
S = 
B 1
pR+pS 1

=
t+(1+c)i pS [1+B 1pR+pS 1 (1 pS)]i
pS [1+B
1
pR+pS 1 (1 pS)]i
and
rBR

BR = 
B 1
pR+pS 1 ; 
B
S = 
B 1
pR+pS 1

=
t+(1+c)i pR[1+B 1pR+pS 1 (1 pR)]i
pR[1+
B 1
pR+pS 1 (1 pR)]i
.
Micronance institution A maximizes prot with respect to interest rates and joint
liability parameters. Note that the following relationships hold:
d

A

BR=
B 1
pR+pS 1 ;
B
S=
B 1
pR+pS 1

drAS
!
= 0 is equivalent to
d

A

BR=
B 1
pR+pS 1 ;
B
S=
B 1
pR+pS 1

dAS
!
= 0 and
d

A

BR=
B 1
pR+pS 1 ;
B
S=
B 1
pR+pS 1

drAR
!
= 0 is equivalent to
d

A

BR=
B 1
pR+pS 1 ;
B
S=
B 1
pR+pS 1

dAR
!
= 0.
This gives the equilibrium interest rates of micronance institution A dependent on
the joint liability parameters:
rAS

BR = 
B 1
pR+pS 1 ; 
B
S = 
B 1
pR+pS 1

=
t+(1+c)i pS [1+AS (1 pS)]i
pS [1+
A
S (1 pS)]i
rAR

BR = 
B 1
pR+pS 1 ; 
B
S = 
B 1
pR+pS 1

=
t+(1+c)i pR[1+AR(1 pR)]i
pR[1+
A
R(1 pR)]i
.
If micronance institution A also o¤ers a contract that separates borrowers, it must
hold that AR <
1
pS+pR 1 < 
A
S . We set 
A
R = 
A 1
pR+pS 1 with 0 < 
A < 1 and AS =
A 1
pR+pS 1 with 
A > 1. Then, equilibrium interest rates of micronance institution A
are given by
rAS

AR = 
A 1
pR+pS 1 ; 
A
S = 
A 1
pR+pS 1 ; 
B
R = 
B 1
pR+pS 1 ; 
B
S = 
B 1
pR+pS 1

=
t+(1+c)i pS [1+A 1pR+pS 1 (1 pS)]i
pS [1+A
1
pR+pS 1 (1 pS)]i
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rAR

AR = 
A 1
pR+pS 1 ; 
A
S = 
A 1
pR+pS 1 ; 
B
R = 
B 1
pR+pS 1 ; 
B
S = 
B 1
pR+pS 1

=
t+(1+c)i pR[1+A 1pR+pS 1 (1 pR)]i
pR[1+
A 1
pR+pS 1 (1 pR)]i
.
This results in equilibrium prots of micronance institution A as follows:
A

AR = 
A 1
pR+pS 1 ; 
A
S = 
A 1
pR+pS 1 ; 
B
R = 
B 1
pR+pS 1 ; 
B
S = 
B 1
pR+pS 1

= t.
Let us now look at the case in which micronance institution A o¤ers a contract that
does not achieve self-selection of borrowers, that is, AR =
1
pR+pS 1 = 
A
S . Then,
equilibrium interest rates of micronance institution A are given by
rAS

AR = 
A
S =
1
pR+pS 1 ;
B
R = 
B 1
pR+pS 1 ;
B
S = 
B 1
pR+pS 1

=
t+(1+c)i pS [1+ 1pR+pS 1 (1 pS)]i
pS [1+
1
pR+pS 1 (1 pS)]i
rAR

AR = 
A
S =
1
pR+pS 1 ;
B
R = 
B 1
pR+pS 1 ;
B
S = 
B 1
pR+pS 1

=
t+(1+c)i pR[1+ 1pR+pS 1 (1 pR)]i
pR[1+
1
pR+pS 1 (1 pR)]i
.
This results in equilibrium prots of micronance institution A as follows:
A

AR = 
A
S =
1
pR+pS 1 ;
B
R = 
B 1
pR+pS 1 ;
B
S = 
B 1
pR+pS 1

= t.
Hence, if both micronance institutions o¤er contracts that achieve self-selection, no
incentive exists to deviate by o¤ering a contract that does not achieve self-selection of
borrowers.
Case 2: Equilibrium with Contracts that do Not Achieve Self-selection of Borrowers
We will now examine whether micronance institution A has an incentive to deviate
from o¤ering a contract that does not achieve self-selection of borrowers given that
micronance institution B o¤ers a contract that does not achieve self-selection and,
thus, satises BR =
1
pS+pR 1 = 
B
S . Then, interest rates of micronance institution B
can be expressed as
rBS

BR = 
B
S =
1
pS+pR 1

=
t+(1+c)i pS [1+ 1pR+pS 1 (1 pS)]i
pS [1+
1
pR+pS 1 (1 pS)]i
and
rBR

BR = 
B
S =
1
pS+pR 1

=
t+(1+c)i pR[1+ 1pR+pS 1 (1 pR)]i
pR[1+
1
pR+pS 1 (1 pR)]i
.
Appendix to Chapter 3 118
Micronance institution A maximizes prot with respect to interest rates and joint
liability parameters. Note that the following relationships hold:
d

A

BR=
B
S=
1
pS+pR 1

drAS
!
= 0 is equivalent to
d

A

BR=
B
S=
1
pS+pR 1

dAS
!
= 0
d

A

BR=
B
S=
1
pS+pR 1

drAR
!
= 0 is equivalent to
d

A

BR=
B
S=
1
pS+pR 1

dAR
!
= 0.
This gives the equilibrium interest rates of micronance institution A dependent on
the joint liability parameters:
rAS

BR = 
B
S =
1
pS+pR 1

=
t+(1+c)i pS [1+AS (1 pS)]i
pS [1+
A
S (1 pS)]i
rAR

BR = 
B
S =
1
pS+pR 1

=
t+(1+c)i pR[1+AR(1 pR)]i
pR[1+
A
R(1 pR)]i
.
If micronance institution A also o¤ers a contract that does not achieve self-selection
of borrowers, it must hold that AR =
1
pS+pR 1 = 
A
S . Then, equilibrium interest rates
of micronance institution A are given by
rAS

AR = 
A
S = 
B
R = 
B
S =
1
pR+pS 1

=
t+(1+c)i pS [1+ 1pR+pS 1 (1 pS)]i
pS [1+
1
pR+pS 1 (1 pS)]i
rAR

AR = 
A
S = 
B
R = 
B
S =
1
pR+pS 1

=
t+(1+c)i pR[1+ 1pR+pS 1 (1 pR)]i
pR[1+
1
pR+pS 1 (1 pR)]i
.
This results in equilibrium prots of micronance institution A as follows:
A

AR = 
A
S = 
B
R = 
B
S =
1
pR+pS 1

= t.
Let us now look at the case in which micronance institution A o¤ers a contract that
achieves self-selection of borrowers, that is AR = 
A 1
pR+pS 1 and 
A
S = 
A 1
pR+pS 1 .
Then, equilibrium interest rates of micronance institution A are given by
rAS

AR = 
A 1
pR+pS 1 ;
A
S = 
A 1
pR+pS 1 ;
B
R = 
B
S =
1
pR+pS 1

=
t+(1+c)i pS [1+A 1pR+pS 1 (1 pS)]i
pS [1+A
1
pR+pS 1 (1 pS)]i
rAR

AR = 
A 1
pR+pS 1 ;
A
S = 
A 1
pR+pS 1 ;
B
R = 
B
S =
1
pR+pS 1

=
t+(1+c)i pR[1+A 1pR+pS 1 (1 pR)]i
pR[1+
A 1
pR+pS 1 (1 pR)]i
.
This results in equilibrium prots of micronance institution A as follows:
A

AR = 
A 1
pR+pS 1 ;
A
S = 
A 1
pR+pS 1 ;
B
R = 
B
S =
1
pR+pS 1

= t.
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Hence, if both micronance institutions o¤er contracts that do not achieve self-
selection, no incentive exists for a micronance bank to deviate by o¤ering a contract
that does achieve self-selection of borrowers.
Note that there also exist equilibria in which one micronance institution o¤ers con-
tracts that achieve self-selection of borrowers and the other micronance institution
o¤ers contracts that do not achieve self-selection of borrowers.
Proof of Lemma 3.2:
The utility of a safe borrower if she receives a loan from micronance institution A is
given by
UAS = i+ pS[v  
 
1 + rASR

i]  tx.
The utility of a safe borrower if she receives a loan from micronance institution B is
given by
UBS = i+ pS[v  
 
1 + rBSR

i]  t (1  x).
Hence, the marginal borrower in the segment of safe borrowers is given by
xS (I; I) =
t pS(rARS rBRS)i
2t
.
The utility of a risky borrower if she receives a loan from micronance institution A is
given by
UAR = i+ pR[v  
 
1 + rASR

i]  tx.
The utility of a risky borrower if she receives a loan from micronance institution B is
given by
UBR = i+ pR[v  
 
1 + rBSR

i]  t (1  x).
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Hence, the marginal borrower in the segment of risky borrowers is given by
xR (I; I) =
t pR(rASR rBSR)i
2t
.
Prots of micronance institutions are given as follows:
A (I; I) = 2xS (I; I) [pS
 
1 + rASR

i  (1 + c) i  k]+
2 (1  )xR (I; I) [pR
 
1 + rASR

i  (1 + c) i  k]
B (I; I) = 2[1  xS (I; I)][pS
 
1 + rBSR

i  (1 + c) i  k]+
2 (1  ) [1  xR (I; I)][pR
 
1 + rBSR

i  (1 + c) i  k].
Micronance institutions maximize their prot with respect to interest rates which
results in the following equilibrium interest rates, market shares and prots:
rASR (I; I) = r
B
SR (I; I)  rSR (I; I) = [pS+pR(1 )][k+t+(1+c)i] [p
2
S+(1 )p2R]i
[p2S+(1 )p2R]i
xS (I; I) = xR (I; I) =
1
2
A (I; I) = B (I; I) = t[pS+pR(1 )]
2 (pS pR)2(1 )[k+(1+c)i]
p2S+(1 )p2R
.
Proof of Lemma 3.3:
The utility of a safe borrower if she receives a loan from micronance institution A is
given by
UAS = i+ pS[v  
 
1 + rASR

i]  tx.
The utility of a safe borrower if she receives a loan from micronance institution B is
given by
UBS = i+ p
2
S[v 
 
1 + rBS

i]+ pS (1  pS) [v 
 
1 + rBS

i BS
 
1 + rBS

i]  t (1  x)  d.
Hence, the marginal borrower in the segment of safe borrowers is given by
xS (I;G) =
t+d+pS [r
B
S  rARS+BS (1 pS)(1+rBS )]i
2t
.
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The utility of a risky borrower if she receives a loan from micronance institution A is
given by
UAR = i+ pR[v  
 
1 + rASR

i]  tx.
The utility of a risky borrower if she receives a loan from micronance institution B is
given by
UBR = i+p
2
R[v 
 
1 + rBR

i]+pR (1  pR) [v 
 
1 + rBR

i BR
 
1 + rBR

i]  t (1  x) d.
Hence, the marginal borrower in the segment of risky borrowers is given by
xR (I;G) =
t+d+pR[r
B
R rASR+BR(1 pR)(1+rBR)]i
2t
.
Prots of micronance institutions are given as follows:
A (I;G) = 2xS (I;G) [pS
 
1 + rASR

i  (1 + c) i  k]+
2 (1  )xR (I;G) [pR
 
1 + rASR

i  (1 + c) i  k]
B(I;G) = [1  xS(I;G)][2p2S(1 + rBS ) + 2pS(1  pS)(1 + BS )(1 + rBS )  2(1 + c)]i+
(1  )[1 xR(I;G)][2p2R(1+ rBR)+2pR(1  pR)(1+BR)(1+ rBR)  2(1+ c)]i.
Micronance bank A chooses repayment rates and micronance B both interest rates
and joint liability factors to maximize prot. This results in the following equilibrium
interest rates, market shares and prots:
rASR (I;G) =
[pS+pR(1 )](d+2k+3t+3(1+c)i) 3[p2S+(1 )p2R]i
3[p2S+(1 )p2R]i
rBS (I;G) =
pS [pS+pR(1 )](d+2k+3t+3(1+c)i)+[p2S+(1 )p2R]f3t 3d+3(1+c)i 6pS [1+BS (1 pS)]ig
6pS [p
2
S+(1 )p2R][1+BS (1 pS)]i
rBR (I;G) =
pR[pS+pR(1 )][d+2k+3t+3(1+c)i]+[p2S+(1 )p2R]f3t 3d+3(1+c)i 6pR[1+BR(1 pR)]ig
6pR[p
2
S+(1 )p2R][1+BR(1 pR)]i
xS (I;G) =
2[p2R+(p2S p2R)](d k+3t) (1 )pR(pS pR)[3(1+c)i+d+2k+3t]
12t[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
xR (I;G) =
2[p2R+(p2S p2R)](d k+3t)+pS(pS pR)[3(1+c)i+d+2k+3t]
12t[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
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A (I;G) = 2[pS+pR(1 )]
2(d k+3t)2 9(pS pR)2(1 )[k+(1+c)i][d+3t+(1+c)i]
18t[p2S+(1 )p2R]
B (I;G) = 4[pS+pR(1 )]
2(d k 3t)2+9(pS pR)2(1 )[d t+(1+c)i]2
36t[p2S+(1 )p2R]
.
Note that micronance institution B attains the same prot both if it o¤ers a prot
maximizing contract that achieves self-selection of borrowers and if it o¤ers a prot
maximizing contract that does not achieve self-selection of borrowers given that micro-
nance bank A asks the pooled interest rate rASR (I;G). Hence, again, equilibria exist in
which micronance institution B o¤ers a contract that achieves self-selection or o¤ers
a contract that does not achieve self-selection given that micronance institution A
o¤ers individual loans.
Proof of Proposition 3.3:
Note that
A(I;G)  A(G;G) = 1
18t[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
f2[pR +  (pS   pR)]2 (d  k) (d  k + 6t) 
9 (1  ) (pS   pR)2 [(1 + c)2 i2 + (d+ k + 3t) (1 + c) i+
dk + 3kt+ 2t2]g.
Solving A(I;G)  A(G;G) = 0 for i, we arrive at
i =  d+k+3t
2(1+c)
 1
2(c+1)
q
d2 + k2 + t2   2 (dk   3dt+ 3kt) + 8[pR+(pS pR)]2(d k)(d k+6t)
9(pS pR)2(1 ) .
As we only look at positive values of i, only the larger one of both thresholds is relevant
for our analysis. We dene
i1   d+k+3t2(1+c) + 12(c+1)
q
d2 + k2 + t2   2 (dk   3dt+ 3kt) + 8[pR+(pS pR)]2(d k)(d k+6t)
9(pS pR)2(1 ) .
Furthermore,
d(A(I;G) A(G;G))
di
=  (1 )(pS pR)2(1+c)(d+k+3t+2i+2ci)
2t[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
< 0 and
d2(A(I;G) A(G;G))
di2
=  (1 )(pS pR)2(1+c)2
t[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
< 0.
Hence, A(I;G)  A(G;G) describes a parabola with its maximum at i =  d+k+3t
2(1+c)
.
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It follows from the analysis above that
A(I;G)  A(G;G) > 0 if i < i1 and A(I;G)  A(G;G) < 0 if i > i1.
Note that
A(I; I)  A(G; I) = 1
36t[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
f4[pR +  (pS   pR)]2 (k   d) (d  k   6t) 
9 (1  ) (pS   pR)2 [(c+ 1)2 i2 + 2 (d+ t) (1 + c) i+ d2+
t2 + 4kt  2dt]g.
Solving A(I; I)  A(G; I) = 0 for i, we arrive at
i =   d+t
1+c
 1
(1+c)
q
4t (d  k)  4[pR+(pS pR)]2(d k 6t)(d k)
9(pS pR)2(1 ) .
As we only look at positive values of i, only the larger one of both thresholds is relevant
for our analysis. We dene
i2    d+t1+c + 1(1+c)
q
4t (d  k)  4[pR+(pS pR)]2(d k 6t)(d k)
9(pS pR)2(1 ) .
Furthermore,
d(A(I;G) A(G;G))
di
=  (1 )(pS pR)2(1+c)[d+t+i(1+c)]
2t[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
< 0 and
d2(A(I;G) A(G;G))
di2
=  (1 )(pS pR)2(1+c)2
2t[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
< 0.
Hence, A(I; I)  A(G; I) describes a parabola with its maximum at i =   d+t
1+c
.
It follows from the analysis above that
A(I; I)  A(G; I) > 0 if i < i2 and A(I; I)  A(G; I) < 0 if i > i2.
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Proof of Proposition 3.4:
Solving A(I;G)  A(G;G) = 0 for c, we arrive at
c =  d+k+3t+2i
2i
 1
2i
q
d2 + k2 + t2   2 (dk   3dt+ 3kt) + 8[pR+(pS pR)]2(d k)(d k+6t)
9(1 )(pS pR)2 .
As we only look at positive values of i, only the larger one of both thresholds is relevant
for our analysis. We dene
c1   d+k+3t+2i2i + 12i
q
d2 + k2 + t2   2 (dk   3dt+ 3kt) + 8[pR+(pS pR)]2(d k)(d k+6t)
9(1 )(pS pR)2 .
Furthermore,
d(A(I;G) A(G;G))
dc
=  (1 )(pS pR)2[d+k+3t+2i(1+c)]i
2t[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
< 0 and
d2(A(I;G) A(G;G))
dc2
=  (1 )(pS pR)2i2
t[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
< 0.
Hence, A(I;G) A(G;G) describes a parabola with its maximum at c =  d+k+3t+2i
2i
.
It follows from the analysis above that
A(I;G)  A(G;G) > 0 if c < c1 and A(I;G)  A(G;G) < 0 if c > c1.
Solving A(I; I)  A(G; I) = 0 for c, we arrive at
c =  d+t+i
i
 2
i
q
(d  k) t  [pR+(pS pR)]2(d k 6t)(d k)
9(1 )(pS pR)2 .
As we only look at positive values of i, only the larger one of both thresholds is relevant
for our analysis. We dene
c2   d+t+ii + 2i
q
(d  k) t  [pR+(pS pR)]2(d k 6t)(d k)
9(1 )(pS pR)2 .
Furthermore,
d(A(I;G) A(G;G))
dc
=  (1 )(pS pR)2[d+t+(1+c)i]i
2t[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
< 0 and
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d2(A(I;G) A(G;G))
dc2
=  (1 )(pS pR)2i2
2t[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
< 0.
Hence, A(I; I)  A(G; I) describes a parabola with its maximum at c =  d+t+i
i
.
It follows from the analysis above that
A(I; I)  A(G; I) > 0 if c < c2 and A(I; I)  A(G; I) < 0 if c > c2.
Proof of Proposition 3.5:
(1) Shape of A(G;G)
A(G;G) = t
d(A(G;G))
dt
= 1
d2(A(G;G))
dt2
= 0.
(2) Shape of A(I;G)
A(I;G) = 2[pS+pR(1 )]
2(d k+3t)2 9(pS pR)2(1 )[k+(1+c)i][d+3t+(1+c)i]
18t[p2S+(1 )p2R]
Note, rst, that A(I;G) is not dened at t = 0.
Note, second, that
d(A(I;G))
dt
= [pR+(pS pR)]
2
p2R+(p2S p2R)
  [pR+(pS pR)]2(d k)2
9[p2R+(p2S p2R)]t2
+ (1 )(pS pR)
2[d+(1+c)i][k+(1+c)i]
2[p2R+(p2S p2R)]t2
.
If we solve
d(A(I;G))
dt
= 0 for t, we arrive at
t = 
p
[pR+(pS pR)]2(d k)2  92(1 )(pS pR)2[d+(1+c)i][k+(1+c)i]
3[pR+(pS pR)] .
In order for the above expression to be dened, we assume [pR+  (pS   pR)]2 (d  k)2
  9
2
 (1  ) (pS   pR)2 [d + (1 + c) i][k + (1 + c) i] > 0. In what follows, we will refer
to this assumption as Condition (1).
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Note, third, that
d2(A(I;G))
dt2
= 2
9t3[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
f[pR +  (pS   pR)]2 (d  k)2   92 (1  ) (pS   pR)2
[d+ (1 + c) i][k + (1 + c) i]g > 0 due to Condition (1).
Since we only consider t > 0, A(I;G) must be a parabola with a minimum at
t =
p
[pR+(pS pR)]2(d k)2  92(1 )(pS pR)2[d+(1+c)i][k+(1+c)i]
3[pR+(pS pR)] .
Furthermore, it holds that lim
t!1
d(A(I;G))
dt
= [pR+(pS pR)]
2
p2R+(p2S p2R)
.
Finally, note that [pR+(pS pR)]
2
p2R+(p2S p2R)
< 1 since this expression is equivalent to
  (pS   pR)2 (1  ) < 0. Hence, in the limit, the rst order condition of A(I;G)
approaches [pR+(pS pR)]
2
p2R+(p2S p2R)
, a value that is smaller than the constant rst order condition
of A(G;G) which is equal to 1. As a consequence, it must be true that there is exactly
one intersection of A(I;G) and A(G;G). We now calculate the exact intersection
point.
Calculation of the Intersection Point
Note that A(I;G)  A(G;G) = 0 is equivalent to
t2 + 9(1 )(pS pR)
2[k+(1+c)i] 4[pR+(pS pR)]2(d k)
6(1 )(pS pR)2 t+
9(1 )(pS pR)2[(1+c)2i2+dk+(d+k)(1+c)i] 2[pR+(pS pR)]2(d k)2
18(1 )(pS pR)2 = 0
We dene
B1  9(1 )(pS pR)
2[k+(1+c)i] 4[pR+(pS pR)]2(d k)
6(1 )(pS pR)2
C1  9(1 )(pS pR)
2[(1+c)2i2+dk+(d+k)(1+c)i] 2[pR+(pS pR)]2(d k)2
18(1 )(pS pR)2
Solving the above expression for t, we arrive at
t =  1
2
B1  12
p
B21   4C1.
Due to the above analysis, the larger one of both thresholds is the one that is relevant
for our analysis. We dene
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t1   12B1 + 12
p
B21   4C1.
It follows from the analysis above that A(I;G) > A(G;G) for t < t1 and that
A(I;G) < A(G;G) for t > t1.
(3) Shape of A(I; I)
A(I; I) = t[pS+pR(1 )]
2 (pS pR)2(1 )[k+(1+c)i]
p2S+(1 )p2R
d(A(I;I))
dt
= [pS+pR(1 )]
2
p2S+(1 )p2R
d2(A(I;I))
dt2
= 0.
(4) Shape of A(G; I)
A(G; I) = 4[pS+pR(1 )]
2(d k 3t)2+9(pS pR)2(1 )[d t+(1+c)i]2
36t[p2S+(1 )p2R]
Note, that this is equivalent to
A(G; I) = 
36
f2[p2R+(p2S p2R)](d k 3t) pR(pS pR)(1 )(d+2k+3i+3ci+3t)g2
t[p2R+(p2S p2R)]2
+
1 
36
f2[p2R+(p2S p2R)](d k 3t)+pS(pS pR)(d+2k+3t+3i+3ci)g2
t[p2R+(p2S p2R)]2
Note, rst, that A(G; I) is not dened for t = 0.
Second, note that
d(A(G;I))
dt
=   
36t2[p2R+(p2S p2R)]2
f2[p2R +  (p2S   p2R)] (d  k + 3t)  pR (pS   pR) (1  )
(d+ 2k + 3i+ 3ci  3t)gf2[p2R +  (p2S   p2R)] (d  k   3t)  pR (pS   pR)
(1  ) (d+ 2k + 3i+ 3ci+ 3t)g
  (1 )
36t2[p2R+(p2S p2R)]2
f2[p2R +  (p2S   p2R)] (d  k   3t) + pS (pS   pR)
(d+ 2k + 3i+ 3ci+ 3t)gf3pS[(1 + c) i+ d+ t] (pS   pR) + 2pR
[pR +  (pS   pR)] (d  k + 3t)g.
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We now show that
d(A(G;I))
dt
> 0 holds. Therefore, we use the following four conditions:
Condition (2) follows from xS (I;G) > 0 and is given by
2[p2R +  (p
2
S   p2R)] (d  k + 3t)  pR (pS   pR) (1  ) (d+ 2k + 3t+ 3i+ 3ci) > 0.
From Condition (2) we get Condition (3) which is given by
d  k + 3t > 0.
Condition (4) follows from xS (I;G) < 1 and is given by
2[p2R +  (p
2
S   p2R)] (d  k   3t)  pR (pS   pR) (1  ) (d+ 2k + 3i+ 3ci+ 3t) < 0.
Condition (5) follows from xR (I;G) < 1 and is given by
2[p2R +  (p
2
S   p2R)] (d  k   3t) + pS (pS   pR) (d+ 2k + 3i+ 3ci+ 3t) < 0.
It can be easily seen that these four conditions ensure that
d(A(G;I))
dt
> 0.
Third, note that
d2(A(G;I))
dt2
= 4[pR+(pS pR)]
2(d k)2+9(1 )(pS pR)2(d+i+ci)2
18t3[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
> 0.
Hence, it follows from the above analysis, that A(G; I) is a parabola with a minimum
where only the increasing part of the parabola is of interest for us.
Note, further, that
d(A(G;I))
dt
can be written as
d(A(G;I))
dt
=
3[pR+(pS pR)]2+[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
4[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
  [pR+(pS pR)]2(d k)2
9[p2R+(p2S p2R)]t2
  (pS pR)2(d+i+ci)2(1 )
4[p2R+(p2S p2R)]t2
.
Hence, it holds that lim
t!1
d(A(G;I))
dt
=
3[pR+(pS pR)]2+[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
4[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
.
Note, further, that
3[pR+(pS pR)]2+[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
4[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
> [pS+pR(1 )]
2
p2S+(1 )p2R
is equivalent to
2 (pS   pR)2 (1  ) [p2R +  (p2S   p2R)] > 0. Hence, in the limit, the rst order
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condition of A(G; I) approaches
3[pR+(pS pR)]2+[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
4[p2R+(p2S p2R)]
, a value that is larger
than the constant rst order condition of A(I; I) which is equal to [pS+pR(1 )]
2
p2S+(1 )p2R
.
As a consequence, there must be exactly one intersection point of A(G; I) and
A(I; I) that is interesting for our analysis. To the left of this intersection, it must
hold that A(I; I) > A(G; I) and to the right of this threshold, it must hold that
A(I; I) < A(G; I). We now calculate the exact intersection point.
Calculation of the Intersection Point
A(I; I)  A(G; I) = 0 is equivalent to
t2 + 24[pR+(pS pR)]
2(k d)+3(1 )(pS pR)2[(1+c)i+2k d]
3(1 )(pS pR)2 t+
4[pR+(pS pR)]2(d k)2+9(1 )(pS pR)2[d2+(1+c)2i2+2d(1+c)i]
9(1 )(pS pR)2 = 0.
We dene
B2  24[pR+(pS pR)]2(k d)+3(1 )(pS pR)
2[(1+c)i+2k d]
3(1 )(pS pR)2
C2  4[pR+(pS pR)]2(d k)
2+9(1 )(pS pR)2[d2+(1+c)2i2+2d(1+c)i]
9(1 )(pS pR)2
Solving the above expression for t, we arrive at
t =  1
2
B2  12
p
B22   4C2.
Due to the above analysis, the larger one of both thresholds is the one that is relevant
for our analysis. We dene
t2   12B2 + 12
p
B22   4C2.
It follows from the analysis above that A(I; I) > A(G; I) for t < t2 and that
A(I; I) < A(G; I) for t > t2.
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